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This dissertation integrates economic and sociological approaches to network
organizing to explain the structure and perfonnance of network organizational fonns.
Previous theorizing from economics and sociology linked network organizational
structure to "pairwise" or dyadic assessments oftransaction efficiency and relational
efficacy. Research based on these theories offered only partial understanding of network
organizational perfonnance because this work ignores the impact ofmultiple dyads
interacting simultaneously, which occurs at the network level of analysis.
This study integrates economic and sociological theories, treating them as
interdependent explanations of network structure and perfonnance. Theory is developed
at the network level of analysis, which is necessary to explain the structure and
perfonnance of network organizations. Taking a network governance perspective, I
vformulate a theoretical model predicting the impact of exchange conditions upon the
structure and performance of network organizations. I focus upon a specific variant of
network organizations, "temporary interorganizational networks" (TINs), and develop
and test hypotheses derived from transaction cost economics and from the sociological
perspective focusing on relational embeddedness. I test these hypotheses by constructing
a unique dataset containing comprehensive financial, organizational, and performance
information regarding a population of network organizations during the years 2000-2007.
Each observation in this dataset constitutes a network form designed to address a specific
project, and these observations include both those networks that succeeded and those that
failed.
The study's design overcomes a limitation of prior cross-sectional analyses:
Most prior analyses treat network ties as durable and assume that all ties add value to an
organization. This assumption is challenged by empirical findings suggesting that the
value of a relational tie decays rapidly with time. In contrast, the transient relationships
common in TINs repeatedly form and dissolve over time. By observing both the
formation and dissolution ofties and both successful and unsuccessful interorganizational
networks, this study is among the first to test the full range of network organizational
performance.
My results indicate that exchange conditions significantly affect both the structure
and performance of the network organizational form. Additionally, analyses reliably
predict failure of the network form, which amends and extends prior theory.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The large, vertically integrated companies that arose during the first three-quarters
of the 20th century were organized to deliver efficiently produced goods to a growing
domestic market (Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992). The prevailing organizational
structures gained efficiencies through centralized planning and control mechanisms and
firm boundaries were determined according to whether a transaction was governed more
efficiently inside the firm or in the external market (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975).
Since about 1980, advances in information technology, deregulation and privatization
have changed the rules for strategy (Evans & Wurster, 2000) and allowed companies
access to new forms of capital, technology and skills that simply were not available
previously (Prahalad & Oosterveld, 1999). These changes challenged the traditional
rules of competition (Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001) and an increasing number of
firms are reducing their scope of internal activities in favor of network organizations
(Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992).
Network organizations link competitive success with doing fewer things better
instead of advocating resource accumulation and control (Snow, Miles, & Coleman,
1992). Such organizations require radically different business models and new scholarly
2theorizing about how network organizations interact and how more hierarchical
organizations can transform their business models to compete in a networked economy.
However, the majority of theories used to explain organizational structure and
performance were developed under different economic conditions (Hitt, Ireland, Camp,
& Sexton, 2001). Prior economic conditions were characterized by long-term
relationships between partners, which facilitated the design of more permanent
organizational structures. These organizational structures were characterized by large
manufacturing operations, brick and mortar buildings, long-term contractual
relationships, and extended time horizons. The networked economy has caused a
dramatic reduction in the occurrence of these older organizational structures. Brick and
mortar have been replaced with virtual organizations. Long-term contracts have been
replaced with temporary contracts. Finally, long-term alliances composed of durable
relationships have been replaced by network alliances that last only as long as the current
task. This rapid change in the economic environment suggests our old theories may not
apply or at least need serious revision to explain organizational economics in more
temporary industrial settings.
Due to the disconnect between theories developed for long term organizational
structures and the more temporary nature of some network organizations, we know very
little about the design and performance of these temporary organizational structures
(Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; Snow, Miles, &
Coleman, 1992). Furthermore, due to scholars' anticipation of the positive benefits
derived from a networked economy, there is a bias among researchers that suggests any
3network relationship is positive and results in increasing returns to cooperating parties
(Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; Podolny & Page, 1998). Due to this bias in research,
we know very little about any negative performance or failure associated with network
organizing. Only by examining the full range of network organizational performance can
we be certain about the costs and benefits to network organizations (Podolny & Page,
1998) and begin to adapt existing theories to the emerging networked economy. This gap
in understanding provides the rationale for the dissertation.
Rationale for the Study
The notion that governance structures are designed according to exchange
conditions is not new and has been empirically supported across a wide range of
industries. Even when applied to less permanent organizations, such as strategic alliances
or equity joint ventures, theories of organizational governance consistently held when
studying these less permanent governance structures. However, dramatic changes in the
last twenty years have shortened the temporal duration of many governance structures.
Whereas strategic alliances and joint ventures may shorten the time window from several
decades to several years, these emerging governance structures may last only a few days
(music video production), weeks (film and housing construction), or months (highway
construction). New terminology arose to describe these more ephemeral governance
structures, such as virtual organizations (Davidow & Malone, 1992), temporary project
originations (Bechky, 2006; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008), quasifirms (R.G. Eccles, 1981),
4and modular organizations (Hoetker, 2006; Schilling & Steensma, 2001). The question
remains, do the older theories still apply despite a dramatic reduction in the lifespan of
more temporary organizational forms?
In addition to the shorter temporal duration of network relationships, researchers
have noted a bias in studies of network organizational performance. The overwhelming
majority of research on network organizational forms highlights their functionality and
ignores any dysfunctionality (Podolny & Page, 1998). This has created a selection bias
among organization scholars; namely, scholars report only the beneficial aspects of the
network form at the expense of any costs (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; Podolny &
Page, 1998).
Researchers have suggested that our lack of understanding about the performance
of network organizational forms stems from a lack of data (Podolny & Page, 1998).
Podolny and Page (1998) suggest that in order to examine the full range of performance,
including poor performance and failure, comprehensive data on a population of network
organizations is needed. While I agree with these authors that such data are difficult to
obtain, I disagree with their assertion that the empirical gap constitutes the primary
limitation to our understanding of network organizational performance.
The more limiting characteristic is theoretical, and arises from a mismatch
between levels of analysis. Scholars continue to explain network level performance
using dyad-level relationships. This is likely due to the availability of reliable data at the
dyad level, but in order to advance a more robust theory of networks, we must think
differently about networks (Salancik, 1995) and move the level of analysis up to the
5network level (Gu1ati & Gargiulo, 1999; Walter W. Powell, White, Koput, & Jason,
2005; Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). The network level of analysis involves the
aggregation of multiple dyads interacting simultaneously (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007).
This dissertation introduces a new construct, Aggregate Tie Strength (ATS), that resolves
the inconsistency between levels of analysis, and it leverages a unique dataset that
contains a broad range of financial, organizational and performance data across a
population of network organizations.
To summarize, my research design finesses a conundrum that has plagued prior
research, the fact that only those organizations that succeeded and survived are usually
available to be studied. In contrast, I will observe the entire set of potential network
designs - viable and nonviable alike. These data will allow me to bring an empirical test
to a series of hypotheses linking the design of network organizations to fine-grained
measures of their performance. This study has the potential to significantly advance our
understanding of the costs and benefits of network organizations. Through a series of
research questions, I unpack the design and performance ofthe network organizational
form. The next section presents these questions and objectives for the study.
Research Questions and Objectives for the Study
For a governance form to persist, it must address the problems of adapting,
coordinating and safeguarding exchanges more efficiently than other governance forms
(Williamson, 1991). Transaction cost economics (TeE) has been the dominant
theoretical perspective to examine the structure and performance of governance forms.
6TCE "is grounded upon a legal understanding oforganizations as governance
mechanisms distinct from markets" (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005, p. 492). Under TCE, the
firm boundary is determined by asking whether conducting a transaction inside the firm
or externally in the market most reduces the sum ofproduction costs and governance
costs (Williamson, 1985b). Governance costs include monitoring operations, allocating
requirements for production, initial contractual agreements, and setting up initial
procedures for exchange (Mayer & Salomon, 2006).
However, TCE has come under fire from sociologists, who argue that transaction
efficiency arguments are "under socialized" (M. Granovetter, 1985). Sociologists argue
that all economic transactions are embedded within a wider network of social
relationships and that governance structures arise from these embedded relationships in
addition to economic considerations (M. Granovetter, 1985). This is particularly the case
in networked economies, where the shorter temporal duration of economic exchanges
increases the influence of social relationships (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Walter
W. Powell, 1990). Sociologists define the quality of relationships between firms
according to the level of relational embeddedness between partners. Relational
embeddedness refers to the degree to which exchange parties know of and consider one
another's needs and goals (M. Granovetter, 1992). From a sociological perspective,
relational embeddedness drives organizational form at least as much as economic
concerns. Reconciling these competing theories is necessary to fully explain the
structure and performance of network governance.
7By treating economic and sociological explanations of organizational structure as
interdependent, this dissertation develops a new theoretical framework capable of
explaining network governance. I begin with a research question that investigates how
exchange conditions affect the structure of temporary interorganizational networks.
From an economic perspective, exchange conditions drive the design of network
structures, which involves selecting network partners to match an opportunity. Economic
perspectives suggest that firms select partners to reduce production and transaction costs
according to factors that align exchange conditions with the cumulative capabilities found
among a network's partners. Examining the effect of exchange conditions on network
structure supports the following research question.
RQ: How do exchange conditions affect the structure of the network
organizational form?
Once these antecedents of network organizational structure are determined,
investigating the effectiveness of these structures is the next goal of the study. Exchange
conditions will drive partner selection initially, and the resulting network structures will
vary in their relational embeddedness. The next research question examines how
network structure interacts with exchange conditions to affect the performance of these
governance structures. By examining variation in network governance structure across a
population of network organizational forms, I unpack the interactions between exchange
conditions, network governance structure, and performance. Examining these
interactions supports the following research question.
8RQ: How do exchange conditions and network organizational structure interact
to affect the performance of networks as a form of governance?
My final research question examines the longitudinal impact of learning across a
population of network organizations. Several scholars have touted the learning benefits
of network organizational forms (Dore, 1983; Hamel, 1991a; Walter W. Powell, 1990;
Uzzi, 1997), but these studies attribute benefits to individual firms participating in a
network and largely ignore learning behaviors among and between networks. Studying
learning at the network level of analysis ties with behavioral learning (Starbuck &
Hedberg, 2001) and with population level learning (J. A. Baum & Berta, 1999; Miner &
Anderson, 1999; Miner & Haunschild, 1995). Behavioral learning theories suggest
learning arises from automatic reactions to performance feedback. Behavioral
approaches portray learning as a mechanistic and involuntary process, where learners
continue behaviors that produce pleasant outcomes and discontinue behaviors that lead to
unpleasant outcomes (Starbuck & Hedberg, 2001). A primary advantage to behavioral
learning is that behavioral theories can explain how learning occurs even when
information about individual managers' perceptions is unavailable. For this reason,
behavioral learning is often used to explain population level learning. Population level
learning investigates how behaviors by firms with shared experience may affect a
transformation of behaviors across that population of firms (Miner & Haunschild, 1995).
For this study, I examine whether and how a population of network organizations learns
over time.
9RQ: How does learning by individual organizations affect a transformation of
behaviors across a population of network organizations?
Defining Network Governance
Contrary to purely sociological treatments of network organizational forms that
emphasize informal agreements between cooperating parties with shared norms and
values (for detailed reviews, see Podolny and Page, 1998; Borgatti and Foster, 2003),
network governance refers to contractual agreements between autonomous parties that
may have entirely different norms and values. Additionally, network governance
structures vary in their temporal dimensions. Some structures are designed for longer
periods, such as R&D alliances, while others are designed for much shorter durations,
such as film production, construction projects, and disaster relief (Jones & Lichtenstein,
2008). Since governance structures aim to match the characteristics ofa project with
those of the firm and the external environment, these structures are designed for specific
opportunities and re-designed for others. This study defines network governance
according to Jones et aI., (1997) and their definition and rationale are offered below.
Network governance involves a "select, persistent, and structured set of
autonomous firms engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open
ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard
exchanges" (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). These authors clarify what they mean by
"implicit and open-ended contracts" as follows (Page 916):
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To be sure, fonna1 contracts may exist between some pairs of members, but those
do not define the relationships between all parties. For example, in a film project,
both the cinematographer and the editor may have contracts with the studio, but
these contracts do not specify the relationship between the two subcontractors.
These authors go on to clarify the nature of these project specific relationships:
"Network governance is composed of finns that operate like a single entity (when
required) '" in other domains these finns may be fierce competitors" (Jones et al. 1997:
916). These authors cite the film industry as emblematic of network governance (page
916):
Here, film studios, producers, directors, cinematographers, and a host of other
contractors join, disband, and rejoin in varying combinations to make films.
Network governance comprises a select subset of film studios and subcontractors.
The seven major film studios repeatedly use and share among their films an elite
set of subcontractors who constitute 3 percent (459 of the 12,400) of those
registered in guilds (Jones & Hesterly, 1993).... Structured relations among
subcontractors and film studios are based on a division of labor: film studios
finance, market, and distribute films, whereas numerous subcontractors with
clearly defined roles and professions (e.g., producer, director, cinematographer,
and editor) create the film.
To summarize, network governance is an organizational fonn that persists under
specific exchange conditions (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997), involves autonomous
finns that join, disband and rejoin in varying combinations over time, and involves
specific coordination mechanisms guided by contractual relationships between some
finns (a studio and a cinematographer) and socially embedded (non-contractual)
relationships among others (a cinematographer and an editor). In order to empirically
examine the structure and perfonnance of these organizational fonns, data on a
population of network organizations is needed (Podo1ny & Page, 1998). Below I briefly
11
describe a population of network organizations, bridge construction organizations in
Oregon, from which I obtained organizational, financial, and performance data down to
the level of each individual network partner.
Describing the Research Setting and Previewing Results
The ideal setting to investigate network governance, as defined for this study,
would include a persistent and structured set of autonomous firms that join, disband and
rejoin network organizations according to the characteristics of an opportunity (Jones,
Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). While Jones et al. (1997) choose the film industry as
emblematic ofmany of the requirements for network governance, I choose the bridge
construction industry in Oregon. Much like the film industry, bridge construction firms
and their subcontractors are autonomous units that regularly join, disband and rejoin
networks; however, the bridge construction industry introduces an additional industry-
wide control that facilitates testing the performance of these governance structures.
Because bridge construction is largely funded by the federal government, federal
regulations only permit a contract to be awarded to a general contractor with the lowest
overall cost for completing a bridge. This low-cost requirement enhances this empirical
setting by controlling for strategy across all organizations.
In addition to the low cost requirement imposed on bridge construction
organizations in Oregon, several other controls are present in this research setting. First,
there is no product variation and each competing organization has near perfect
information of product characteristics in the form of engineering blue-prints and proj ect
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specifications. Second, there is only one customer - the Oregon Department of
Transportation. Third, technology does not vary widely within the industry - cranes and
bulldozers are uniformly available and their functionality has remained consistent for
decades. Thus, organizations within this industry do not vary widely due to product
innovation, customer innovations, technology innovations, or strategy_ The largest
source of variation among organizations in this industry is how they organize their
governance structure.
In closing, I will reinforce one final and unique feature of this research setting-
its data. These data include comprehensive financial, organizational, and performance
information (down to the level of each individual network partner) on over 1600 detailed
proposals that bridge construction firms submitted in response to requests for proposals to
construct approximately 330 state highway bridges during the years 2000-2007. Each of
the 1600 proposals in this dataset specifies a network governance structure for addressing
a specific project, and these data cover both those proposals that succeeded in being
selected, and those that failed to be selected. Thus, my research design addresses a
shortcoming that has plagued prior research, the fact that only those organizations that
succeeded and survived are usually available to be studied. In contrast, I observe the
entire set of potential network designs - viable and nonviable alike.
To preview my results, exchange conditions significantly affect both the
performance and structure of network governance. Regarding learning, it appears
network organizations learn more from failure than from success, echoing earlier findings
about individuals and firms (Starbuck & Hedberg, 2001). Perhaps most interesting to
13
network organization scholars, the design of network governance structures does have a
dark side. Failure among network organizations occurs when they disregard exchange
conditions and fall victim to network inertia. Repeated network structures that become
rigid and do not adapt to exchange conditions are significantly and negatively related to
performance.
Organization and Outline of the Study
This study proceeds as follows. I begin with a review of the literature on
organizational forms. This literature has its roots in organizational economics (Coase,
1937; Williamson, 1975), but economic viewpoints are becoming increasingly challenged
by sociological perspectives. These perspectives include how relational embeddedness
(Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; M. Granovetter, 1985, 1992) affects economic transactions and
how changes in economies have caused new organizational forms to emerge (Walter W.
Powell, 1990). I conclude by emphasizing three prominent gaps in the literature and
how this study closes them. Next, Chapter III provides a theoretical framework to
investigate how exchange conditions affect network organizational structure and
performance. Chapter III also presents hypotheses to test these relationships. Chapter
IV outlines the research methodology. Chapter IV begins with a detailed description of
the research method, empirical setting, sample design, and data collection that allow me
to bring the hypotheses to a valid empirical test. I describe the operationalization of
variables and conclude Chapter N with a framework for statistical analysis. Chapter V
offers the results from empitical testing, the findings from the study, and discusses
14
limitations. I conclude with Chapter VI where I review the findings and discuss both
research and managerial implications.
15
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the last twenty years or so has seen rapid
changes in economic environments that have altered the rules for strategy (Evans &
Wurster, 2000) and allowed companies access to new forms of capital, technology and
skills that simply were not available previously (Prahalad & Oosterveld, 1999). These
new economic conditions challenge the traditional rules of competition (Hitt, Ireland,
Camp, & Sexton, 2001) and an increasing number of network organizational forms are
emerging in response to these changes in competitive environments (Bradach & Eccles,
1989; Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992). These organizations are de-layered, downsized,
and operated through a network of market-sensitive business units, rather than through
large hierarchies (Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992). Such organizations require radically
different organizational structures and new scholarly theorizing about the emergence,
persistence and performance of network organizational forms.
This chapter summarizes three theoretical perspectives that provide the
conceptual underpinnings of this dissertation: Organization Theory, Transaction Cost
Economics and Sociology. Each of these perspectives explains why organizations may
exist, and why we observe variation in organizational forms. However, each does so
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from a different viewpoint, with different theoretical foundations, and largely in
competition with the other two perspectives. Due to these differences, we know quite a
bit about how these perspectives independently explain organizational forms (Walter W.
Powell, 1990), but we know much less about any interdependence between these
perspectives (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). This literature review revisits prior,
independent explanations of organizational forms and investigates how integrating prior
theorizing can explain the emergence, persistence and performance of the network
organizational form.
This chapter is organized into five main sections. The first section explains the
selection of these three perspectives, arguing they are particularly well suited to an
exploration of the processes and outcomes ofthe network form of organization. The
second, third and fourth sections review past theorizing about organizational forms from
organization theory (aT), transaction cost economics (TCE), and sociology. The
conclusion of section four introduces Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti' s (1997) concept of
network governance. Network governance integrates theoretical components from aT,
TCE and sociology to explain the emergence, persistence and performance ofthe
network form of organization. Section five amends and extends Jones et al. (1997).
Section five begins by summarizing important gaps in understanding and then describes
how this dissertation aims to close them.
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Three Perspectives on Organizational Forms
In the early twentieth century, scholars began theorizing about universal concepts
in organizing. For example, Taylor (1911) featured an engineering approach and
proposed formulating work systems from the bottom up. By beginning with the nuts and
bolts and gradually addressing the motion of workers, sequencing of tasks, packaging of
tasks into jobs and the arrangement ofjobs into departments, early "engineers" of
organization science, like Taylor provided a foundation for studying operations that is
still used today (Scott, 2004). Next, managerial scientists, such as Fayol (1919) viewed
organizations from the top down and began devising principles for subdividing and
organizing complex tasks (Scott, 2004). Weber (1947) first articulated the characteristics
of bureaucracy, such as clearly defined hierarchies, positions and rules. Each of these
scholars promoted a universalistic agenda and believed their ideas should translate to all
organizations. Additionally, a common characteristic of this early theorizing was to
ignore the influence of the external environment or at least to hold it constant (Miles &
Snow, 1978). While ignoring the environment simplified early Gonceptions of
bureaucracy, it did not explain organizational adaptation and change very well. This
practice began to change when social scientists viewed the organization itself as an
interesting variable.
Social scientists who study organizations and management have devoted much
thought to the impact of organizational structures (and organizational forms) upon the
attitudes and work performance of organizational members. Largely classified as
organization theorists, this field was interdisciplinary from the outset. Two academic
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centers drove the emergence of organization theory, the Carnegie Institute of Technology
and Columbia University (Scott, 2004). The Carnegie Institute was composed of political
scientists, economists and psychologists. Led by the work of Herbert Simon (1947) and
March and Simon (1958), among others, their contributions raised the level of analysis to
the organization. Their ideas were grounded in "bounded rationality," which nicely
linked arguments of purpose and intended rationality with the recognition that cognitive
and social constraints restricted rational action (Scott, 2004). Columbia University, led
by Merton (1949), promoted an idea of the "unintended consequences of purposive
action," which Merton's junior scholars expanded to include differences between public
and private organizing (Selznick, 1949) and how individual bureaucracies designed to
solve one problem give rise to other problems (Blau, 1955). Collectively, these scholars
theorized that an interaction between intended economic rationality and social constraints
affected both the structure and performance of organizations.
Beginning in the late 1950s and into the 1960s, contingency theorists promoted
that the proper alignment between an organization and its environment (Bums & Stalker,
1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) affects organizational performance. Rather than
treating the internal mechanisms as independent variables that can be easily manipulated
(Taylor, 1911; Weber, 1947), contingency theorists treat internal structures as dependent
variables whose structure is largely determined by factors in the environment (Miles &
Snow,1978). The incorporation of an organization's environment as a critical predictor
of organizational form continues to be a major thrust within organization theory,
economics and sociology. By changing organizational forms into an outcome of interest,
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organization scholars cemented their perspective as critical to future discussions of
organizational forms.
Scholars in the area of strategic management have an overriding interest in one
particular outcome - organizational performance. Organizational performance is largely
a study about firm boundaries and determining the proper location of a organization's
boundary is critical to performance (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Transaction cost
economics is the dominant theoretical perspective that explains the locus of firm
boundaries. TCE "is grounded upon a legal understanding of organizations as
governance mechanisms distinct from markets" (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005, p. 492).
Under TCE, the firm boundary is determined by asking whether conducting a transaction
inside the firm or externally in the market most reduces governance costs. Governance
costs include monitoring operations, allocating requirements for production, setting up
initial contractual agreements, and setting up initial procedures for exchange (Mayer &
Salomon, 2006; Williamson, 1975).
While transaction cost economics has been the dominant theoretical platform for
determining the boundary of the firm, scholars increasingly believe that determining the
locus of firm boundaries is less dependent on economics than previously theorized.
Increasingly, scholars recognize that determining firm boundaries is more nuanced and
socially motivated (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). By incorporating social elements into
firm boundary decisions, scholars can better explain why organizational boundaries may
differ under similar economic conditions. For example, Granovetter criticizes TCE as
"under socialized" (M. Granovetter, 1985) and argues that economic transactions are
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highly constrained by ongoing social relations and should not be viewed solely as an
attempt by atomistic actors to maximize transaction efficiency. Granovetter cemented his
position that economic and social motivations are interdependent, stating: "to construe
them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding" (1985, p. 482). Thus, transaction
cost economics and social relationships represent two critical theoretical platforms to
study organizational boundaries. In particular, the interdependence of economics and
sociology may better explain why there is variation in organizational form, and how this
variation affects organizational performance.
To summarize, organization theory, transaction cost economics, and sociology
each explains why organizational forms exist and why there is variation among
organizations operating in similar environments. Each of these theoretical perspectives
on organizational forms began more than fifty years ago and none of them could have
predicted the changes in the economic environment over the last twenty years (Achrol &
Kotler, 1999; Evans & Wurster, 2000; Ritt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001; Prahalad &
Oosterveld, 1999). In order to explain how these radical and recent changes in the
competitive environment affect organizational structure and performance, this
dissertation borrows critical ideas from each perspective. A combination of these
perspectives is necessary to explain the emergence and performance of network forms of
organization (Jones, Resterly, & Borgatti, 1997). In sections two, three, and four, I
provide a history of organizational forms from each perspective, followed by a new
theoretical perspective that integrates components from each theory - network
governance.
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Organization Theory: Early Perspectives, Contingency Theory, and Neo-
Contingency Perspectives
The history of organization theory can be generally understood as beginning with
a search for universalistic rules - all organizations are the same (Fayo1, 1919; Weber,
1947) - and evolving into a search for variation among organizations - all organizations
are different (Bums & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). The search for
variation among organizational forms began with contingency theory (Bums & Stalker,
1961), which suggests that proper organizational form "depends on the situation." Early
contingency theorists offered a deterministic view of alignment between organizational
structure and its task environment as predicting success. While interesting, this
perspective largely ignored the decision making of managers. Subsequent theorizing
increased the importance of managerial decisions and promoted a coalignment between
environment and organization, which led to the development of organizational strategy as
a field of research. Below I describe this journey from environmental determinism to
organizational strategy and the ascendance of decision-making as a key component of
organization structure and performance.
In the early twentieth century, scholars began theorizing about universal concepts
in organizing, which largely ignored any environmental influences. For example, Taylor
(1911) featured an engineering approach and proposed formulating work systems from
the bottom up. By beginning with the nuts and bolts and gradually addressing the motion
of workers, sequencing of tasks, packaging oftasks into jobs and the arrangement ofjobs
into departments, these early "engineers" of organization science provide a foundation for
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studying operations that is still used today (Scott, 2004). Next, managerial scientists,
such as Fayo1 (1919) viewed organizations from the top down and began devising
principles for subdividing and organizing complex tasks (Scott, 2004). Weber (1947)
first articulated the characteristics ofbureaucracy, such as clearly defined hierarchies,
positions and rules. Each of these scholars promoted a universalistic agenda and believed
their ideas should translate to all organizations. Further, a common characteristic of this
early theorizing was to ignore the influence of the external environment or to at least hold
it constant (Miles & Snow, 1978). This practice began to change when social scientists
viewed the organization itself as an interesting variable.
A primary criticism of universalistic theories of organizing was the inability of
bureaucracies to explain organizational adaptations to individuals and the external
environment (Miles & Snow, 1978). Burns and Stalker (1961) offered a contingent
model of organizational forms. These authors noticed that organizations operating in
stable environments generally had a mechanistic structure while successful organizations
in more dynamic environments had flexible or organic organizational structures (Bums &
Stalker, 1961). Spurred by these findings, contingency theorists in the 1960s promoted
that proper alignment between an organization and its environment leads to greater
organizational performance (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Rather than treating the internal
mechanisms as independent variables that can be easily manipulated (Taylor, 1911;
Weber, 1947), contingency theorists treat internal structures as dependent variables
whose structure is largely determined by factors in the environment (Miles & Snow,
1978). By changing organizational form into an outcome of interest, organization
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scholars cemented their perspective as critical to future discussions of organizational
forms.
Contingency Theory and the Role of Organizational Environment
The incorporation of an organization's environment as a critical predictor of
organizational form continues to be a major thrust of organization theory. An
organization's environment was originally conceptualized by Emery and Trist (1965)
according to the degree of interconnectedness and the extent of change in an
environment. Emery and Trist (1965) classified organizational environments in
ascending order of environmental change and uncertainty: (1) placid-randomized, (2)
placid-clustered, (3) disturbed-reactive, and (4) turbulent. Subsequent theorizing further
developed the interplay between an organization's environment and decision-making by
managers; including the role of environmental uncertainty on decision-making (Duncan,
1972) and how an organization's task environment (Thompson, 1967) or specific
environment (Dill, 1958) affect the types of goal setting and goal attainment pursued.
Over time, the task environment emerged as the primary determinant of organizational
form as it contains "the primary set of forces to which an organization must respond"
(Miles & Snow, 1978, p. 253). This important step in understanding challenged
deterministic viewpoints that managers did not matter and opened the door for fresh
theorizing about causes ofvariation in organizational form.
In addition to environmental variables that predict organizational forms,
contingency theorists have suggested that technology is a contingency variable worth
studying. Beginning with Woodward (1965), organization scholars aligned contingent
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organizational structures with the presence oftechnologies. For example, Woodward
(1965) suggested that small-batch technologies facilitate adaptation because they required
lower amounts aflabor and capital intensity. Mass-production technologies require an
interim amount of labor and capital intensity. In contrast, she theorized that continuous
process-technology was highly labor and capital intensive. The amount of organizational
structure increases with capital and labor intensity, with the less administrative control in
small-batch processes and the greatest administrative or hierarchical control in
continuous volume production (Woodward, 1965).
Technology introduces specific coordination demands for organizations. Each
type oftechnology must be coordinated differently and these coordination demands are
reflected in an organization's structure (Miles & Snow, 1978). Additionally, the degree
of task uncertainty, work flow interdependence (Thompson, 1967) and sub-unit size
affect the type of coordination that is most effective (Van de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig,
1976). In sum, contingency theories that emphasize technology suggest coordination
mechanisms are driven by technological features, and these coordination mechanisms
drive organizational structure (Miles & Snow, 1978).
To summarize, the contingency perspective arose from a dissatisfaction with
universalistic theories of organizational forms (Miles & Snow, 1978). Contingency
perspectives espouse an "it depends" mantra for correct organizational form: The
characteristics of the external task environment and internal technologies drive the
structure of organizations. However, the contingency perspective's explanatory power is
limited by its laissez fair attitude about organizational forms. The "it depends" mantra
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suggests that 'every situation is different' making contingency theory atheoretical in that
it provides even less guidance than the universalistic assumptions that' every situation is
the same' (Miles & Snow, 1978, p. 259). While contingency theory made the important
leap to incorporate a firm's task environment into the discussion, the deterministic nature
of contingency theory ignores the role of managerial choice in the structure and design of
organizational forms. This shortcoming led to neo-contingency theories that highlight the
role of managerial choice in the structure of organizations (Miles & Snow, 1978).
Neo-Contingency Theory and the Role of Managerial Choice
Neo-contingency theory aims to elucidate the roles that managers and decision-
making have in the structure of organizations. Beginning with Thompson (1967),
scholars suggested the deterministic nature of contingency theory did not fully explain
organizational structure nor did it effectively explain variation in organizational structure
under similar environmental and technological conditions (c. R. Anderson & Paine,
1975; Child, 1972; Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer, 1974). Rather than emphasizing
environmental alignment or technological coordination mechanisms as key determinants
of organizational structure, these authors suggested that managerial decision making is
the key link between external environmental characteristics and internal organizational
structure.
For example, Weick (1977) suggested organizational environments are shaped by
managerial decisions or managerial enactment. Because of bounded rationality, Weick
(1977) argued that managers focus on a limited portion of their environment, interpret
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what infonnation they can, and then make decisions that simultaneously transfonn their
organization while also changing the organizational environment via feedback
mechanisms. The process of creating an organizational environment through enactment
is never-ending and involves "the coalignment of the organization with a continually
evolving network of environmental constraints and opportunities" (Miles and Snow,
1978: 261). The concept of organizational strategy, which began at Harvard Business
School in the late 1950s, directly examines this coalignment between organizations and
their environment (Miles and Snow, 1978).
As described above, the outcome of greatest interest to strategy scholars is
organizational perfonnance. Early ideas centered on the perfonnance of individual
organizations and included studies of long-range planning and organizational
perfonnance (Rue & Fulmer, 1972; Steiner, 1969; Thune & House, 1970; Warren, 1966),
the impact of an incremental approach to policy-making and budgeting on perfonnance
(Wildavsky, 1964; Wildavsky & Hammond, 1965), decision-making among dominant
coalitions (Aguilar, 1967; Bower, 1970; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976), and
the relationship between a manager's personal values and strategy (Guth & Tagiuri,
1965; Hage & Dewar, 1973). As the concept of organizational strategy matured, the
concept of coalignment between the organizational environment, technology, and finn
capabilities came to prominence. Critical extensions of OT-based coalignment were
made by Mintzberg (1978) who theorized that strategy was a pattern of decisions that
affect both the structure and perfonnance of organizations. Mintzberg also linked the
power of managerial decision to the pattern of strategy fonnulation, stating: "the strategy
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maker may formulate his strategy through a conscious process, or strategy may form
gradually as he makes decisions one by one" (Mintzberg, 1978).
The importance of Mintzberg's (1978) conceptualization is emphasized in Miles
and Snow (1978:262): "This view of strategy emphasizes the dynamics of organizational
behavior, admits the possibility of multiple causation among organizational
characteristics and environmental conditions and focuses attention on the role of
managerial choice in achieving coalignment - something conspicuously absent in
(previous) contingency theories." The conceptualization of organizational strategy as
coalignment of multiple organizational and environmental characteristics allowed the
science of strategy to become "a tangible and researchable phenomenon" (Miles and
Snow, 1978: 262).
To summarize, the contributions of organization theory to the study of
organizational forms, four critical contributions stand out: (1) organizational structure as
an outcome variable that can be predicted from a variety of environmental, technological
and strategic factors, (2) the task environment as a driver of organizational structure, (3)
the interplay between environmental change and organizational enactment, and (4) the
role of managerial decision-making in organizational structure, strategy, and process.
In the years since neo-contingency theory, scholars increasingly explained
organizational performance from the lens of economics, with transaction cost economics
being the dominant perspective (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Transaction cost
economics bases the locus of a firm's boundary with its task environment upon a
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manager's discretion, and provides link between organization theory and neoclassical
economIcs.
In the next section, I introduce transaction cost economics, the second theoretical
foundation upon which I draw. Transaction cost economics shares many similarities with
organization theory, but also has fundamental differences. Whereas organization theory
largely defines organizations via their technological, environmental, and decision-making
characteristics, TeE promotes a legal view of firms as a nexus of contracts, a result of
property rights considerations, and a legal structure distinct from its external
environment.
Transaction Cost Economics: Organizing for Economic Efficiency
Transaction costs economics promotes an efficiency perspective for
organizational forms and is grounded upon a legal understanding of organizations as
governance mechanisms distinct from markets (Williamson, 1975). Under the efficiency
perspective, the firm boundary is determined by asking whether conducting a transaction
inside the firm or externally in the market most reduces the sum of production and
governance costs. Governance costs include monitoring operations, allocating
requirements for production, initial contractual agreements, and setting up initial
procedures for exchange (Mayer & Salomon, 2006; Williamson, 1975). Hierarchical
governance has advantages over market governance, such as decision and property rights
that enable the use of fiat, alignment of incentives, and monitoring of managerial actions
to efficiently govern transactions (S.E. Masten, 1991). Markets offer competitive
29
pressures to reduce production costs (M. E. Porter, 1985), but also increase monitoring
costs (Williamson, 1985b) and can increase fears of misappropriation (Oxley, 1999). In
sum, the firm boundary should be set at the point that minimizes the cost of governing
activities (Coase, 1937).
Beginning with the writings ofCoase (1937) and Commons (1934), scholars
began to recognize the transaction as the fundamental unit ofmicroeconomic analysis
(Mahoney, 2005). Coase (1937) viewed firms and markets as alternative means for
organizing similar types of transactions. Coase (1937) argued that the operation of
markets costs something, and by organizing transactions within a firm, entrepreneurs can
reduce some of the costs ofmarket contracting. Commons (1934) extended theorizing of
economic organization beyond being a mere response to technological features -
economies of scale, economies of scope, and other physical or technical aspects of
markets. Commons disagreed and suggested organizations "often have the purpose of
harmonizing relations between parties who are otherwise in actual or potential conflict"
(Commons, 1934, p. 6). Although these ideas went largely unnoticed until the 1970s,
subsequent theorizing by Williamson and others promoted the idea that "economic
organization has the purpose ofpromoting continuity of relationships by devising
specialized governance structures, rather than permitting relationships to fracture under
the hammer of unassisted market contracting" (Williamson, 1985b, p. 3). These
discussions established that "organizational form matters a great deal, and in doing so
moved the economics of organization much closer to the fields oflaw, organization
theory, and business history" (Walter W. Powell, 1990, p. 296).
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Initial extensions of Coase (1937) and Commons (1934) focused on organizations
as substitutes for failures in the price mechanism of markets - which puzzled leading
scholars ofthe time. Chester Barnard (1938, p. 4) suggested organizational fonns were
not simply a substitute for market failures, but rather a "conscious, deliberate and
purposeful" cooperation among men. The cooperative efforts were intendedly rational,
but limited due to physical, biological and social factors (Barnard, 1938, pp. 12-45).
Friederich Hayek (1945) challenged a prevailing view that market prices served as
signals carrying sufficient infonnation to allow managers to rationally assess and
complete transactions. Hayek (1945, pp. 523-524) believed that organizations served as
adaptive systems to protect exchanges, and that simply focusing on "statistical aggregates
(prices) ignored the impact of idiosyncratic knowledge" that serves as the basis for
adaptive action. These authors anticipated the subsequent theoretical fonnulation of
bounded rationality (Simon, 1947), a critical element in the emergence and persistence of
organizational fonns (Williamson, 1975).
Building on the work ofHayek and Barnard, Arrow (1963) described finns and
markets as alternative instruments for organizing economic activity. Arrow noted that
while the boundary of the finn is commonly theorized as a line across which only price-
mediated transactions take place, the economic content of both price-mediated (market)
and internal transactions are 0 ften similar (Kenneth J Arrow, 1971). Arrow (1971)
further conceived of the locus of a finn's boundary as a decision variable. The decision
of where to locate boundaries considers economic variables and the context within which
the integrity of trading parties is considered (Kenneth Joseph Arrow, 1974).
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Williamson (1975) built upon Arrow's insight and extended his arguments. By
considering the integrity of trading parties, transaction efficiency is inextricably linked to
behavioral uncertainty in the form of opportunism. Williamson (1975:255) describes
opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile; agents who are skilled at dissembling
realize transaction advantages. Economic man ... is thus a more subtle and devious
creature than the usual self-interest seeking assumption reveals." Due to risks of
opportunism associated with market contracting, specific investment, and uncertainty;
several governance costs arise including monitoring operations, allocating requirements
for production, setting up initial contractual agreements, and setting up initial procedures
for exchange (Mayer & Salomon, 2006; Williamson, 1975). Williamson (1975)
suggested that due to the interdependence of pricing, uncertainty, and opportunism, it is
not enough to simply question whether internal or market organization of transactions is
preferred, but also which type of organizational form is to be employed (Mahoney, 2005).
Williamson (1991) conceived a continuum of organizational forms, with market
and hierarchical governance at opposite poles. Using a comparative approach to
economic organization, Williamson noted that organizational forms should not be
examined separately, but rather in relation to alternative forms (Williamson, 1991, p.
269). He noted that "a hierarchy is not merely a contractual act but is also a contractual
instrument, a continuation of market relations by other means" (Williamson, 1991, p.
271). Williamson conceived of three generic governance structures - market, hierarchy
and hybrid - and each form is characterized by a "syndrome of attributes that bear a
supporting relation to one another" (Williamson, 1991, p. 271).
32
Williamson (1991) described the differences between market, hierarchical and
hybrid forms as follows. Hierarchies have advantages due to internal administrative
controls within firms as compared to between firms: "Markets and hierarchies are polar
modes" with market governance focused on classic contract law and hierarchies focused
on forbearance contract law (Williamson, 1991, p. 280). "Classic contract law applies to
the ideal transaction in law and economics - 'sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by
clear performance' (Macneil, 1974, p. 738) - in which the identity of the parties is
irrelevant" (Williamson, 1991, p. 271). Forbearance contract law relies on the
assumption of a superior-subordinate relationship (Williamson, 1975). Whereas market
disputes will be settled in a court of law, Williamson broadly classified the hierarchy as a
last resort to markets and as "its own court of ultimate appeal" (Williamson, 1991, p.
274).
Hybrid governance modes rely on neo-classica1 contract law and excuse doctrine,
which relieves parties from strict enforcement. Cooperating parties in hybrid modes
"reject classical contract law and move into a neoclassical contract regime because this
better facilitates continuity and promotes efficient adaptation" (Williamson, 1991, p.
271). Under neoclassical law tenets, the parties maintain autonomy, but their contract is
mediated by an elastic contracting mechanism characterized by exchange agreements,
reciprocal trading, and long-term, incomplete contracts (Williamson, 1991). To
summarize these differences, Williamson offered a table of distinguishing attributes for
each generic governance mode, recreated as Table 1 below (Williamson, 1991: 281):
Summarizing, the hybrid mode is characterized by semi-strong incentives, an
intermediate degree of administrative apparatus, displays semi-strong adaptations
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of both kinds, and works out of a semi-legalistic contract law regime. As
compared with market and hierarchy, which are polar opposites, the hybrid mode
is located between the two of these in all five attribute respects.
Table 1: Market, Hierarchy, and Hybrid Governance Modes, Recreated
from Williamson (1991), Page 281
Distinguishing Attributes ofMarket, Hybrid, and Hierarchy Governance Structures
Attributes Governance Structure
Market Hybrid Hierarchy
Incentive Intensity ++ + 0
Administrative 0 + ++Controls
Autonomous
Adaptation to ++ + 0Market/Price
changes
Coordinated
Adaptation to 0 + ++Market/Price
Changes
Contract Law ++ + 0
+ + = strong; + = semi-strong; 0 = weak
Williamson (1991) concluded that in order to choose the most efficient
governance form, managers must assess an opportunity according to its exchange
conditions. These exchange conditions include (1) the frequency with which transactions
occur, (2) the uncertainty with which transactions are subject, and (3) the type and degree
of asset specificity involved in supplying the good or service in question most reduces the
sum or transaction and production costs (Williamson, 1979).
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Choosing a Governance Form: Discriminating Alignment under Exchange
Conditions
Whether a set of transactions ought to be executed across markets or within a firm
depends on the relative efficiency of each governance mode (Williamson, 1975).
Williamson (1991) referred to making these choices as the "discriminating alignment
approach," arguing that proper governance aligns the firm/market boundary according to
an alignment that will minimize transaction and production costs. In the TeE
perspective, three exchange conditions -asset specificity, frequency, and uncertainty-
are seen to determine which governance mode is most efficient (Williamson, 1975,
1985b). Below I briefly describe these exchange conditions.
Asset Specificity
Asset specificity refers to the transferability of assets to alternative uses and is the
key driver of governance mode choice (Williamson, 1975). High asset specificity means
the assets are dedicated to a single purpose and are impossible or costly to redeploy. The
presence of high asset specificity intensifies coordination between parties "and requires
safeguarding of exchanges" (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997, p. 916) to reduce
uncertainty and opportunism. Firms can create detailed contracts and other safeguards to
prevent these behaviors, but these safeguards are often costly to construct, which
encourages firms to internalize such transactions (Hart, 1995; Mayer & Salomon, 2006).
In sum, the more idiosyncratic the investments required, the more likely the firm will
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organize the transaction internally, since the costs of protecting against potentially
opportunistic suppliers is greater than the cost of internal production (Williamson, 1975).
Four types of asset specificity are common among transactions - site specificity,
physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets (Williamson,
1985b, p. 55). Site specificity has to do with an asset's spatial immobility or the high
costs of set-up and relocation: "Once such assets are located, the parties thereafter are
operating on a bilateral exchange relation for the useful life of such assets" (Williamson,
1985b, p. 95). Physical asset specificity refers to assets with greater mobility than site
specific assets (Williamson, 1985b) and includes "specialized production equipment,
computer technology, and related inter-organizational systems that facilitate coordination
between cooperating parties" (Artz & Brush, 2000, p. 343). Human asset specificity
constitutes specific technical knowledge about a product or service or the learning
required to understand a potential supplier's requirements (Noordewier, John, & Nevin,
1990). Human assets also facilitate the transfer of knowledge in information-rich settings
that require face-to-face communications (Nohria & Eccles, 1992). Further, since human
assets are mobile, they may quit an exchange or reduce their efforts (Coff, 1993).
Dedicated assets involve "expanding the plant on behalf of the buyer" (Williamson,
1985b, p. 96). Finally, Masten et al. (1991) position temporal specificity as an additional
dimension to the four originally proposed by Williamson (1985). Temporal asset
specificity refers to the extent to which timely execution by a partner is critical to success
(Scott E. Masten, Meehan Jr., & Snyder, 1991, p. 9): "When timely execution is critical,
delay becomes a potentially effective strategy for exacting price concessions."
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Frequency ofExchange
Frequency refers to how often specific parties transact with one another.
Frequency transforms the orientation that parties have toward an exchange and increases
the amount of informal control that can be exerted over exchanges. Williamson notes
"repeated personal contacts across organizational boundaries support some minimum
level of courtesy and consideration between parties and discourages efforts to seek a
narrow advantage in any particular transaction" (Williamson, 1975, p. 107). Another
aspect of frequency is reciprocity, which "transforms a unilateral relationship into a
bilateral one" (Williamson, 1985b, p. 191) and creates the perception of a similar
"destiny" with greater "mutual interest" (Williamson, 1985b, p. 155). Jones et al.
(1997:242) suggest frequency is increasingly important as economies shift to alternative
governance forms and offers three potential benefits to frequent exchange:
First, frequency facilitates transferring tacit knowledge in customized exchanges,
especially for specialized processes or knowledge. Second, frequent interactions
establish the conditions for relational and structural embeddedness, which provide
the social mechanisms to adapt, coordinate, and safeguard exchanges effectively.
Third, frequent interactions provide cost efficiency in using specialized
governance structures.
Uncertainty
Environmental uncertainty triggers adaptation, "which is the central problem of
economic organization," because environments are rarely stable and predictable
(Williamson, 1991: 278). Uncertainty arises due the need for continuous adaptation by
contracting parties, and "the impossibility (or costliness) of enumerating all possible
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contingencies and/or stipulating appropriate adaptations to them in advance"
(Williamson, 1985b, p. 79). Adverse affects from uncertainty are most salient when
uncertainty interacts with asset specificity: "Failure to support transaction specific assets
with protective governance structures predictably results in costly haggling and
maladaptiveness" (Williamson, 1985b, p. 79). Demand uncertainty is another problem,
and refers to anticipated volume of use for a particular technology, asset, or transaction
component, and the confidence placed upon estimates of this demand (Walker & Weber,
1984). When volume uncertainty is high, firms will tend to use internal governance to
reduce the need for mid-contract renegotiation associated with excess capacity and
inventory (Walker & Weber, 1984). Technological uncertainty results from fears that
highly specific assets will have a low salvage value if a major technological innovation
renders a transaction-specific asset obsolete. Specialized assets may have to be scrapped
and replaced with new assets associated with the new innovations (Dyer, 1996a). This
type of uncertainty moderates efficiency gains from hierarchical governance and vertical
integration: "The risk of technological obsolescence would consequently moderate the
incentives to integrate ex ante. A highly volatile industry characterized by frequent
technological changes, therefore, will be unattractive for high levels of integration"
(Williamson, 1979, p. 352). This assertion has been supported empirically in multiple
industries (Walker & Weber, 1984).
To summarize, the efficiency perspective of governance "is grounded upon a legal
understanding of organizations as governance mechanisms distinct from markets"
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005, p. 492). Under the efficiency perspective, the firm boundary
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is detennined by asking whether conducting a transaction inside the finn or externally in
the market most reduces governance costs. Governance costs include monitoring
operations, allocating requirements for production, setting up initial contractual
agreements, and setting up initial procedures for exchange (Mayer & Salomon, 2006).
Hierarchical governance has advantages over market governance, such as decision and
property rights that enable the use of fiat, alignment of incentives, and monitoring of
managerial actions to efficiently govern transactions (S.E. Masten, 1991). Markets offer
competitive pressures to reduce production costs (M. E. Porter, 1985), but also increase
monitoring costs (Williamson, 1985b) and can increase fears ofmisappropriation (Oxley,
1999). In sum, the finn boundary should be set at the point that minimizes the total cost
production and of governing activities (Coase, 1937).
In the next section, I summarize theoretical and empirical work since the 1970s
that has both supported and refuted TCE logic for optimal governance fonn. I conclude
with specific gaps in the economic perspective of governance, which have opened a new,
non-efficiency driven, scholarly conversation of organizational governance.
Efficiency Driven Governance: From Williamson (1975) to Today
For many years, transaction cost economics (TCE) has been the driving logic
behind finn boundary decisions. In TCE, the finn considers the ex ante and ex post costs
of exchange as the primary detenninants of whether to conduct an activity internally or
externally, as these are distinct governance structures (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975).
Due to bounded rationality, asset specificity and opportunism are key transaction cost
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drivers, prompting Williamson to suggest that every stage ofproduction should undergo
assessment of the make-or-buy choice to reduce governance costs (1985a). This has led
to widespread treatment of the make-or-buy decision modes as dichotomous choices that,
once selected are difficult to change (Nickerson & Zenger, 2002).
When designing governance structures, firms interact with outside suppliers and
iteratively determine the most efficient governance structure for a given product. Firms
will differ in the number of external suppliers they choose due to differences in their
existing resources (1. Barney, 1991) and in their perceptions of how outsourcing may
lower the total cost of production. Some studies suggest that improving quality via sole
sourcing can minimize production costs (e.g. Deming, 1986) while others suggest that
multiple sourcing minimizes costs by engendering competition between potential
suppliers (e.g. M. E. Porter, 1985). Recently, scholars have touted the benefits oftapered
integration or concurrent sourcing, in which firms both make and buy the same products
(Parmigiani, 2007; Rothaermel, Ritt, & lobe, 2006). Richardson and Roumasset (1995,
p. 73) conclude that no single sourcing strategy will apply across all firms stating, "the
best sourcing arrangement depends on the situation."
More recently, TCE has come under attack as being too static and too strongly
dependent upon equilibrium assumptions (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), reducing its
applicability in more dynamic environments (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Santos &
Eisenhardt, 2005). TCE scholars have responded with a more contingent view of how
TCE tenets inform the design of governance structures (Williamson, 1999). Scholars are
combining Williamson's treatment ofthe make-or-buy choice with the capabilities
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literatures (e.g. Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; David J. Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 2000) to
incorporate resource- and knowledge-based views ofthe finn. These views suggest a
finn internally produce goods that are close to its area of expertise, core to its business,
and related to items it already produces (1. B. Barney, 1986; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990;
Wernerfelt, 1984). Williamson (1999, p. 1097) agrees with the potential for capabilities
arguments to infonn TCE arguments, stating: "transaction cost economics infonns the
generic decision to make or buy, while competence brings in particulars" (emphasis in
original).
Under this contingent TCE logic, characteristics of the product, environment and
finn will jointly infonn governance choice. Internal production is preferred when
products require a high degree of specific investment. Potential suppliers may be hesitant
to commit vast resources to specific investments and even if suppliers initially agree,
fears of opportunism increase in these situations because supply chain finns may seek
raise prices to justify the high investment cost (Krause, Handfield, & Tyler, 2007).
Additionally, products that are difficult to evaluate prior to production may be better
produced internally. This may be due to high technological uncertainty or appropriability
concerns (Oxley, 1999) or product complexity concerns (S. W. Anderson, Glenn, &
Sedatole, 2000). Still, while internal production facilitates adaptation and coordination,
outsourcing will push risks of obsolescence onto suppliers. Finns will outsource when
fears of opportunism are low, external assets and resources are autonomous and less re-
deployable (David J. Teece, 1984), and to take advantage of other finns' expertise
(Argyres, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Rubin, 1973). This indicates that when
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technological or demand uncertainties are highest, hybrid governance such as alliances or
market governance through outsourcing may be a better choice (e.g. Gulati, Lawrence, &
Puranam,2005). Finally, scope economies can drive a firm's decision to outsource.
Economies of scope arise when the cost of performing several functions simultaneously
proves more efficient than conducting each activity individually (Helfat & Eisenhardt,
2004; Panzar & Willig, 1981). Economies of scope can be attained through market
exchange when governance costs created by indivisibility and nontradability of assets are
low (Monteverde & Teece, 1982). Conversely, if a firm has considerable knowledge and
experience related to the product and can exploit internal scope economies, it will be
motivated to internally produce the product (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; D.l. Teece,
1986).
Despite widespread agreement on the theoretical underpinnings of transaction
cost and capabilities arguments for efficient governance mode choice, recent empirical
studies have produced results that question these basic, agreed upon tenets. For example,
Anderson, Glen and Sedatole (2000) found highly complex products changed the rules
regarding fears of asset specificity and opportunism among outside suppliers. They
found the greater the complexity of a product and its sub-processes, the greater the use of
outsourcing. This directly conflicts with the early governance literature about the roles
specific assets, opportunism and bounded rationality play in sourcing decisions based on
transaction efficiency (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975). Additional empirical work has
questioned the role of uncertainty in make-or-buy decisions. Behavioral uncertainty
caused by exchange partners negatively affects the efficiency of market governance
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(Dyer, 1996b; Walker & Weber, 1984) while technological uncertainty seems to reverse
the causal arrow, favoring market governance over hierarchical governance (Richardson,
1996). Finally, Nickerson and Zenger (2002) argue that interdependence between
transactions affects governance structure. High interdependence may favor hierarchical
governance because of fiat and incentive advantages found internal to the firm
(Nickerson & Zenger, 2002). These inconsistencies imply that the efficiency perspective
of governance does not capture all firm-level strategies or decisions to make-or-buy,
prompting Conner and Prahalad (1996, p. 491) to suggest: "Maybe opportunism isn't the
only reason firms with seemingly similar transaction cost situations choose different
forms of governance."
To summarize, the efficiency perspective has several limitations. First, despite
recent attempts to link TCE and capabilities literatures, the efficiency conception remains
a discussion about the most efficient location of a transaction. Further, as described
above, introducing capabilities arguments can actually confound findings from TCE
(Dyer, 1996b). These limitations constrain the efficiency perspective to static analyses
and equilibrium conditions. These limitations have caused scholars from the fields of
sociology, network theory and organization theory to challenge the efficiency perspective
of governance. Next, I review these challenges and describe the contention that network
governance constitutes a distinct new organizational form that is neither market nor
hierarchy, not simply a hybrid combination ofthe two (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997;
Podolny & Page, 1998; Walter W. Powell, 1990).
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Sociology: The Role of Embeddedness
Spurred largely by Granovetter's (1985) argument that economic theorizing is
"under-socialized," sociologists began to criticize the efficiency perspective ofmarkets
and hierarchies in the 1980s (Podolny & Page, 1998). Granovetter's central argument is
that economic transactions are highly constrained by ongoing social relations and should
not be viewed solely as an attempt by atomistic actors to maximize transaction efficiency.
Granovetter cemented his position that economic and social motivations are
interdependent, stating: "to construe them as independent is a grievous
misunderstanding" (1985, p. 482).
Granovetter puts forth an argument of economic embeddedness and
systematically challenges Williamson's neo-classical economic assumptions about
markets and hierarchies. Embeddedness refers to "the extent to which dyadic (economic)
relations are embedded in a broader system of social relations" (M. Granovetter, 1985, p.
482). While Williamson (1975: 106) does acknowledge that the influence of social
relations on repeated market transactions supports "some minimum level of courtesy and
consideration between parties," Granovetter (1985) argues this does not go far enough.
Granovetter cites the work ofMacauley (1963, pp. 63-64) and the relationships between
internal sales people and external clients as having deeply social relationships, including
salesman that have "gossip about competitors, shortages and price increases to give
purchasing agents who treat them well." These deeply embedded social relationships
help settle disputes, even in the presence of detailed contracts (M. Granovetter, 1985).
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Granovetter (1985) also cites extensive use of subcontracting as creating
opportunities for sustained relationships among firms that are not organized
hierarchically within one corporate unit. Common in construction projects and within the
garment industry (Uzzi, 1996), this type of quasi-integration (R.G. Eccles, 1981) results
in a quasi-firm that is a mode of organizing preferred to pure market transactions or
formal vertical integration" (R.G. Eccles, 1981, pp. 339-340). Granovetter (1985: 498)
argues these long-term relationships and their embeddedness in a wider community of
construction personnel "generate standards of expected behavior that not only obviate the
need for but are superior to pure authority relations (found in hierarchies)."
Granovetter concludes with salient arguments against the use of fiat, efficiencies
ofintemallabor markets, and communication efficiencies within hierarchies. His general
conclusion is that social relations between firms are more important than the market
relations proposed by economists; while social relations within firms are less important
than as hypothesized in the market and hierarchy line of thinking (M. Granovetter, 1985,
p. 501). His direct challenge to Williamson's market and hierarchy description of
organizational forms fomented an outpouring of sociological research aiming to elucidate
and extend the embeddedness hypothesis, which resulted in inter-organizational networks
as a form of governance (Podolny and Page, 1998). In the next section, I describe these
papers, summarize their impact, and detail the emergence the network form of
governance.
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The Emergence of Networks as a Form of Governance
Beginning in the 1980s, sociologists became increasingly intrigued by a plethora
of organizational forms that failed to conform to traditional market or hierarchy
archetypes (Podolny & Page, 1998). Empirically, changes in the US regulatory
environment allowed US firms to engage in cooperative activities with market
competitors (Achrol & Kotler, 1999; Podolny & Page, 1998; Snow, Miles, & Coleman,
1992). Theoretically, Granovetter (1985) challenged neo-classical economics and its
dichotomous market and hierarchy classification of organizational forms. Williamson
(1991) countered with descriptions ofthe hybrid organizational form, but suggested that
hybrid forms were rare and that the distribution of organizational forms along the markets
and hierarchies continuum was "thick in the tails" (Williamson, 1985b).
Initial attempts to distinguish network organizations from pure markets and
hierarchies led to their being defined by social relationships between firms. Led by
Powell (1990), sociologists argued that network organizational forms are indeed distinct
and possess their own logics. Powell (1990:301) suggested, "markets, hierarchies and
networks are all part of a larger puzzle that is the economy. The properties of the parts of
this system are defined by the kinds of interaction that takes place among them." Chief
among these interactions is a norm of reciprocity among cooperating network partners
that protects transactions and reduces their costs. Below I recreate Powell's table (Table
2) that summarizes the differences between these forms of economic organization (1990:
300):
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Table 2: Summary of Forms of Organizing, Recreated from Powell (1990), Page 300
Forms
Key Features Market Hierarchy Network
Nonnative Basis Contract - Property Employment Complementary
Rights Relationship Strengths
Means of Prices Routines Relational
Communication
Methods of Conflict Haggling - resort to Administrative fiat Nonn of reciprocity
Resolution courts for - Supervision - Reputational
enforcement concerns
Degree of Flexibility High Low Medium
Amount of Low Medium to High Medium to High
Commitment
Among the Parties
Tone of Climate Precision and/or Fonnal, Open-ended, mutual
Suspicion bureaucratic benefits
Actor Preferences or Independent Dependent Interdependent
Choices
Mixing of Fonns Repeat Transactions Infonnal Status Hierarchies
(Geertz, 1978) Organization
(Dalton, 1957)
Contracts as Multiple Partners
hierarchical Market-like
documents features: profit
(Stinchcombe, centers, transfer Fonnal Rules
1985) pricing (Eccles,
1985)
Powell (1990) went on to describe the differences between market, hierarchy, and
network fonns of organizing. Powell (1990: 302-03) described: "Markets ... are a
spontaneous coordination of mechanisms that imparts rationality anu consistency to the
self-interested actions of individuals and firms ... Hierarchies offer clear departmental
boundaries, clean lines of authority, detailed reporting mechanisms and fonnal decision-
making procedures." Network organizations differ. These organizations offer some of
the flexibility found in markets but also some of the control found in hierarchies.
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Powell explained (1990: 302): "In network modes ... transactions occur neither through
discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat ... rather, the parties in a network agree to
forego the right to pursue their own interests at the expense of others." Powell borrowed
from Axelrod (1984) to explain how network relationships are formed around
expectations of future interactions. Axelrod (1984) coined the term "shadow of the
future" to describe how the likelihood of future interactions constrains the pursuit of
immediate payoffs from current interactions. In these cases, cooperation emerges out of
mutual interests and behaviors are based on standards that no single participant can
determine alone (Powell, 1990). Powell's (1990) final foundation for the efficacy of
network fonus is trust. Trust is a remarkable lubricant to economic exchange (Arrow,
1974) as it reduces complex realities "far more quickly than prediction, authority, or
bargaining" (Powell, 1990: 305).
To summarize, Powell's conception of network organizational forms explains
their emergence due to norms of reciprocity (Powell, 1990), goals of cooperation
(Axelrod, 1984), and increasing returns to trust (Kenneth Joseph Arrow, 1974). His
insight supports that network forms of organization are indeed "Neither Market Nor
Hierarchy" and his work elicited a plethora ofpapers asserting the benefits of network
organizations. These benefits include learning (Dore, 1983; Hamel, 1991b; Walter W.
Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1997), legitimation and status (J. Baum & Oliver, 1992; Podolny,
1993; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) and economic benefits (Bradach & Eccles, 1989;
Dare, 1983; Kanter, 1991; Parkhe, 1991; Walter W. Powell; Uzzi, 1997; Williamson,
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1991), as well as benefits explained by resource dependence (J. Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976;
Selznick, 1949) and social welfare theories (Perrow, 1993).
I began this section by describing sociologists' interest in distancing their
conception of network organizations from the economic conception of pure markets and
hierarchies (Williamson, 1991). Judging by the wealth of studies touting the social and
learning benefits to network organizations, it is safe to say they succeeded. However, by
presenting such a convincing and polarizing argument to the existence and persistence of
network organizing via social mechanisms, these scholars backed themselves into a
comer. Their enthusiasm for the positive benefits of network organizations largely
removed any discussion of their negative consequences or costs (Podolny & Page, 1998).
Only by pursuing a middle-ground incorporating both economic and social mechanisms
for governance can we recognize both functional and dysfunctional aspects of the
network organization (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; Podolny & Page, 1998).
Recognizing this need, a multi-disciplinary team of authors, one each from organization
theory (Candace Jones), transaction cost economics (William Hesterly) and social
networks (Stephen Borgatti), developed a general theory of network governance that
includes both economic and social mechanisms, which represents a major step in our
understanding (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). Next, I present their conception of
network governance, which is the basis for the remainder of this dissertation.
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Reconciling Economic and Sociological Governance: Exchange Conditions and
Social Mechanisms
In contrast to purely sociological treatments of network organizational forms
emphasizing informal agreements between cooperating parties who share norms and
values (for detailed reviews, see Podolny and Page, 1998; Borgatti and Foster, 2003),
network governance includes contractual agreements between autonomous parties that
may have entirely different norms and values. This study defines network governance
according to Jones et aI., (1997) and their definition and rationale are offered below.
Network governance involves a "select, persistent, and structured set of
autonomous firms engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open
ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard
exchanges" (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). These authors clarify what they mean by
"implicit and open-ended contracts" as follows (Page 916):
To be sure, formal contracts may exist between some pairs of members, but those
do not define the relationships between all parties. For example, in a film project,
both the cinematographer and the editor may have contracts with the studio, but
these contracts do not specify the relationship between the two subcontractors.
These authors go on to clarify the nature of these project-specific relationships:
"Network governance is composed of firms that operate like a single entity (when
required) ... in other domains these firms may be fierce competitors" (Jones et al. 1997:
916). These authors cite the film industry as emblematic ofnetwork governance (pp.
916):
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Here, film studios, producers, directors, cinematographers, and a host of other
contractors join, disband, and rejoin in varying combinations to make films.
Network governance comprises a select subset of film studios and subcontractors.
The seven major film studios repeatedly use and share among their films an elite
set of subcontractors who constitute 3 percent (459 of the 12,400) of those
registered in guilds (Jones & Hesterly, 1993).... Structured relations among
subcontractors and film studios are based on a division of labor: film studios
finance, market, and distribute films, whereas numerous subcontractors with
clearly defined roles and professions (e.g., producer, director, cinematographer,
and editor) create the film.
For a governance form to persist, it must address the problems of adapting,
coordinating and safeguarding exchanges more efficiently than other governance forms
(Williamson, 1991). In the TCE perspective, three exchange conditions - uncertainty,
asset specificity, and frequency - determine which governance fornl is most efficient
(Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). Williamson (1994, p. 85) acknowledges that
"network relations are given short shrift" in the governance conversation, partially
because ofTCE's preoccupation with dyadic relations. By combining TCE's reliance on
exchange conditions with social network theory, scholars can move the level of analysis
above dyadic relations. Combining these theoretical platforms allows Jones et
al.(1997:913) to provide a "simple, yet coherent framework for identifying the
(exchange) conditions under which network governance is likely to emerge and the social
mechanisms that allow network governance to coordinate and safeguard customized
exchanges" better than other governance forms. These authors make a critical distinction
about network governance. Rather than positioning network governance as a generic
structure in competition with Williamson or with sociologists, these authors limit the
emergence of network governance to specific exchange conditions and rapidly changing
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markets. Next, I review these exchange conditions and markets that commonly exhibit
rapid change.
Jones et al. (1997) begin by identifying specific forms of uncertainty and asset
specificity that give rise to network governance. Next, they extend TCE by incorporating
task complexity (Walter W. Powell, 1990; W. W. Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996)
into the explanation of governance form. Jones et al. (1997:917) suggest the
incorporation of task complexity "is important because it moves theory beyond a dyadic
focus." Third, Jones et al. (1997:917) show how Williamson's notion of frequency,
"which is underspecified and underdeveloped in TCE, provides a link with social
network constructs of relational and structural embeddedness" (M. Granovetter, 1985,
1992; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). Frequency is important for several reasons (Jones, Hesterly, &
Borgatti, 1997, p. 917):
First, frequency facilitates transferring tacit knowledge in customized exchanges,
especially for specialized processes or knowledge. Second, frequent interactions
establish the conditions for relational and structural embeddedness, which provide
the social mechanisms to adapt, coordinate, and safeguard exchanges effectively.
Third, frequent interactions provide cost efficiency in using specialized
governance structures (Williamson, 1985b).
By combining TCE with social network theory (Powell, 1990), Jones and her coauthors
(1997:918) identify four conditions necessary for network governance to emerge and
thrive: "(1) demand uncertainty with stable supply, (2) customized exchanges high in
human asset specificity, (3) complex tasks under time pressure and (4) frequent
exchanges among parties comprising the network." Since I have reviewed three ofthese
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four exchange conditions elsewhere in this manuscript, I will review task complexity
under time pressure presently.
Task complexity is defined as follows: "Task complexity refers to the number of
specialized inputs needed to complete a product or service" (Jones et aI., 1997: 921). As
complex projects increase in their need for specialized inputs, greater behavioral
interdependence results (Jeffrey Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This will often require
different specialists be incorporated into the task, due to the increased scope of activities
found in complex projects. When task complexity is combined with high time pressure,
coordination through a series of sequential exchanges becomes infeasible (Jones et aI.,
1997). High time pressure forces firms to reduce lead times and increase coordination, as
is common in industries such as semiconductors, computers, film and fashion. Greater
coordination and adaptation can reduce some of the effects of time pressure, which
supports an increasing need for network governance when the exchange conditions of
high time pressure and task complexity coincide.
To summarize, network governance is an organizational form that emerges and
thrives under specific exchange conditions (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997), involves
autonomous firms that join, disband and rejoin in varying combinations over time, and
involves specific coordination mechanisms guided by contractual relationships between
some firms (a studio and a cinematographer) and socially embedded (non-contractual)
relationships among others (a cinematographer and an editor). In the next section, I
review the literature that has examined performance related to network governance.
These studies combine both economic and social mechanisms in their analyses by
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relating the presence and strength of social/network ties to the economic performance of
the network organizational form. While innovative, these studies suffer from many of the
same problems that plague prior research by sociologists - their bias is toward studying
the positive and beneficial aspects of network organizing. I begin the next section by
examining the sources of this bias, and explaining how conceptual arguments at the
network level of analysis are based upon empirical evidence at the dyad-level of analysis.
This mismatch between conceptual theorizing and empirical practice is a primary barrier
to our understanding of network organizations. I conclude the next section by
emphasizing both theoretical and empirical gaps in the literature that relates the presence
and strength of network ties to the performance of networks as a form of governance.
The Performance of Networks as a Form of Governance
The effects of network ties on performance can be traced back to Granovetter's
influential studies ofjob seekers and their ego-networks (M. Granovetter, 1995; M. S.
Granovetter, 1973). He defines tie strength as a "(probably linear) combination of the
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) , and the
reciprocal services which characterize the tie" (M. S. Granovetter, 1973, p. 1361).
Building off Granovetter's definition, several scholars began to question how an ego's
(individual or firm) collection of dyadic ties might interact to affect the performance of
the network as a whole (See Table 3).
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Table 3: Research Relating Tie Strength to Organizational Performance
Past Research on the Performance ofNetworks
(Dyad level of analysis)
Qualitative Quantitative
Granovetter (1973,1995) Baker (1990)
lJarkhe (1991) Gu1ati (1995)
lLarson (1992) Stuart, Hoang & Hybe1s (1999)
Grabher (1993) Shane & Cable (2002)
Doz (1996) Goerzen (2007)
Liebeskind et a1 (1996)
Uzzi (1997)
Capaldo (2007)
However, a critical flaw arose between these authors' conceptual arguments about
whole networks, their ability to gather data, and their conclusions about how a who1e-
network of ties might impact performance. Despite an increasing acknowledgement of
the benefits derived from whole-networks (Gu1ati & Gargiulo, 1999; Walter W. Powell,
White, Koput, & Jason, 2005; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Rosenkopf & Schilling,
2007), data gathering and analysis remained at the dyad level. Even more concerning,
scholars acknowledged their inability to collect network level data (Podo1ny & Page,
1998), but this did not keep them from publishing findings about whole networks based
on individual dyads. Next, I review these studies that relate the presence and strength of
dyadic ties to the overall performance of a network - highlighting their common
emphasis of dyad-level relationships.
With Granovetter's (1973, 1995) definition of tie strength as a baseline, several
scholars have investigated the impact of tie strength on organizational performance. At
the organization level, more frequent ties, a greater number of repeated ties, greater
resource commitments, and longer durations for a particular tie characterize strong ties
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(Capaldo,2007). Conversely, fewer repeated ties, more ties with a greater number of
partners, ties with fewer resource commitments, and ties lasting for shorter durations
characterize weak ties (Capaldo, 2007). Qualitatively, tie strength has been linked to
learning and adaptation (Parkhe, 1991), to task integration and the effects of similar
cultures and norms between dyadic partners (Doz, 1996), and to ties with prominent
network partners, which can impact a focal organization's status and legitimacy (Larson,
1992). Liebeskind et al. (1996) suggested that an absence of network ties led to
pharmaceutical companies being unable to enter the nascent biotechnology industry.
Finally, Uzzi (1997) suggested that there exists an optimal number of strong versus weak
ties. In his study of the New York City garment industry, he found that firms relying too
heavily on strong ties (over-embedded) or on weak ties (under-embedded) perform worse
than firms with a blend of strong and weak ties.
Empirically, most research on the performance of network organizations has been
limited to studies of dyadic relationships between partners. Building on Larson's (1992)
study of the effects of ties to prominent network partners on performance, Stuart Hoang
and Hybels (1999) studied the effects of ties to prominent partners on the performance of
entrepreneurial firms. Likewise, Shane and Cable (2002) studied how ties to prominent
partners affect the ability of start-up ventures to attract funding. Baker (1990) began to
theorize about variation in performance from network ties and looked at the dyadic
relationships between corporations and their banks. He found that a mixture of strong
and weak ties leads to optimal performance, echoing Uzzi' s (1997) qualitative findings in
the garment industry. Gulati (1995) studied patterns of tie formation between dyadic
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partners and found that not only do strong ties enhance performance, but also that these
benefits decay rapidly over time. Gulati (1995) found that only the four most recently
formed ties affect p~rformance between alliance partners positively.
Researchers have suggested that our lack of understanding about the performance
of network organizational forms stems from a lack of network-level data (Podolny &
Page, 1998). Podolny and Page (1998) suggest that in order to examine the full range of
performance, including poor performance and failure, comprehensive data on a
population of network organizations is needed. While I agree with these authors that
such data are difficult to obtain, I disagree with their assertion that the empirical gap
constitutes the primary limitation to our understanding of network organizational
performance.
The more limiting characteristic is theoretical, and arises from a mismatch
between levels of analysis. Scholars continue to conceptualize network level
performance using dyad-level relationships. In order to advance a more robust theory of
networks, we must think differently about networks (Salancik, 1995) and move the level
of analysis up to the network level (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Walter W. Powell, White,
Koput, & Jason, 2005; Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). The network level of analysis
involves the aggregation of multiple dyads interacting simultaneously (Goerzen, 2007;
Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007).
To summarize, past literature relating organizational performance to the presence
and strength of network ties is largely qualitative and conceptual and nearly all
quantitative work is at the dyad level of analysis. Additionally, scholars have touted the
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benefits to network organizing while largely ignoring any costs, which has led scholars to
frame network ties as durable and to frame changes in network partners as easy and
always leading to positive outcomes (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006). Podolnyand
Page (1998, p. 73) offer a direct criticism of scholars' biased studies of
interorganizational networks: "researchers must counterbalance the focus on prevalence
and functionality (of networks) with an equally strong focus on constraint and
dysfunctionality." These issues create three noticeable barriers to our understanding of
network organizations and performance: (1) Network ties are studied largely at the dyad
level, (2) network ties are largely assumed to be stable and durable over time, and (3)
network performance measures are not robust.
Narrowing the Gaps in Understanding
Narrowing these gaps in understanding requires three things. First, scholars need
to revisit the construct of tie strength and its preoccupation with dyadic ties between
individuals. The first logical step, as suggested by Capaldo (2007), is to move the level
of analysis to interorganizational ties between firms. Capaldo (2007) extends tie strength
to the inter-organizational level as follows. He begins by reviewing the three critical
dimensions of tie strength as conceived by Granovetter (1973): frequency of interaction,
intensity of interaction, and duration of interaction. Next, Capaldo (2007) extends these
dimensions to the inter-organizational level. Capaldo (2007) links frequency and
intensity of interaction to a resource commitment and a social commitment between
cooperating firms. Regarding duration, he links these interactions to the amount of time
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associated with a particular tie. Collectively, these interfirm ties describe a temporal
dimension, a resource dimension, and a social dimension, which represents a critical
advancement of the tie strength construct (Capaldo, 2007: 589):
Coherently, I frame tie strength as a three dimensional concept composed of a
temporal dimension, a resource dimension, and a social dimension. Thus,
strong(er) interfirm ties are characterized by long(er) time-frames and high(er)
resource commitments when compared to weak(er) ties, as well as by tight(er)
interpersonal relations and trust-based interorganizationallinkages. I argue that
the following three variables should be employed to express the strength of an
interorganizational relationship: (1) the relationship's overall duration; (2) the
frequency of collaboration; and (3) the intensity of collaboration. The higher the
relationship's duration, and the higher the frequency and intensity of
collaboration, the higher the strength of the relationship.
While Capaldo's (2007) extension of the tie strength construct to an inter-organizational
construct is important, a limitation of his study is its reliance on inter-organizational
dyads. This dissertation extends Capaldo (2007) by aggregating multiple interfIrm dyads
up to the network level of analysis, which Provan et al. (2007) in their review of the
network literature, identify as a critical area for future research.
Second, scholars need to recognize that network ties can be unstable, short-lived,
and that the transformation of network ties is associated with costs (Gulati, 1995; Kim,
Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006). As mentioned by Kim et al. (2006), a selection bias exists
among scholars studying these ties due to their comparing returns to organizational
performance with the presence of current and new partners. Because these comparisons
treat tie formation and dissolution as discrete events, rather than as a series of unfolding
events that occur over time, changes in network ties always seem to result in positive
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outcomes (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006). Empirical evidence suggests otherwise.
Uzzi (1996) conceptualized tie formation and dissolution as a series of unfolding events,
and found these changes are more difficult than previously theorized. Further, Gulati
(1995) found that the benefits from previous ties decays rapidly and Goerzen (2007)
found that repeated alliance network ties actually reduce economic performance. Clearly,
there exists an opportunity to study tie formation and dissolution over time and with an
eye toward any negative consequences.
Following these scholars, I introduce a new construct, Aggregate Tie Strength, to
address gaps one and two in our understanding. Narrowing Gap 1 requires changing the
level of analysis. To accomplish this, I build off Capaldo's (2007) notion of tie strength
as a relationship between firms by aggregating all of a lead-firm's dyadic ties, thus
raising the level of analysis to the network (e.g. Provan et al. 2007). Next, I need to
address that the value of ties changes over time. Aggregate Tie Strength (ATS) is a
composite measure that accounts for both the presence and sum of ties between a lead-
firm and its cooperating partners, as well as incorporating the recency of their formation.
ATS, incorporates Gulati's (1995) finding that the benefits from ties decays rapidly over
time by using a "moving window" approach. By incorporating current and past
behaviors into ATS, I narrow Gap 2 in the literature. This construct allows me to
capture variation of a cross-sectional nature, as in Goerzen (2007), but also over time,
which represents a critical extension to both Goerzen (2007) and Gulati (1995).
Finally, to narrow Gap 3 in understanding, I need robust data on the full range of
performance (Podolny and Page, 1998). Prior network performance measures were not
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robust, due to the unavailability of data across a population of networks (Podolny and
Page, 1998) and across time (Goerzen, 2007). I solve both of these problems by
leveraging a unique panel data set that contains information across a population of
network organizations during the years 2000 - 2007. In the next section, I describe my
contribution and conclude this literature review.
Network Performance at the Network Level
In 0rder to examine the performance of at the network level, I link back to theory
about lead-firm networks and introduce the construct Aggregate Tie Strength (A TS).
Lead-firm networks focus our attention on a single focal firm (ego) and the set of nodes
that firm has ties with (alters) (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007).
"Lead-firm governance occurs in networks in which all organizations share a common
purpose ... but there is a more powerful, perhaps larger organization that has sufficient
resources and legitimacy to playa lead role" (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007, p. 504). Lead-
firm networks represent a promising avenue to examine whole-networks, where network
governance is the rule rather than the exception (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Walter W.
Powell, White, Koput, & Jason, 2005; Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007).
ATS accounts for the simultaneous interaction of multiple dyadic ties between an
ego and its alters, but also incorporates Gulati's (1995) empirical finding that the value
derived from network ties decays over time. This construct represents one of my
theoretical contributions to the literature on network organizations because it takes into
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account both the occurrence of multiple simultaneous ties between an ego and its alters
and the recency of their formation.
Next, in order to study the full range of performance, I need reliable information
on both network tie formation and tie dissolution (Podo1ny and Page, 1998). Jones and
Lichtenstein (2008) suggest alliance networks formed in response to temporary projects
address this need. Temporary interorganizationa1 projects are defined as: "projects in
which multiple organizations work jointly on a shared activity for a limited period of
time" (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008, p. 230). Due to their limited duration, temporary
interorganizationa1 projects have specific start and end dates, and these dates are known
among alliance partners and often published in trades journals and industry artifacts
(Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). Additionally, temporary projects are characterized by
clearly stated goals and performance outcomes. These goals generally come in the form
of industry artifacts or documents, such as a movie script, architectural and engineering
request for proposals, construction blue prints, or Broadway Playbills, for example (Jones
& Lichtenstein, 2008).
Thus, firms collaborating on temporary interorganizationa1 projects fit Jones et
al.' s (1997) definition of network governance. Due to their temporary nature, there is
high time pressure. Temporary projects have sufficient task complexity to warrant the
creation of detailed artifacts like blue prints and scripts to facilitate coordination (Jones,
Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). Temporary projects also occur
in industries of rapid change, but with a stable network of autonomous firms that
regularly form and dissolve ties according to exchange conditions. Finally, in industries
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where temporary projects are common, information on tie formation and dissolution dates
are more readily available. Please see Table 4 for examples of temporary
interorganizational projects.
Table 4: Examples of Scholarly Work That Studies Temporary Interorganizational
Projects (Adapted from Jones and Lichtenstein, 2008)
Project Description (authors)
• Film production (Bechky, 2006; Faulkner & Anderson, 1987; Jones & DeFillippi,
1996)
• Music video production (Bechky, 2006; Jones & DeFillippi, 1996)
• Architecture and Construction Projects (R.G. Eccles, 1981)
• Fashion (Uzzi, 1996, 1997)
• Broadway Musicals (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005)
• Emergency and Crisis Response (e.g. Hurricane Katrina) (Brandstrom, Bynander,
& 'T Hart, 2004)
This concludes Chapter II. Chapter III presents a theoretical framework and a
series of hypotheses that test how exchange conditions interact with Aggregate Tie
Strength to affect the performance of network governance.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
As reviewed in the last chapter, research indicates organizational fonns are
shaped by exchange conditions and embedded social relationships. Researchers from
economics, organization theory and sociology have explored the emergence,
persistence and perfonnance of organizational fonns and these scholars tend to
explain organizational fonns from their own perspectives, with their own theories,
and in competition with other perspectives and theories. For example, economists use
the transaction as their primary unit of analysis and describe how the structure of
organizational fonns results from a pursuit of transaction efficiencies that reduce the
costs of organizing (Scott E. Masten, Meehan Jr., & Snyder, 1991; Williamson, 1975,
1985b). Sociologists largely use dyadic relationships between social actors as their
unit of analysis and explain the structure of organizational fonns according to how
embedded dyadic relationships affect the social and economic costs of organizing (M.
Granovetter, 1985, 1992; Walter W. Powell, 1990).
Due to these differences in perspective and measurement, we know quite a bit
about the independent effects of economic and sociological explanations of
organizational fonns (Walter W. Powell, 1990), but we know much less about any
interdependence among these theoretical traditions (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti,
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1997). In order to unpack the interdependence ofthese perspectives, scholars have
suggested network organizational forms are a fruitful theoretical setting that deserves
further attention (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Podolny & Page, 1998; Walter
W. Powell, 1990).
The previous chapter outlined three specific gaps that arise from attempts to
explain the structure and performance of network organizational forms. First, both
economic and sociological traditions view transactions/relationships at the dyad level
of analysis, which limits our understanding of how multiple dyads interact in a
network of relationships to affect structure and performance at the network level of
analysis (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Walter W. Powell, White, Koput, & Jason, 2005;
Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). Second, relationships between cooperating firms are
largely theorized as stable, with changes in network partners seen as easy and
resulting in positive benefits, which ignores any difficulties and negative benefits
(Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; Podolny & Page, 1998). Third, reliable data on the
full range of performance, including poor performance and failure, is often
unavailable (Podolny & Page, 1998). This study addresses these gaps by empirically
examining the structure and performance of network organizational forms using
robust data that includes the full range of organizational performance.
In the preceding literature review, I used Jones et al.'s (1997) definition of
network governance as a conceptual framework to integrate previous theorizing by
economists and sociologists. These authors do not characterize network governance
as a generic governance structure in competition with other structures. Rather, this
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framework postulates that the collective effects of specific exchange conditions
account for the emergence, structure and performance of network governance: "No
single exchange condition gives rise to network governance; rather a combination of
specific conditions is required for network governance to emerge and thrive as an
organizational form"(Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997, p. 923). These exchange
conditions occur in settings that require high adaptation due to changes in product
demand, high coordination costs associated with integrating diverse specialists in
complex tasks, and needs for safeguarding due to overseeing and coordinating
customized exchanges (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). The need to safeguard
these exchanges inhibits market governance and the need for adapting exchanges
inhibits the use of pure hierarchies. Network governance balances these competing
demands as it integrates the most applicable arguments from TeE and social
networks when these exchange conditions are present (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti,
1997).
By arguing that the network form of governance emerges and persists only
under specific exchange conditions, Jones et al. (1997) begin a new conversation
about the interdependence of economic and sociological explanations for
organizational structure and performance. This study builds upon the work of Jones
et al. (1997) and asks the following research question: How do exchange conditions
and interfirm partnerships interact to affect the structure andperformance of
temporary network organizational forms?
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Linking Alliance Design to Organizational Forms
Research suggests the alliance literature offers a fruitful setting to study the
interdependence of economic and sociological explanations of organizational forms
(Dyer & Singh, 1998; Goerzen, 2007; Gu1ati & Singh, 1998; Jones & Lichtenstein,
2008; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). In economics,
alliance networks have been treated as a variant ofthe make-or-buy decision (Gu1ati
& Singh, 1998; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999). The same logic by which firms
choose between the extremes of make-or-buy (Scott E. Masten, Meehan Jr., &
Snyder, 1991; Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Walker & Weber, 1984) is expected to
continue once firms elect to form an alliance (Gu1ati & Singh, 1998). Further, as in
sociology, alliance networks exhibit both relational and structural embeddedness
(Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008) - the key sociological measures ofvariation among
organizational forms (M. Granovetter, 1992).
Alliance networks are deliberately designed networks, often led by lead firms,
that aim to create competitive advantage through cooperative advantage (Ring, 1996),
through idiosyncratic combinations of complementary resources (Kogut, 1991; Kogut
& Zander, 1992), and through relational advantages (Dyer & Singh, 1998). To create
these advantages, alliance networks tend to involve repeated partnerships or repeated
alliances. Research from the automotive industry highlights the advantages derived
from repeated alliances including reduced development risks, reduced time-to-market,
and reduced quality defect rates (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994;
Womack, Jones, & Ross, 1990). Research by Helper (1991) shows that repeated
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alliances enhance innovation and strategic flexibility. These findings have led
scholars to suggest that the ability to design networks, interact, and share knowledge
with other companies is a distinctive organizational competence (Lorenzoni &
Lipparini, 1999, p. 320).
Scholars interested in knowledge, innovation and learning make broad claims
that repeated alliances lead to better outcomes: "tight, repeated, trust-based
relationships ... are likely to bring sustained competitive advantages in terms of
innovation and cost economics" (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999, p. 332),
Lead firms deliberately act to create an architecture ofcapabilities where
expertise is located both internally and externally, and partnered organizations
are seen as intelligent units [wherein] the internal knowledge should help a
lead firm to appreciate, select, and mobilize external capabilities (firms).
Simultaneously, lead firms should learn to interact with others to better
manage internal competencies" (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999, p. 332)
These statements are in sharp contrast to some empirical findings about the effects of
repeated partnerships. For example, Gulati (1995) found the value from repeated
partnerships decays rapidly - only the four previous partnerships benefit
performance. Further, Goerzen (2007) found that firms often do enter into repeated
partnerships, but doing so actually decreased economic performance. Thus, it appears
the relationship between repeated partnerships in alliance networks and economic
performance is more nuanced than previously theorized.
Social network scholars address variation in network form along two
fundamental dimensions: relational embeddedness and structural embeddedness (M.
Granovetter, 1992). The differences between these types of embeddedness can be
understood by the differences between their operational definitions. Relational
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embeddedness refers to the quality of dyadic exchanges - the degree to which
exchange parties know of and consider one another's needs and goals (M.
Granovetter, 1992). Operationally, the number of repeated partnerships often
measures relational embeddedness. Empirical studies show that relational
embeddedness attenuates transactional uncertainty as alliance partners playing
specific roles come to know and understand each other's preferences through
repeated interactions and exchanges (Grabher, 2002; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988;
Uzzi, 1996). These characteristics prompted Borgatti and Foster (2003) to
characterize relational embeddedness as "the pipes" within a network because
relational embeddedness increases informationjlow between cooperating parties.
Depending on the size of the "pipes," information flows are enhanced or reduced
through relational embeddedness.
Structural embeddedness is the extent to which mutual contacts within a
network are connected to one another (Granovetter, 1992: 35), framed as "the
girders" within a network by Borgatti and Foster (2003). Operationally, structural
embeddedness refers to the amount of indirect communication between third parties
and how this communication affects the overall network structure. A greater amount
of communication between third parties enhances structural embeddedness because
organizational actors "will not only have direct relations, but also are linked
indirectly to third parties, who are likely to have future interactions and talk about
their interactions with one another" (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008, p. 239). In the lead
firm network case, structural embeddedness is more a measure of subcontractors and
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their movement within and between lead firms than a direct measure of a particular
lead firm's structure. Borgatti and Foster (2003) characterize structural
embeddedness as "the girders" linking parties within the overall network, rather than
"the pipes" which deal more with the quality and intensity of relationships. Overall,
structural embeddedness tends to reduce transaction uncertainty and facilitate
coordination in alliances as it "facilitates shared understandings and rules for
collaboration that distinct organizations bring to their joint activities" (Jones &
Lichtenstein, 2008, p. 239).
To summarize, choosing alliance partners can be viewed as a specific instance
of Williamson's make-or-buy decision (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999) with alliance
networks exhibiting both relational and structural embeddedness (Jones &
Lichtenstein, 2008). By integrating TCE with social network theory, "we can
enhance our understanding of the origins and persistence of structural embeddedness
and social mechanisms that allow network governance to emerge and thrive" (Jones,
Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). Alliance networks are deliberately designed networks
(Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999), which fits with Williamson's discriminating
alignment hypothesis (Williamson, 1991). Finally, alliance networks incorporate the
economic decisions at the dyad level associated with TCE and aggregate them up to
the network level - with lead firm networks being a salient example (Lorenzoni &
Lipparini, 1999; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007).
Next, I describe a particular type of lead firm networks - those designed for
temporary interorganizational projects. Temporary interorganizational projects
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combine high time pressure, project complexity, multiple network partners, and a
high need for coordination (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008) - all of which are necessary
for network governance to emerge and thrive (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997).
Temporary Interorganizational Projects
Interorganizational projects, "in which multiple organizations work jointly on
a shared activity for a limited period of time, are increasingly used to coordinate
complex products/services in uncertain and competitive environments" (Jones and
Lichtenstein, 2008: 232). This type ofjoint collaboration has been studied in
industries such as advertising, (Grabher, 2002), construction (R.G. Eccles, 1981),
biotechnology (W. W. Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996) and financial services
(Eccles & Crane, 1988; Podolny, 1993, 1994). Interorganizational projects thrive in
both the public and private sectors. Jones and Lichtenstein (2008) cite several
examples in the public sector, including large public infrastructure projects (Altshuler
& Luberoff, 2003) and urgent responses to natural disasters and social crises (2005a;
Moynihan, 2005b, 2005c). Interorganizational projects require governance forms that
align with lead firm networks (R.G. Eccles, 1981; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007).
Jones and Lichtenstein (2008: 234) describe how firms intermingle in the temporary
project space as lead firms and subordinates:
In some cases, the (lead firm) is a coordinator of multiple independent entities,
as for example a construction contractor working with dozens of individual
contractors in 'quasi-firms' (Eccles, 1981), or large engineering firms that
may employ hundreds of subcontracting companies in 'mega-projects'
(Berggren, Soderlund, & Anderson, 2001). In a similar sense, the (lead firm)
may represent multiple actors. In complex cases, multiple clients work with
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multiple (lead firms) in large scale infrastructure projects (Morris & Hough,
1987).
In temporary organizing, the pool of potential partners that a lead firm can
select from is stable, though partner firms often move among and between lead firms.
This unique characteristic to temporary organizing increases structural embeddedness
(M. Granovetter, 1992; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). Within this pool of structurally
embedded network partners, subcontracting firms are more specialized and end up
performing a similar task for multiple lead firms, sometimes engaging multiple lead
firms in the same industry simultaneously (Bechky, 2006; R.G. Eccles, 1981; Jones &
Lichtenstein, 2008).
In her study titled "Gaffers, Gophers, and Grips: Role Based Coordination in
Temporary Organizations," Bechky (2006) studied structural embeddedness directly
by examining the intermingling of subcontractors that serve the film industry. Due
to the highly complex tasks and short time durations, subcontractors in the film
industry are selected and monitored more through social mechanisms than formal
contracts (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Walter W. Powell, 1990). Eccles (1981,
p. 340) also found this in his study of construction firms, noting that relations
between subcontractors and general contractors are generally stable and continuous
over long periods of time. The effect of these highly embedded relationships suggests
temporary projects are governed with more informal mechanisms. This contrasts
with traditional hierarchies that view external relationships through arms-length
contracts (Bechky, 2006, p. 3).
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A key distinction of interorganizational project collaborations from more
commonly studied interorganizational collaborations like joint ventures and strategic
alliances, is that projects by definition are temporary (Jones and Lichtenstein, 2008:
232):
Interorganizational projects exist for a limited period of time designated by
pre-established end point in order to carry out pre-specified goals; when these
goals are completed, the project organization literally dissolves ... In
contrast, joint ventures and alliances, at least in the literature that uses them,
rarely specify an expected end date.
Eccles (1981) noted these conditions in his study of construction firms. Since
temporary organizing is temporally limited (a film location or construction site) and
site-specific: "Limitations are put on the length of time opportunism has to be
suffered .. , And because jobs are performed on different sites. " contract renewal for
the next job is necessary since the relationship is automatically 'dissolved'" (KG.
Eccles, 1981, p. 342). More typical alliances, such as joint ventures and strategic
alliances are established with an expectation of ongoing and open interactions (Jones
and Lichtenstein, 2008). Traditional alliances facilitate access to unique resources
and capabilities (Gulati, 1999) and having a portfolio ofpartners may provide a basis
for competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000;
Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Koka & Prescott, 2002; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002).
However, due to the unspecified temporal dimensions of traditional alliance
networks, empirical examination of temporal effects on organizational governance
has received little attention (Anand & Khanna, 2000). While firms typically
announce new alliances with great fanfare, reliable data on alliance dissolution is
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rarely made available (Podolny & Page, 1998). Due to explicitly stated beginning
and end dates, temporary networks provide a fruitful setting to examine both tie
formation and dissolution among networks (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008).
Jones and Lichtenstein (2008) suggest temporary alliance networks require
special coordination techniques stemming from "temporal embeddedness." Temporal
embeddedness captures "how the variance in the duration ofprojects influences what
kinds of coordination techniques are used to manage uncertainty when multiple
organizations collaborate to create ajoint project or service" (Jones & Lichtenstein,
2008, p. 233). The concept of temporal embeddedness aligns nicely with Masten et
al.' s (1991) exchange condition oftemporal specificity. Temporal specificity
suggests that "when timely execution by a partner is critical to success, delay
becomes a potentially effective strategy for exacting price concessions" (Scott E.
Masten, Meehan Jr., & Snyder, 1991, p. 9). Thus, in temporary projects, the
exchange condition of temporal specificity is a key driver of organizational form.
Jones and Lichtenstein (2008:240) define temporal embeddedness as "the expected
duration of an interorganizational project," and I frame its impact on organizational
forms as an exchange condition, consistent with Masten et al.'s (1991) temporal
specificity.
Table 5 compares traditional alliance networks and temporary alliance
networks in terms of the pre-conditions of network governance. As discussed in the
previous chapter, by combining TeE with Powell (1990), Jones et al. (1997:918)
identify four conditions necessary for network governance to emerge and thrive: "(1)
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demand uncertainty with stable supply, (2) customized exchanges high in human
asset specificity, (3) complex tasks under time pressure and (4) frequent exchanges
among parties comprising the network."
Table 5: Comparing Traditional and Temporary Networks
Traditional Alliance TemporaryPre-Conditions for Network Networks InterorganizationalGovernance Networks
Demand Uncertainty High High
Stable Supply Mixed to Low High
(Binding dyadic (Many lead
relations with firms/subcontractors to
unspecified time choose from with highly
horizons) specified and short time
horizons)
Customized Exchanges high in Yes YesHuman Asset Specificity
Frequent exchanges among Yes Yespartners
Task Complexity High High
High Time Pressure Mixed to Low High
Thus, temporary alliance networks represent a promising setting to study
network governance as this setting meets each criteria for the emergence and
persistence of network governance (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). Next, I
extend and amend previous conceptions of temporary project organizing (R.G.
Eccles, 1981; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008) by describing the process lead firms enact
to design temporary networks and by defining a new term to capture variation across
temporary networks - Aggregate Tie Strength.
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Temporary Interorganizational Networks
Following Jones and Lichtenstein (2008), I use the term "temporary
interorganizational network" (TIN) to refer to the network organizational form that a
lead firm (ego) assembles in response to a temporary project. TINs are a network
organizational form composed of two or more fimls that is designed to complete a
specific project over a known time duration. While Jones and Lichtenstein (2008)
describe various "ideal types" of organizing for temporary projects, they do little to
elucidate the mechanisms lead firms use in selecting partners. Next, I describe the
iterative process of selecting partners to match project characteristics.
Figure 1 depicts the iterative process lead firms use to design a TIN around a
project with known parameters. First, the lead firm receives a request for proposals
(RFP) for a project with known characteristics. Then, this lead firm considers the
population of available network partners, drawing on recent experience interacting
with these partners (e.g. Gulati, 1995). The lead firm then designs a network
architecture that represents the optimal match of network partner skills with proj ect
characteristics.
As depicted in Figure 1, when lead firms design TINs, they take into account
the characteristics of a current project to determine "who does what" while
simultaneously considering recent interactions with potential partners. Recall,
relational embeddedness has been defined as "the degree to which exchange parties
know of and consider one another's needs and goals (Granovetter, 1992)" - franled as
"who does what" by Jones and Lichtenstein (2008).
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Figure 1: The Iterative Design of a TIN According to Project
Characteristics
Second, the iterative design process accounts for the extent of repeated partnerships, a
critical component of relational embeddedness (M. Granovetter, 1992; Jones,
Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). Because TINs are transient organizational structures,
lead firms will have worked with a large number of partners over several types of
projects. Due to these experiences, they can assess how the quality of prior
relationships with particular partners may affect the current project. Comparing the
costs and benefits of these prior relationships enacts an iterative design process that
ultimately results in a project specific TIN.
However, as reviewed in Chapter II, a limitation ofpast studies that examined
the effects of repeated partnerships on organizational performance is that the value of
prior partnerships is assumed to be durable over time. This suggests that the mere
presence of a prior tie with a network partner brings value to a lead firm, but ignores
the fact that the value of ties decays rapidly with time (Gulati, 1995). In order to
77
incorporate both the presence of previous ties and how their value may erode with
time, I introduce a measure that captures relational embeddedness due to the presence
of repeated ties, but also considers their value over time and any potential decay.
Aggregate Tie Strength: A Composite Measure of Network Structure
To capture these temporal aspects of how relational embeddedness affects the
value of network ties, I introduce a composite measure of network structure,
Aggregate Tie Strength. Aggregate Tie Strength (ATS) captures relational
embeddedness in the context of TINs. However, my conceptualization of ATS
extends previous treatments of repeated partnerships by limiting the temporal window
through which a former tie adds value. Borrowing from Gulati's (1995) empirical
finding that the value of repeated partnerships decays rapidly, my conceptualization
ofATS only includes the sum of recent interactions between a lead firm and its
network partners. Gulati (1995) empirically found that only the four most recent
partnerships bring value to the current relationships, I use this finding and only
account for the most recent partnerships to compute ATS. Thus ATS represents past
relationships and future possibilities as interdependent, which more accurately
reflects the decision processes in network partner selection (Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu,
2008).
Higher values of ATS indicate a TIN using fewer and better-known partners.
Higher ATS values indicate a tight network with strong ties - high relational
embeddedness, which can result from several scenarios. For example, high values
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can result from either a large number of repeated partnerships that increase the value
of the numerator or from a lower value in the denominator (choosing only a select
few partners to do more of the work) or some combination of the two. Lower values
of ATS indicate lower tie strength, which is indicative of a wider network consisting
of more network partners, fewer repeated partners, and partners with more disparate
and more specialized skills. Having defined a measure to capture variation in
network organizational structure, next I revisit my research question: How do
exchange conditions and interfirm partnerships interact to affect the structure and
performance oftemporary interorganizational networks?
Investigating the Relationship between Exchange Conditions, Network
Governance Structure, and Performance
In this section, I develop an empirical model that allows testing how exchange
conditions affect the structure and performance of temporary interorganizational
networks (TINs). First, I present a general conceptual model (Figure 2) that reviews
the exchange conditions Jones et al. (1997) suggest are necessary for network
governance to persist. Figure 2 also extends their model into the context ofTINs by
including temporal specificity as an exchange condition (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008;
Scott E. Masten, Meehan Jr., & Snyder, 1991). TINs represent an exciting theoretical
setting to investigate how exchange conditions and network governance structure
affect network organizational performance. The remainder of this chapter develops
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conceptual and empirical models specific to the context of temporary organizing,
using TINs to test these relationships.
To extend the general model shown in Figure 2, I propose a relationship exists
between exchange conditions, network governance structure, and performance.
Performance is defined as the lowest total cost for structuring a TIN. Costs for
structuring a TIN arise from exchange conditions (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997),
but they also arise from the quality of the relationships a lead firm has with its
partners (M. Granovetter, 1992; Gulati & Singh, 1998). Relational embeddedness
captures the quality of relationships a lead firm has with its partners and is also a
primary driver of organizational forms (M. Granovetter, 1992; Jones, Hesterly, &
Borgatti, 1997; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). These factors give me reason to believe
that both exchange conditions and relational embeddedness (ATS) affect
performance. In the following paragraphs, I develop an empirical model to capture
both the moderating and mediating effects that exchange conditions and ATS have on
performance.
Figure 2: Exchange Conditions Common to TINs (Adapted from Jones at aI.,
1997)
Exchange Conditions
Network Governance
Human Asset Specificity Structure
Uncertainty
Aggregate Tie StrengthTask Complexity
Task Duration (ATS)
80
Figure 2 specifies the exchange conditions needed for network governance to
emerge as shown in Jones et aI., (1997) (human asset specificity, uncertainty, task
complexity) and adds temporal specificity in the form oftask duration (Jones &
Lichtenstein, 2008; Scott E. Masten, Meehan Jr., & Snyder, 1991). It is worth noting
that high human asset specificity is especially prevalent in networks and in TINs
(Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). Additionally,
customization of products and services is common among firms cooperating in
networks (Miles & Snow, 1992). The interaction of high human asset specificity and
high product customization increases the risks associated with human assets
"quitting" an exchange or reducing their efforts (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997, p.
920), because in the more ephemeral relationships found in networks, these "assets"
are more dependent upon one another's cooperation to complete an exchange (Coff,
1993). For this study, I do not measure human asset specificity directly; rather I
follow Jones et aI. (1997) and treat human asset specificity as a necessary component
of all exchanges that occur within TINs. Thus, Figure 2 serves as a general
conceptual model for how certain exchange conditions affect governance structure in
the context ofTIJ~s.
While Jones, et aI. (1997) proposed the interaction of these effects broadly
promotes embeddedness among network partners, I am interested in extending Figure
2 to look at the joint effects of exchange conditions and network structure on
performance. To model exchange conditions, I use project characteristics and to
model governance structure, I follow other scholars who have used lead firm
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networks to unpack how the these networks are designed and the implications of
network design on performance (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Provan, Fish, &
Sydow, 2007).
As discussed previously, TINs represent a salient example oflead firm
networks because they combine economic and sociological logics to explain network
structure and performance. In economics, networks have been treated as a variant of
the make-or-buy decision (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999). The
same logic by which firms choose between the extremes of make-or-buy (Scott E.
Masten, Meehan Jr., & Snyder, 1991; Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Walker & Weber,
1984) is expected to continue once firms elect to form an alliance (Gulati & Singh,
1998). Additionally, alliance networks exhibit relational embeddedness (Jones &
Lichtenstein, 2008), a critical measure in sociology. Since lead firm networks are
deliberately designed networks, these networks fit with Williamson's discriminating
alignment hypotheses (Williamson, 1991). This suggests that lead firms select
partners to reduce production and transaction costs according to factors that align
exchange conditions with the cumulative capabilities found among a TIN's partners.
Research suggests the quality of relationships between partners drives the
economic performance of these organizational forms (Robert G. Eccles, 1981; R.G.
Eccles, 1981; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999). For example, Eccles (l981a, b) found a
select, persistent set of well-known and trusted subcontractors improves the
efficiency of organizing in the construction industry. Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999)
found that as the quality of partners increases, the costs of organizing are reduced.
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Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) link these cost efficiencies to gains from tight,
repeated, and trust-based partnerships that bring both sustainable competitive
advantage and cost economies to organizing. Collectively, these studies suggest that
exchange conditions do not provide a complete explanation of the perfonnance of
networks; only when exchange conditions are linked with partner characteristics can
perfonnance be fully explained. This is a very strong statement, implying that
repeated partnerships explain why or how exchange conditions cause perfonnance.
Analytically, this logic requires a test ofmediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). As
described earlier, I operationalize repeated partnerships as Aggregate Tie Strength
(ATS) and, following these scholars, propose that ATS mediates the relationship
between exchange conditions and perfonnance.
From Mediation to Moderation
Scholars have shown that exchange conditions and repeated partnerships can
have synergistic effects on perfonnance (Gulati, 1998; Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008).
Exchange conditions and past partnerships are necessarily intertwined as origins of
economic efficiency (M. Granovetter, 1985; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Poppo,
Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). Repeated partnerships act as a "social lubricant" to transactions
that enhances task coordination between parties engaging in network partnerships
(Gulati, 1998). Additionally, parties that choose to cooperate in repeated partnerships
develop "credible assurances" that partnerships will continue into the future (Dyer &
Singh, 1998). This expectation of continuity is an effective contractual safeguard
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because repeated partnerships and long-tenn contractual relationships contain
customized provisions that safeguard exchanges from opportunistic behaviors (Poppo
& Zenger, 2002).
Poppo et al. (2008) suggested exchange conditions influence the expectation
ofcontinuity among network partners. This proposed interaction of exchange
conditions and repeated partnerships in shaping network perfonnance requires an
analytic test of moderation. Figure 3 shows the complete empirical model for this
study.
Figure 3 depicts the tests of mediation using solid lines and depicts the tests of
moderation using dashed lines. For the mediation analysis, ATS mediates the
relationship between proj ect characteristics and perfonnance. I begin with
hypotheses to test the direct effect ofproject characteristics on ATS (Hypotheses 1a-
c), followed by a hypothesis that tests the direct effect of ATS on perfonnance
(Hypothesis 2a). The relationships for these direct effects are depicted with solid
arrows between variables. The dashed arrows shown below depict the interaction
between exchange conditions and ATS. As described above, exchange conditions are
expected to enhance or reduce the direct effect of ATS on perfonnance (Poppo, Zhou,
& Ryu, 2008).
Exchange Conditions and Governance Structure
In order to unpack the effects of exchange conditions on network structure, I
begin by examining how project characteristics affect the structure of TIN's. Under a
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discriminating alignment approach (Williamson, 1991), lead firms will design
networks to reduce the production and coordination costs on a project-by-project
basis.
Figure 3: General Empirical Model
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Since network governance relies on the interdependence of embeddedness and
exchange conditions, I develop a series of hypotheses according to literature from
TCE (Scott E. Masten, Meehan Jr., & Snyder, 1991; Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Walker
& Weber, 1984; Williamson, 1975, 1985b, 1991), capabilities (e.g. Eisenhardt &
Martin, 2000; David J. Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 2000), and alliances (e.g. Dyer and
Singh, 1998; Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Gu1ati and Singh, 1998) on how these literatures
jointly inform network partner selection. From TCE and Capabilities, a firm should
internally produce goods that are close to its area of expertise, core to its business,
and related to items it already produces (J. B. Barney, 1986; Praha1ad & Hamel, 1990;
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Wernerfelt, 1984). From alliance literatures, firms should seek to exert higher levels
of hierarchical control when forming alliances with these same three properties (R.G.
Eccles, 1981; Gulati & Singh, 1998). By combining insights from these two
literatures, I offer hypotheses that link partner selection to project complexity, project
duration and project uncertainty. Figure 4 outlines hypotheses 1a-c that unpack this
relationship.
Figure 4: Hypothesis 1- How Do Exchange Conditions Affect ATS?
Project Complexity H1a (-)
ATS
Project Duration H1b (+)
Project Uncertainty H1c (+)
Project complexity is defined as the number of specialized inputs required to
complete a project (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). As project complexity
increases, the number and specialization of tasks increases, which affects production
by increasing the amount and types of equipment needed, increasing the diversity of
materials used, and increasing the amount of subcontracting (Robert G. Eccles,
1981). Under these highly complex conditions, the network form of governance is
particularly suited to integrating the actions of multiple autonomous firms (Jones,
Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997).
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This discussion is similar to modularity (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996).
Modularity is founded on an expectation that "strategies, technologies, and
transactions all change over time" (Baldwin, 2008, p. 156) which encourages firms to
conduct transactions through loosely-coupled networks or "modular organizations"
(Hoetker, 2006). Modular organizations are designed around loose-couplings
between organizational units allowing the various units involved in production to
operate autonomously and be easily reconfigured (Hoetker, 2006; Sanchez &
Mahoney, 1996). Hoetker (2006:502) suggests that in modular organizational design,
characteristics of the organization mirror the characteristics of the product:
A new notebook computer model requires the design of the computer as a
whole and of components including the hard drive, display and keyboard. The
notebook manufacturer organizes the design process by choosing a supplier
for each component and structuring the coordination between them. During
the product design process ... the suppliers will develop their respective
components, the firm will develop the end product, and they will work
together so that the individual components integrate effectively into the end
product.
In modular organizations, "a tightly integrated hierarchy is supplanted by a loosely-
coupled network of organizational actors" (Schilling & Steensma, 2001, p. 1149).
Within these loosely-coupled networks, transactions are not technologically
determined, rather, they arise through the interplay of cooperating firms' knowledge
and resources and in alignment with a specific opportunity (Baldwin, 2008).
Collectively, this literature on modular organizations suggests that as project
complexity increases, organizational characteristics will mirror those of the project
and increase in complexity as well.
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Another reason lead finns may reduce relational embeddedness when
complexity is high is to take advantage of knowledge and skills found among their
wider network of partners. Lead finns can benefit from external finns' expertise
when pursuing complex projects (Argyres, 1996; Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander,
1992; Rubin, 1973). Additionally, complex projects may benfit from leveraging the
flexibility of the network fonn of governance to integrate multiple autonomous,
diversely skilled parties to complete a project (Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 2001).
The use of more diverse partners that complete a greater portion of the work reduces
relational embeddedness and results in a lower value of ATS.
Hypothesis 1a: Higher levels ofproject complexity will be associated
with lower levels ofATS within TINs
Proj ect duration is associated with the size of a proj ect. Eccles (1981)
suggested project duration is directly linked to project size because it is reasonable to
assume larger projects require more labor, materials, and are more costly. Large,
high budget projects are associated with longer time durations (Jones & Lichtenstein,
2008) and induce lead finns to fonn stable and continuous relations with their
partners (R.G. Eccles, 1981). Longer interactions enhance incentives for greater
cooperation, which increases the cost-effectiveness of trust as a contractual safeguard
(Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). For example, "when the expected payoffs from a finite
series ofcooperative exchanges are known and large compared to the gains of
defecting in the present [and losing the stream of returns from future business],
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parties choose to cooperate" (Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008, p. 41). Longer projects
increase expectations of continuity, trust, and enhance the transfer of private or tacit
knowledge (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Tesler, 1980). Each of
these conditions suggests projects of greater duration will encourage stronger
networks with a dense cluster of strong ties so that firms can capitalize on these
benefits.
Longer durations also allow firms to gain efficiencies from developing
superior interorganizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and these longer
relationships allow cooperating firms to derive benefits from dedicated resources
(Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). A select group of partners that interact over time
derives benefits from information sharing (Dyer, 2000; Hayes, Wheelwright, & Clark,
1988), trust (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998) and greater cooperation (Carson,
Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Heide & John, 1990). Using a smaller group of partners with
long standing relationships increases relational embeddedness and results in a higher
value of ATS, which provides the logic for hypothesis 1b:
Hypothesis 1b: Higher levels ofproject duration will be associated
with higher levels ofATS within TINs
Uncertainty has been a central component ofmultiple theories of
organizations (March & Simon, 1958; Jeffrey Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson,
1967). Researchers in strategic management have also considered uncertainty as a
major factor affecting strategic decisions (M. Porter, 1980). Within strategic
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management, Williamson (1985) suggested two types of uncertainty most affect the
transaction environment, primary and secondary uncertainty. Primary uncertainty
refers to a lack of knowledge about exogenous states of nature, whereas secondary
uncertainty refers to a lack ofknowledge about other economic actors (Williamson,
1985b).
Project uncertainty, as used in this study, fits Williamson's definition of
primary uncertainty. Project uncertainty arises from exogenous sources and is a
characteristic of the task environment for a particular project. While the alliance
literature suggests pure task uncertainty can be reduced only over time (Santoro &
McGill, 2005), it also characterizes task uncertainty as a cause ofmore endogenous
forms of uncertainty, which can be reduced by a firm's actions (Folta, 1998). Thus,
task uncertainty and secondary uncertainties work in concert to explain the structure
and performance of TINs.
An increase in the uncertainty within a firm's task environment also increases
risks from behavioral (secondary) uncertainty arising from opportunism (Williamson,
1985b). Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998) suggest that primary and behavioral uncertainty
are interdependent and jointly inform network partner selection. Within TINs
specifically, two types of secondary or "supplier uncertainty" (Sutcliffe & Zaheer,
1998) affect TIN organization the most. These types of secondary uncertainty arise
from the volume of use for a transaction-specific technology and the potential for
opportunistic behaviors by network partners.
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Jones and Lichtenstein (2008) suggest volume uncertainty and behavioral
uncertainty among partners affect temporary organizing the most. Volume
uncertainty refers to the anticipated volume of use for a particular technology, asset or
transaction component and the confidence placed upon estimates of its future demand
(Walker & Weber, 1984). Due to its rigid role structure among subcontractors
(Bechky, 2006; R.G. Eccles, 1981) temporary organizing reduces some concerns of
volume uncertainty, but the positive effects of role coordination diminish as
uncertainty increases. Role based coordination arises from repetitive, continuous and
unchanging future opportunities, such as the workers that hold microphone booms for
film projects (Bechky, 2006). However, when future opportunities are not as
predictable, role-based coordination is dominated by relational mechanisms and trust
(Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). Eccles (1981) found an increasing reliance on trust in
uncertain situations in the home building industry, an industry where quasi-firms and
temporary networks are the dominant organizational form. Eccles (1981) found that
general contractors preferred to use the same set of subcontractors whose work they
knew they could rely upon.
Behavioral uncertainty increases risks associated with appropriability (Oxley,
1999) and favors engaging fewer partners and employing internal governance (Dyer,
1996a; Walker & Weber). Additionally, behavioral uncertainty coupled with task
uncertainty makes comprehensive contracting with partners more difficult (Argyres &
Mayer, 2007; Hart, 1995; Williamson, 1985b). Finally, "a lack of experience with a
partner will increase concerns about the potential quality and quantity of that
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partner's contributions, especially when task uncertainty is high ... partner
uncertainty will compound the risks from task uncertainty" (Santoro & McGill, 2005,
p. 1263). Networks higher in shared experience and smaller in total number of
partners will exhibit a higher value of ATS, which sets up hypothesis lc:
Hypothesis 1c: Higher levels ofproject uncertainty will be associated
with higher levels ofATS within TINs
Next, I examine the interaction of project characteristics and network structure
on network organizational performance. Recall, for this study organizational
performance increases as transaction and production costs decrease (Coase, 1937;
Williamson, 1975). Network governance is expected to be observed in situations
where the embeddedness of transactions within a wider social network enhances
organizational effectiveness by safeguarding exchanges more effectively than
markets, and adapting more effectively than hierarchies (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti,
1997).
Exchange Conditions, Governance Structure and Performance: Direct and
Moderated Effects
To test the interaction between exchange conditions and governance structure
on performance, a test of moderation is required. Within the specific context of TINs,
exchange conditions are expected to moderate the direct relationship between
governance structure (ATS) and performance. Figure 5 (below) models the direct
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effect between ATS and perfonnance (solid arrow) and the moderating effect that
exchange conditions have on ATS (dashed arrows). Depending on the type of
exchange condition, higher (lower) levels of ATS will enhance (reduce) the
perfonnance of network governance. Through a series of hypotheses, I unpack how
exchange conditions moderate the direct effect of ATS on perfonnance in temporary
interorganizational networks.
Figure 5: Testing the Moderating Effects of Exchange Conditions on
Governance Structure and Their Joint Impact on Performance
Governance Structure
Exchange Conditions
Project Complexity
Proj ect Duration
Project Uncertainty
ATS
H2b+
--- ----------------------.
H2c+
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H2d+
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H2a-
I Performance I
When considering the direct effect of governance structure on perfonnance,
one needs to consider how TINs differ from other governance structures. As
described earlier, TINs are a specific variant of network organization that mayor may
not derive benefits from relational embeddedness that are common in other
93
organizational forms. For example, relational embeddedness has been shown to
increase performance in more hierarchical governance forms due to efficiencies
gained from information sharing (Dyer, 2000; Hayes, Wheelwright, & Clark, 1988),
trust (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998) and greater cooperation (Carson, Madhok,
& Wu, 2006; Heide & John, 1990). However, these governance forms are more
permanent than those formed for temporary projects and the benefits from repeated
partnerships may not be as prevalent in TINs.
Within TINs, the pool of potential partners that a lead firm can select from is
large, stable, and highly specialized. Due to the high degree of specialization, partner
firms tend to work among and between lead firms performing similar functions,
instead of working with a select few lead firms and developing complex functions
(Bechky, 2006; R.G. Eccles, 1981; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). Kim, Oh and
Swaminathan (2006) suggest network governance is particularly susceptible to
adverse effects from relational embeddedness, because ties are formed and dissolved
with increasing frequency. They argue that forming and dissolving ties are each
associated with costs, and scholars cannot assume the same benefits found in
hierarchies translate directly to networks.
Research on the formation and dissolution of network ties has largely assumed
that changes in network structure result in beneficial or positive outcomes (Podolny &
Page, 1998). This literature suggests changes in network partners are a critical
strategic option for firms seeking to improve their capabilities (Hennart, Kim, &
Zeng, 1998; Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Borgatti, 1998). Under this
94
framework, "if organizations are dissatisfied with partners that do not provide the
desired resources, they attempt to change their partners to gain access to such
resources from new partners" (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006, p. 704). Because
scholars treat tie formation and dissolution as discrete events and not as a sequence of
events that unfold over time (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006), their theories largely
assume that tie formation and dissolution is easy and results in increasing strategic
flexibility. However, when tie formation and dissolution are considered as sequences
of events that unfold over time, the embedded nature of interorganizational ties
reduces flexibility (Uzzi, 1996). This is particularly true in repeated partnerships
where relationship-specific routines and co-developed assets further embed
relationships between cooperating parties. In these cases of heightened constraint,
Kim, Oh, and Swaminathan (2006) suggest "network inertia" may actually reduce
beneficial outcomes that could be achieved by changes in network partners. I aim to
investigate the effects of network inertia within the specific context of TINs.
According to structural inertia theory, inertia is an inevitable result of creating
a well-tuned organizational architecture that exploits strategic advantage (Barnett &
Carroll, 1995; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Kim et al. (2006: 705) characterize
network inertia in a similar fashion: "Network inertia can be regarded ... as a by-
product of the previously successful management of networks that generate synergies
for the participating organizations." Thus, relationships with partners that resulted in
past success are likely to be repeated. Over time, this behavior can result in
"competency traps" that actually reduce performance. Competency traps occur when
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a favorable perfonnance is attributed to an inferior routine, which causes
organizations to continue building and refining that routine at the expense of other,
better routines (Levitt & March, 1988). In the TIN context, positive perfonnance
outcomes from partnering with a select few partners will be repeated, but these
outcomes discourage the selection of potentially better TIN partners in the future.
Due to the nature of network inertia and its increasing embeddedness between TIN
partners over time, competency traps are likely to decrease perfonnance. This
infonns the direct effect between ATS and perfonnance. Higher values of ATS are
associated with higher values of embeddedness, which suggests the following
hypothesis:
H2a: As ATS increases, temporary interorganizational networkperformance
decreases
In addition to the direct effect of embeddedness on perfonnance, scholars
have shown that exchange conditions and embeddedness can have synergistic effects
on perfonnance (Gulati, 1998; Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). Exchange conditions and
past partnerships are necessarily intertwined as origins of economic efficiency (M.
Granovetter, 1985; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008).
Poppo et al. (2008) suggest that when exchange conditions and embeddedness work
collectively, their joint effects have a stronger impact on organizational perfonnance.
In the following hypotheses, I predict that the interactions between embeddedness and
exchange conditions will produce a synergistic effect on perfonnance.
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Exchange Conditions as Moderators of the Effect of Governance Structure on
Performance
Project Complexity
Project complexity increases the number of specialized inputs necessary to
complete a project (Jones et aI., 1997), which increases the coordination costs in
networks. Gulati and Singh (1998:782) define coordination costs in networks as "the
anticipated organizational complexity of decomposing tasks among partners along
with the coordination of activities to be completed jointly or individually across
organizational boundaries and the related extent of communication and decisions that
would be necessary." In situations where hierarchy is the preferred governance
mode, high complexity is expected to lead to an increase in hierarchical controls,
because such controls facilitate coordination, especially in situations of high
interdependence (Barnard, 1938; Chandler, 1962; Thompson, 1967). The higher the
anticipated interdependence between network partners, the higher the coordination
costs (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Gulati and Singh (1998) conclude that in cases where
coordination costs are high and complexity enacts higher interdependence between
network partners, more hierarchical forms, such as alliances and equity joint ventures
will result in better performance. Because joint ventures typically create shared
equity between partners, they act more like a single entity and have their own
hierarchical controls that allow managers to make on-the-fly adjustments more
effectively than other alliance forms (Parkhe, 1993; Pisano, Russo, & Teece, 1988).
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However, in cases where TINs are the preferred governance mode, project
complexity has the opposite effect and causes more modular forms of organizations to
emerge. Modular organizations address coordination demands by supplanting more
hierarchical alliance forms with a loosely coupled network of cooperating partners
(Hoetker, 2006). The central argument within modular systems is that while complex
projects may contain multiple interdependent components, the firms that produce
these components are interchangeable (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). Modular
organizations actually derive benefits from complexity, because if decision makers
are dissatisfied with a particular supply-chain firm, they can drop that firm while
creating minimal disruption to the overall project (Schilling & Steensma, 2001).
Because TIN's operate in industries where an adequate stock of role-based specialties
exist (Bechky, 2006; R.G. Eccles, 1981) subcontracting firms can be swapped in and
out with relative ease and at minimal cost (Hoetker, 2006).
To summarize, when project complexity is high, TINs that are designed more
like modular organizations will have better performance. TINs designed like
modular organizations will have lower values of ATS, reflecting a wider network,
fewer repeated partnerships, and a network of specialized and interchangeable
partners. Within the specific context of TINs, increasing project complexity will
tend to decrease values of ATS. This suggests that increasing levels ofproject
complexity will counteract the direct effect of ATS on performance.
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H2b: The negative influence ofATS on performance is moderated by project
complexity such that at higher levels ofproject complexity, the impact
ofATS on performance is lower
Figure 6: Project Complexity Moderates the Direct Effect of ATS on
Performance
-
ATS Performance
+
Project
Complexity
Project Duration
The second exchange condition expected to moderate the governance
structure/performance relationship is project duration. Because TINs are a temporary
governance structure, managing them over longer durations forces lead firms to
balance between opposing forces: more flexible networks that facilitate adaptation
versus more stable networks that facilitate coordination and increase efficiency.
Provan and Kenis (2008) propose that longer project durations favor network
structures with a strong central figure, such as lead firm networks. They suggest
longer time horizons favor stability over flexibility, because efficiency gains arising
from stable networks and known partners improve performance. Efficiency in
networks primarily arises through trust, shared experience, and a mutual
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understanding of each other's needs and goals (Gulati, 1998; Provan & Kenis, 2008);
all of which depend upon the amount of repeated partnerships and relational
embeddedness that partners bring to the TIN at its inception.
Efficiency gains from network stability are improved by partners' past history
and by partners' shared expectation for the project's future (Arino & Reuer, 2004).
When projects have longer durations, the "shadow of the future" tends to make the
partnership self-reinforcing and causes partners to think in win-win terms rather than
in a zero-sum way (Arino & Reuer, 2004; Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). This suggests
that when project duration increases, lead firms benefit more from strong and dense
networks with deeply embedded partners.
Eccles (1981) noted that in industries where temporary organizing is present,
relations between subcontractors and general contractors are generally stable and
continuous over long periods of time because cooperating firms derive efficiency
advantages from knowing each other's tendencies and routines and from sharing
common expectations. Nelson and Winter (1982) echo these findings, noting how
longer durations allow firms to gain efficiencies from developing superior
interorganizational routines. Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002) agree, suggesting longer
relationships allow cooperating firms to derive benefits from dedicated resources. A
select group of partners that interact over time derive benefits from information
sharing (Dyer, 2000; Hayes, Wheelwright, & Clark, 1988), trust (Zaheer, McEvily, &
Perrone, 1998) and greater cooperation (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Heide &
John, 1990).
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Select groups of partners who repeatedly work together fonn networks with
high values of ATS. Repeated interactions increase relational embeddedness, which
facilitates coordination as partners know and understand each other's preferences
(Grabher, 2002; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Uzzi, 1996). Greater coordination
attenuates transaction uncertainty, increases efficiency of exchanges, and improves
perfonnance. Collectively, these arguments suggest that projects with greater
duration will lessen the negative direct effect of ATS on perfonnance. For extremely
long projects, such as those lasting several years, the efficiency gains found through
strong and dense networks (high ATS) may overcome the negative perfonnance from
high ATS on shorter projects. This logic supports the following hypothesis:
H2c: The negative influence ofATS on performance is moderated by project
duration such that at higher levels ofproject duration, the impact of
ATS on performance is lower
Figure 7: Project Duration Moderates the Direct Effect of ATS on Performance
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Project Uncertainty
Finally, ATS and proj ect uncertainty are expected to have an interactive effect
on performance. Project uncertainty is a characteristic of a TTI'J"'s task environment.
When project uncertainty increases, risks associated with behavioral uncertainty and
opportunism increase (Williamson, 1985b). When considered together, project
uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty simultaneously inform network partner
selection (Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998). When TINs are designed under higher levels of
project uncertainty, lead firms must assess the resources a potential partner brings to
the TIN and assess how the value derived from that partner's resources may change in
the face of drastic changes in the external environment (Arino & Reuer, 2004). Some
unanticipated changes may increase the value of a partner's resources while others
may decrease the value of that partner's resources (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). For
example, Arino and colleagues (Arino, Torre, Doz, Ring, & Lorenzoni, 2002) showed
how a seemingly straightforward alliance between Coca-Cola and Nestle, formed to
distribute the iced coffee Nescafe, actually hurt Coca-Cola's sales in other areas.
Neither Coca-Cola nor Nestle anticipated this prior to forming the alliance, thus
contingencies for handling this development were not included in their initial contract
(Arino, Torre, Doz, Ring, & Lorenzoni, 2002). The inability of these partners to
adapt to this new information ultimately led to the dissolution of the alliance between
Coca-Cola and Nestle (Arino & Reuer, 2004).
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Because these future changes in value are unknown at the time an alliance is
formed, Reuer, Zollo and Singh (2002) suggest the initial governance decision is only
one component of a much broader series of challenges that cooperating firms must
adjust to in the face of uncertainty. The increasing reliance on adaptation under high
uncertainty favors TINs higher in relational embeddedness, because prior experience
with a partner increases flexibility and allows for lower cost adaptations (Luo, 2002).
In addition to costs arising from unknown future adaptations, costs from
uncertainty in networks also arise from concerns about future specifications, cost
uncertainties, and problems associated with observing partners' contributions (Gulati
& Singh, 1998). Each of these conditions increases the risks ofmoral hazard and
encourages the incorporation of more hierarchical controls in networks (Oxley, 1997;
Pisano, 1989; Pisano, Russo, & Teece, 1988). Within TINs, pressures that might
encourage hierarchical controls are met instead by increasing relational
embeddedness. Increasing relational embeddedness through repeated partnerships
and by using fewer and better-known partners allows for greater cooperation and
allows for adaptation at lower costs (Luo, 2002). These arguments imply that as
project uncertainty increases, TINs will adapt better ifthey have higher values of
ATS. To test this relationship, I hypothesize that increasing values of project
complexity wi11lessen the negative direct effect of ATS on performance.
H2d: The negative influence ofATS on performance is moderated by project
uncertainty such that at higher levels ofproject uncertainty, the impact
ofATS on performance is lower
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Figure 8: Project Uncertainty Moderates the Direct Effect of ATS on
Performance
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An Analysis of Learning Across a Population of TINs
A vast literature touts the learning benefits to firms from participating in
networks. Network ties are conduits for rapid knowledge transfer between partners
(Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Hamel & Prahalad, 1991; Kogut). Networks allow
collaborating firms to internalize one another's skills (Hamel, 1991b). Finally, the
dynamic capabilities literature suggests that learning is path dependent and "often a
process of trial, feedback, and observation" (David J. Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997,
p.523). I aim to investigate learning within the specific context of TINs.
Path dependent learning, due to its incorporation of feedback mechanisms,
aligns with behavioral learning theories. Behavioral learning theories depict learning
as a mechanistic and involuntary process where firms are assumed to repeat behaviors
that lead to pleasant outcomes and discontinue behaviors that lead to unpleasant
outcomes (Starbuck & Hedberg, 2001). One advantage of behavioral theories is they
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can explain how learning can improve over time, even when information about
individual manager perceptions is unavailable (Starbuck & Hedberg, 2001). I adopt a
behavioral perspective to learning and develop hypotheses that measure the adoption
of a network design based on past success or failure of this design across a population
of network organizations, holding project characteristics constant across time.
Population level learning is defined as "a systematic change in the nature and
mix of routines in a population of organizations arising from shared experience"
(Miner & Haunschild, 1995). Thus, population level learning is largely a study of
imitation - with the increasing adoption of successful routines drawing the majority
of scholars' attention (Miner, Kim, Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1996). Like their
counterparts in the network literature, scholars of population level learning largely
ignore failure. When failure is examined, population ecology scholars (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984) and a few studies of bankruptcy and disasters (Perrow, 1984; Sutton
& Callahan, 1987) treat failure as an outcome, and their findings are limited to causal
models of failure - what predicts it and how to avoid it (Miner, Kim, Holzinger, &
Haunschild, 1996). By treating failure as an independent variable, scholars can ask a
completely different series of questions. Specific to population level learning,
treating success or failure as an independent variable allows scholars to investigate
how success/failure at the organization level may affect a transformation at the
population level (Miner, Kim, Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1996).
Miner, et aI., (1996) suggest learning from success or failure at the population
level is evidenced by the increasing adoption of successful routines and the removal
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of routines that led to failure. They offer Volti's (1992) account of the removal ofthe
Pony Express mail delivery routine once railroads rose to prominence. Following the
rise of railroads, the nature and mix of routines for delivering transcontinental mail
changed and the removal of the Pony Express represents learning from failure (Miner,
Kim, Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1996, p. 240). I am interested in whether these same
effects - the increasing adoption ofbeneficial routines and the removal of deleterious
routines happens in the context oftemporary interorganizational networks. Since the
quasi-firm or temporary organization is characterized by a tight-knit culture of
subcontractors intermingling with lead firms (Bechky, 2006; R.G. Eccles, 1981; Jones
& Lichtenstein, 2008), these firms watch each other, communicate with each other,
and learn each other's routines over time. To study learning from success and failure
from these interactions, I offer the following hypotheses:
H3a: Populations ofnetwork organizations learn from success. When new
projects have similar characteristics to past projects, organizations
will exhibit learning by increasing the occurrence ofTIN's that
previously succeeded
Figure 9: Learning From Success Across a Population of TINs
Superior Performance of H3a+ Occurrence of the same TIN
TIN in the Past in the present
TIN i in Time(l_l1) TIN; in Time 1
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H3b: Populations ofnetwork organizations learn from failure. When new
projects have similar characteristics to past projects, network
organizations will exhibit learning by reducing the occurrence of
TIN's that previously failed
Figure 10: Learning From Failure Across a Population of TINs
Inferior Performance of Occurrence of the same
TIN in the Past H3b - TIN in the present
TIN j in Time(t_n) TIN j in Time t
This concludes Chapter III. The goal of this chapter was to develop a series of
hypotheses that examined how exchange conditions affect the structure and
performance of network governance. The chapter began by reviewing gaps in the
current literature associated with theoretical differences in level of analysis and with
the decay in the value of network ties over time; and also an empirical gap associated
the unavailability of network tie data that describes poor performance and failure.
The construct ofAggregate Tie Strength addresses these issues in two important
ways. First, ATS aggregates all of a lead firm's dyadic ties to the network level of
analysis and allows studying performance of the whole network. Second, ATS
incorporates Gulati's (1995) empirical finding that the value ofties is not durable and
decays over time. Finally, by studying temporary interorganizational networks
(TINs), this chapter addresses the third gap in understanding. Since TINs involve the
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repeated formation and dissolution of ties over time, reliable data on how these
network changes affect performance is available. In the next chapter, I describe the
research setting, sample design, and method of analysis that allow me to test these
hypotheses.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter outlines the research design to test empirically the hypotheses
presented in Chapter III. The first section explains the nature and rationale of the
research method adopted for this study. The next section describes the empirical setting,
arguing that it offers an ideal setting to examine the structure and performance ofnetwork
governance. The sections that follow describe sources of data, data collection
procedures, provide the operational definitions of variables, and describe statistical
analysis techniques.
Description of the Research Method
Strategy research faces a difficult challenge because it studies a complex topic.
"Strategy" is a difficult to measure construct (Hambrick, 1980) because in practice,
strategies "can differ from competitor to competitor within the same industry" (Harrigan,
1983, p. 398). These challenges have led strategy scholars to follow a dichotomous
research approach, choosing between fine-grained methods that capture the nuance and
idiosyncrasies of individual organizations and more coarse-grained approaches that
facilitate generalizeability (Hambrick, 1980; Harrigan, 1983). Much insight can be
gained from fine-grained methodologies, such as ethnographies and cases studies, but
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these findings often lack generalizeability and statistical rigor (Hambrick, 1980).
Conversely, coarse-grained methodologies using data from sources such as PIMS and
COMPUSTAT introduce statistical rigor that may be generalizeable to other populations,
but they lose the nuance and insights about individual firm strategies that case studies can
provide (Harrigan, 1983). Harrigan (1983) promotes a mixed-method or "hybrid
methodology" for strategy research, which relies upon multiple data sources and intricate
sample designs. Intricate sample designs are those that incorporate their hypotheses into
decisions about data collection and sample stratification (Harrigan, 1983)
Research examining the effects of tie strength on network performance has
followed the dichotomous approach (Harrigan, 1983) found in the larger strategy
literature. At the fine-grained level, ethnographies and case studies have examined how
strong ties provide organizations advantages from trust, mutual adjustment, reciprocity
and from having a long-term perspective (Capaldo, 2007; Larson, 1992; Walter W.
Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1996). For example, in an ethnography of the New York City
garment industry, Uzzi (1996) observed that firms participating in strong and dense
networks derived advantages in information sharing that facilitated the fine-grained
exchange of tacit knowledge. Similarly, Larson's (1992) ethnography of entrepreneurial
firms across three industries found that firms become more dependent upon each other
and rely more strongly on trust when strong ties are developed.
Capaldo (2007) examined the effect oftie strength on organizational performance
in the Italian furniture industry. Using a comparative longitudinal case study
methodology, Capaldo (2007) redefined tie-strength for use at the network level of
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analysis (as discussed in Chapter 2). Capaldo suggests his definition of
interorganizationa1 tie-strength can facilitate empirical analyses at the coarse-grained
level, due to its incorporation of interorganizational resource commitments,
interorganizational social relationships, and a temporal dimension based on the frequency
of interorganizational exchanges. Next, I review prominent coarse-grained studies on
networks.
At the coarse-grained level, studies of network performance have relied on large
datasets and described aggregate trends (Ahuja, 2000; Dyer, 1996c, 2000; Goerzen, 2007;
Gulati,1995). Furthermore, coarse-grained studies ofnetwork performance tend to focus
on the largest companies within an industry, due to the availability of reliable data
(Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Ahuja (2000) studied the largest
international chemical firms in Western Europe, Japan and the United States and found
that larger numbers of strong ties increase innovation performance, but that this effect
was moderated by the number of weak ties. A large number of weak ties enhanced the
direct effect of strong ties on innovation output (Ahuja, 2000). This focus on the more
prominent companies can introduce several biases, such as survivor bias resulting from
studying only the most successful firms as well as issues with sampling on the dependent
variable - common in studies of patenting (Ahuja, 2000). Another methodological issue
that is particularly prominent when studying only the largest firms in an industry is
missing data. Over time, large firms tend to acquire other firms, creating unbalanced
panels and missing data in studies seeking to study the pattern of tie formation and
dissolution over time (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1995).
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Another issue that has plagued coarse-grained studies of network performance is
the presence of confounding results from similar empirical settings. Despite theoretical
support for the effects of strong and weak ties on network performance, several studies
have found conflicting results despite examining similar phenomena. For example, Dyer
(1996c) examined supplier networks among US and Japanese automakers. Using a
survey instrument across a diverse array of Japanese supplier/keiretsu networks,
including Toyota, Dyer (1996) found that tighter networks composed ofmore strong ties
enhanced quality and reduced cycle times. While Dyer's coarse grained study facilitates
generalizeability, his findings conflict with case study evidence that studied Toyota's
supplier network directly (e.g. Lincoln, Ahmadjian, & Mason, 1998). Lincoln,
Ahmadijan, and Mason (1998) found that strong ties to one supplier actually eroded ties
across Toyota's wider keiretsu supplier network. Additional conflicting findings have
emerged from multi-industry studies. For example, several multi-industry studies of tie
formation and patterns of tie development have examined the effects oftie strength on
economic performance (Goerzen, 2007; Gulati, 1995, 1998). These studies found mixed
results for the impact of tie strength on economic performance, suggesting the limitations
of coarse-grained methods to capturing how tie strength affects performance in networks.
To summarize, because dichotomous methodologies dominate the research on
how the presence of network ties affect organizational performance, our understanding of
this relationship is limited. Harrigan (1983) suggests several ways to reconcile this
methodological shortcoming, including the design of mixed-method studies and use of
intricate sample designs. Mixed-method studies offer advantages over purely fine-
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grained methodologies, because they facilitate generalizeability and often add statistical
rigor (Hambrick, 1980; lick, 1979). Mixed-method studies also help scholars elucidate
some of the idiosyncrasies and nuance that purely coarse-grained studies may lose in
their error terms (Harrigan, 1983; lick, 1979). In the absence ofmixed methodologies,
"intricate sample designs" are a means to unpack the idiosyncrasies of strategy (Harrigan,
1983). This dissertation represents a coarse-grained study coupled with an intricate
sample design that capitalizes on the author's years of experience working within the
bridge construction industry in Oregon.
In order to construct an intricate sample design, researchers must have detailed
knowledge about their empirical setting and organize their sample to align data collection
with the variables that their hypotheses test (Harrigan, 1983). Further, intricate sample
designs must integrate coarse-grained data from multiple locations and triangulate data
from multiple sources to increase the validity of the measures. When scholars use
intricate sample designs, more potentially confounding variables are controlled, which
helps ensure that interpretations of statistical coefficients are justifiable (Harrigan, 1983).
In the Sample Design section of Chapter IV, I describe in detail how I organized these
data to align with the hypotheses I tested. Prior to describing my intricate sample design,
however, I will describe my experience in the industry and the empirical setting.
From 1996 - 2001, I worked in the bridge construction industry in Oregon (the
empirical setting for this dissertation). As a manager in one of the more prominent firms,
my primary responsibility was to choose partners and to design alliance networks. Of the
roughly 40 lead firms in the research sample, I repeatedly competed against each of them
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on sealed bid proposals. To compete successfully for low-cost sealed bid projects, I
developed intimate knowledge ofmy competitors' equipment, capabilities, current
project commitments, and bidding strategies. I gained this knowledge via conversations
with multiple subcontractors, interacting with these firms at trade shows and training
seminars put on by equipment manufacturers, and by reviewing their pricing strategy
after each bid. Because these sealed bid proposals were for federally funded construction
projects, all of the documents were publicly available. Over time, these conversations,
trainings, and pricing reviews gave me intimate knowledge about each competitor's
capabilities, their bidding tendencies, and the types of projects with which each firm was
most successful. My experience provided me with detailed knowledge ofthis study's
empirical setting, which allowed me to construct an intricate sample design as suggested
by Harrigan (1983).
In the next section, I describe in further detail the empirical setting for which I
designed this study, offering additional examples of why this setting and my industry
experience represent a promising blend of fine-grained knowledge and coarse-grained
archival data from which to study the performance of networks.
Empirical Setting
To empirically examine the governance structure and performance of temporary
interorganizational networks (TINs), I adopt Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti's (1997:916)
definition of network governance: "a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous
firms engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open ended contracts
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to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges."
The ideal setting to investigate TIN governance structure and performance, as defined for
this study, would include a persistent and structured set of autonomous firms that join,
disband and rejoin network organizations according to the characteristics of an
opportunity (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997).
These settings are characterized by highly skilled human assets, demand
uncertainty, complex tasks, and downstream adaptation needs that require more flexible
organizational forms to facilitate network tie formation and dissolution (R.G. Eccles,
1981; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). While Jones et al. (1997) choose the film
industry as emblematic of these characteristics, I choose the bridge construction industry
in Oregon. Much like the film industry, bridge construction firms and their
subcontractors are autonomous units that regularly join, disband and rejoin networks;
however, the bridge construction industry introduces an additional industry-wide control
that facilitates testing the performance of these governance structures. Because bridge
construction is largely funded by the federal government, federal regulations only permit
a contract to be awarded to a general contractor with the lowest overall cost for
completing a bridge. In effect, this low-cost requirement controls for firm-level strategy
across all organizations, making this an excellent setting to examine the impact of
network structure upon organizational performance.
Eccles (1981) suggests the construction industry is an ideal empirical setting to
investigate how novel organizational forms respond to changes in market conditions.
The construction industry is broken into three SIC codes, one each for general building
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contractors, heavy and highway general contractors, and special trade contractors.
General building contractors build residential buildings, industrial buildings and
warehouses, and other types ofnonresidential buildings such as schools, stores,
restaurants, hospitals and churches. Heavy and highway general contractors perform all
non-building construction, including bridges, tunnels, various pipelines, dams, harbor and
port and military facilities. Special trade contactors offer plumbing, electrical, painting,
masonry, plaster, roofing, and other specialties that serve the other two categories as
subcontractors (Robert G. Eccles, 1981).
Eccles (1981) uses the term "subcontracting" to refer to the organizational form
adopted by general contractors who construct buildings and highways. Eccles (1981, p.
451) suggests, "Subcontracting in the construction industry is a response to uncertainty
arising from complexity, given the bounded rationality of the firm (Williamson, 1975)."
Construction, particularly of highway bridges, demands specialized expertise in
engineering, construction techniques, and project management (Robert G. Eccles, 1981).
Coordinating these specialists is problematic due to demand uncertainty in the
construction industry: "A general contractor cannot keep a large number of labor
specialties, with constant capacity per specialty, productively occupied because of the
great uncertainty about labor requirements by specialty" (Robert G. Eccles, 1981, p. 452).
Thus, coordinating and retaining these diversely skilled workers within a single firm
would increase transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) by placing a significant burden on
the general contractor to administer and coordinate all the various labor specialties.
Thus, subcontracting is the preferred option. Eccles concludes (1981, p. 451):
116
"Construction technology is intensive, requiring a project management form of
organization to cope with the complexity and uncertainty of the technology and with the
requirements for adaptability."
To summarize, due to highly skilled human assets, demand uncertainty, complex
tasks, and the ongoing adaptation needed to construct a building or bridge, more flexible
organizational forms like subcontracting are preferred. These exchange conditions are
those said to elicit network governance (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). Moreover,
bridge construction introduces an additional industry-wide control that facilitates the
testing of hypotheses about network governance. Bridge construction is largely funded
by the federal government and federal regulations require the award of a contract to
whichever general contractor submits the lowest bid for the project. This low-cost
requirement enhances this empirical setting by controlling for strategy across all
organizations.
In addition to the low cost requirement imposed on bridge construction
organizations in Oregon, several other controls are present in this research setting. First,
there is no product variation and each competing organization has near perfect
information about product characteristics in the form of engineering blueprints and
project specifications. Second, there is only one customer - the Oregon Department of
Transportation. Third, technology does not vary widely within the industry - cranes and
bulldozers are uniformly available and their functionality has remained consistent for
decades. Thus, organizations within this industry do not vary widely due to product
innovation, customer innovations, technology innovations, or strategy. The largest
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source of variation among organizations in this industry is how they organize their
governance structure.
In closing, I will reinforce one final and unique feature of this research setting -
its data. These data include comprehensive financial, organizational, and performance
information (down to the level of each individual network partner) on over 1600 detailed
proposals that bridge construction firms submitted in response to requests for proposals to
construct approximately 330 state highway bridges during the years 2000-2007. Each of
the 1600 proposals in this dataset specifies a unique network governance structure for
addressing a specific project, and these data cover both those proposals that succeeded in
being selected, and those that failed to be selected. Thus, my research design finesses a
conundrum that has plagued much prior research, the fact that only those organizations
that succeeded and survived are usually available to be studied. In contrast, I observe the
entire set of potential network designs - viable and nonviable alike. Next, I describe my
sample design.
Sample Design
The goal of the sample design was to construct a representative sample for a
larger population ofTemporary Interorganizational Networks (TINs). As described
above, the bridge construction industry in Oregon is an ideal setting to study TINs and
network governance. The question remains, are TINs formed to construct bridges in
Oregon representative of a larger population of TINs such that regression analyses
provide useful information that can generalize to this wider population.
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The ideal sampling method to test the hypotheses would be random sampling
from the entire population of US bridge construction firms. Random sampling produces
a probability sample, which allows the exact calculation of the extent to which a sample
value can be expected to differ from a population value. This difference is referred to as
sampling error (Hoyle, Harris, & Judd, 2002; McDaniel & Gates, 2008). When research
constraints, such as time constraints and data availability, make random sampling
prohibitive, nonrandom sampling methods are used. Since my empirical setting is
constrained geographically to the state of Oregon and temporally to the years 2000 -
2007, my sample is nonrandom. Still, several key factors allow me to construct a
representative sample using only information about bridge projects in Oregon.
Furthermore, econometric techniques exist to control for sample selection bias and allows
using regression analyses to generalize findings from a nonrandom sample to the wider
population it represents (Kennedy, 2003). Next, I discuss how I constructed a
representative sample of bridge construction firms and the analysis technique that allows
me to generalize the findings.
Constructing a representative sample ofthe larger US bridge construction industry
requires that the TINs building bridges in Oregon adequately represent TINs building
bridges in any US state. McDaniel and Gates (2008) suggest that "judgment sampling" is
an effective nonrandom sampling strategy for researchers with a high degree of
experience in an industry. Judgment sampling is applied to any sample in which the
selection criteria are based on a researcher's judgment about what constitutes a
representative sample (McDaniel & Gates, 2008). As described above, my experience
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building bridges according to federal guidelines makes me uniquely qualified to construct
a representative sample. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) oversees all
bridge construction projects in the US and their regulations apply to all 50 US states. Of
course, adjustments to geographic conditions in Oregon are made, but these affect the
engineering choices made in design, they do not alter the official rules of the FHWA.
Thus, the rules that govern bridge construction in Oregon largely govern all bridge
construction within the US, which facilitates generalizeability of regression results.
The next step in constructing a representative sample involves ensuring adequate
representation of US construction firms among the TINs working in Oregon. Theory on
construction firms suggests all strategic decisions (including bid proposal costs) are made
at the firm headquarters, even though the actual construction processes may occur in
entirely different locations (Robert G. Eccles, 1981; Seldin & Bloom, 1961). The lead
firms in my sample have headquarters in ten different states. These states are Oregon,
Minnesota, Utah, Washington, Pennsylvania, California, Ohio, Idaho, Nebraska, and
Illinois. Some of these lead firms (~10% of the sample) construct bridges in all 50 states.
Roughly 43% ofthe lead firms in the sample construct bridges in the states west ofthe
Rocky Mountains. All of the lead firms in the sample construct bridges in Oregon,
Washington, and Idaho. Thus, I am confident these data constitute a representative
sample of the wider population of US bridge construction firms.
Finally, debates about the usefulness of significance testing on nonrandom
samples continue within the literature (Schwab & Starbuck, 2009). Since my sample is
indeed nonrandom, some scholars may characterize these data as a subpopulation.
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Schwab and Starbuck (2009) suggest that since null hypothesis significance tests rely
upon random sampling techniques, their use on nonrandom samples and subpopulations
is misguided, because the means and variances of the nonrandom sample may bear no
knowable relationship to means and variances of the population they aim to represent.
To address these concerns, econometric models that incorporate sample selection
equations are increasingly used (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Kennedy, 2003; Shaver,
1998). Sample selection equations account for the sample selection phenomenon within
subpopulations, which avoids bias during estimation (Kennedy, 2003). Sample selection
techniques include two-stage techniques, such as the models prescribed by Heckman
(1976), as well as simultaneous equation models where the selection equation operates
simultaneously with the equation producing the parameter estimates. Kennedy
(2003 :284) suggests the Tobit regression model is particularly suited to analyzing
nonrandom samples and subpopulations because of its simultaneous equation model that
controls for sample selection bias during regression. Thus, while I agree that my sample
of Oregon construction firms is indeed nonrandom, my use of the Tobit regression model
(described later in this chapter) is an accepted technique to control for sample selection
bias, which suggests findings from my regressions indeed represent the wider population.
To increase the predictive power of regression results even further, Harrigan (1983)
suggests intricate sample designs enhance researchers' ability to interpret findings from
regression analyses.
Harrigan (1983) promotes the use of intricate sample designs to increase the
usefulness of findings from coarse-grained studies. As described above, coarse-grained
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studies and archival data increase the generalizeability of statistical analyses, but suffer
because only limited distinctions between the strategies of competitors in the same
industry can be made when solely using these types of data. In purely coarse-grained
studies, these interesting and subtle differences get lumped into the error term of
statistical analyses, which limits scholars' ability to tease out the important effects of the
explanatory variables despite any statistical significance (Harrigan, 1983). However, by
pursuing more intricate sample designs, scholars can unpack the idiosyncrasies between
firms that strategy researchers so desperately desire.
Intricate sample designs are those that incorporate their hypotheses into decisions
about data collection and sample stratification (Harrigan, 1983). Harrigan (1983) states:
"ifkey variables hypothesized to affect strategic choices are used as criterion variables
for segmenting the research sample, researchers ensure they can control for these
variables when analyzing the effects of other factors" (Harrigan, 1983, p. 402). To
restate Harrigan's (1983) point, careful planning of sample design that coaligns
hypothesized variables with sample preparation and organization allows scholars to better
assess the effects statistically significant (or insignificant) variables.
Following Harrigan (1983), my sample design is built specifically around the
hypotheses I sought to test. Because my hypotheses concern the effects of project
characteristics on network organizational performance, my data are organized by project,
and stratified by network organizational performance. For each bridge project that met
the empirical criteria, I include all of the proposals submitted and organize them
according to their relative performance. Additionally, control variables were organized
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on a project-to-project basis. Thus, the sample design reflects the hypotheses, which
increases my ability to make judgments about the strategies I modeled and their affects
on network organizational performance (Harrigan, 1983). Figure 11 represents the
sample design and stratification.
Figure 11: Sample Design and Stratification
Project 1 Controls Performance A Network Form A
Characteristics (Strategy variable)
Project I Controls Performance B Network Form B
Project Characteristics (Strategy variable)
1
Project 1 Controls Performance C Network Form C
Characteristics (Strategy variable)
Project 1 Controls Performance D Network Form D
Characteristics (Strategy variable)
Project 2 Controls Performance X Network Form X
Characteristics (Strategy variable)
Project
2 Project 2 Controls Performance Y Network Form Y
Characteristics (Strategy variable)
Sampling Frame
The sampling frame is a set defming which individuals, groups, organizations, or
other units of analysis qualify for a research sample (Hoyle, Harris, & Judd, 2002). The
selection process consisted of identifying all bridge projects constructed in the state of
Oregon from 2000 - 2007. This period was chosen because prior to February 2000, the
ODOT Subcontractor Disclosure Form (SDF) was not required. The SDF is a written
list of all network participants that perform greater than 5% of the work on a particular
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bridge project in Oregon. This list contains the name of each major subcontractor or
supplier used in each lead finn's bid proposal and is thus the source of all network-
partner data. SDF's from 2008 are not yet available, thus I stopped data collection in
December of2007.
In order for a project to be selected for the sample, it had to contain a bridge
structure or other traffic control structure (retaining wall) that was constructed on-site and
from raw materials. Some heavy highway construction projects, such as asphalt paving
overlay projects, are so reliant on specialized equipment (asphalt paving machinery), that
these proposals do not exhibit sufficient variation among network partners. In the paving
project example, the limited scope of operations and specialized equipment rely on
autonomous assets that limit strategic decisions because autonomous assets perfonn only
one function and are not redeployable to other functions (David J. Teece, 1984).
Further, to continue with the large paving project example, many of these projects
include bridge construction, but not all of them include on-site bridge construction from
raw materials. Eccles (1981) suggests the increased complexity from on-site construction
is inherently necessary to isolate the strategies behind subcontracting as an organizational
fonn (Page 460 - 461). In projects without on-site construction processes, the bridge
structures are so minor in size and so straightforward in scope that they are pre-
manufactured off-site and installed as modular systems once they are hauled to the
project location. The installation of these pre-fabricated modular structures requires no
particular expertise in construction or management. These items include pre-cast
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concrete box culverts, modular retaining wall systems, sign bridge supports, and even
segmental bridge sections that are bolted together much like a child's erector set.
To summarize, non-bridge heavy highway construction projects, such as asphalt
paving overlays, do not have sufficient complexity to cause lead firms to subcontract out
much of the work - thus they are not TINs. Because the network structures formed for
these non-bridge projects are not TINs, they are outside of the theoretical domain for this
study. In these non-bridge projects, asset specialization drives the structure and
performance of networks and often results in stand alone, single firm contractors
completing the work (Hampson & Tatum, 1997). Since this study is interested in
multiple firms organizing for construction projects, complex bridges that require complex
networks are of interest.
Bridge projects that require on-site construction from raw materials are
strategically different because they contain sufficient complexity in scope to require
multiple autonomous firms to furnish and integrate specialized inputs in a coordinated
fashion (Robert G. Eccles, 1981; Hampson & Tatum, 1997). To accurately select these
projects, I reviewed every Request for Proposals (RFP) issued by ODOT from 2000-
2007, and included all projects with bridge or traffic control (retaining wall) structures
that were constructed on-site and from raw materials (no modular or pre-fabricated
bridges). This initial screening process produced 335 bridge projects that elicited 1686
proposals. Figure 12 summarizes how I narrowed the sample after selecting these initial
1686 proposals.
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The second screening process in sample preparation eliminated missing data. For
the second screen, I looked over all 1686 proposals identified in the first stage and
eliminated any proposal that did not have a viable subcontractor disclosure (SDF) form
attached. The ODOT's archive department lost some SDF forms, sometimes lead firms
forgot to include them with their proposals and some SDF's were missing for reasons I
could not identify. This second screen reduced the sample size to 1380 proposals.
The third and final screening process removed projects that had no salient
indicator of task uncertainty. Task uncertainty is a form of primary uncertainty that
exists within an organization's external environment (Williamson, 1985b) and task
uncertainty is a primary driver of subcontracting in the construction industry (Robert G.
Eccles, 1981). Because my research design is limited to the domain of TINs, limiting the
sample to projects with clearly identifiable sources of task uncertainty is necessary to
ensure subcontracting occurs. To accomplish this, I limited the sample to only those
projects that contained project-specific environmental regulations, environmental rules,
or environmental performance stipulations. As described above, the Standard
Specification for all ODaT projects outlines "the rules" for working on any bridge
project in Oregon. These standard rules for environmental protection include some
common sense items such as "only use grade 2 diesel fuels to power on-road equipment"
and "only dispose of fuel in pre-approved containers." Since projects occur in different
geographic locations, different climates, and adjacent to different wildlife, the Standard
Specification is augmented by Project Special Provisions to account for these site-
specific concerns. The presence or absence of Special Provision 00290 could affect a
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lead finn's bidding strategy in many, unobservable ways, so I chose to eliminate all jobs
that were missing section 00290 in the Project Special Provisions. This reduced the
sample to 166 projects, which elicited 584 proposals. Figure 12 summarizes the sample
selection process.
As described earlier, the owner-detennined specifications reduce some of the
uncertainty for lead finns in this competitive bidding process. However, section 00290
remains a salient source of task uncertainty, in spite of attempts to reduce uncertainty in
other areas. Section 00290 involves rules and suggestions about older structures, about
horticulture in the surrounding area, and about the "expected behavior" of wildlife in and
around a project site. Trying to assess all of these potential uncertainties in a competitive
bidding situation is nearly impossible ex ante of beginning work. Next are some
examples of the type of infonnation contained within section 00290 - Environmental
Protection.
Section 00290 - Environmental Protection identifies potential sources of
environmental spills, dictates how to handle disposal, and suggests potential behavior of
wildlife that might be adjacent to a project site. For example, if a bridge project requires
the removal of an old structure that contains lead-based paint, section 00290 will stipulate
procedures for removal and disposal oflead-based paint to minimize any impact on the
local environment. Similarly, if a bridge is to be constructed over a river, environmental
regulations may stipulate that the surface of the river cannot be disturbed during fish
spawning seasons or that in-water pile driving cannot occur when birds are nesting
nearby. Section 00290 will also stipulate when these wildlife are expected to be in the
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Figure 12: Process of Sample Selection
Stage 1: Initial Identification of
Bridge Projects
ODOT Bid Tabulations
(2000 - 2007)
335 Total Bridge
Projects, eliciting 1686
Proposals
Project requirements include a
bridge structure for vehicles or
pedestrians, retaining walls, or
other major structures.
Sign bridges or minor structures
do not qualify
1686 Proposals
Stage 2: Proposal Screening
ODOT Subcontractor
Disclosure Forms
330 Total Bridge
Projects
Eliciting 1380 Proposals
HH""U~E> V~ u~complete
Subcontractor Disclosure
Forms result in these
proposals being
eliminated
Stage 3: Special Provisions
Screening
1380 Proposals
ODOT Project Special
Provisions
166 Total Bridge
Projects, eliciting 584
Proposals
Special Provisions must contain
Section 00290 - Environmental
Regulations
All Projects missing Section
00290 of the Special Provisions
are eliminated
Final Sample 584 Proposals
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area, but it does not give any concrete assurances of timing or suggested operational
changes a contractor should make once these wildlife are spotted - other than "stop what
you are doing." In contrast, if a bridge is constructed in a remote location, far from any
river and any wildlife, the Project Special Provisions may not contain any Section 00290.
This is because in these locations, the Standard Specifications cover all anticipated
construction issues and these standard rules do not need to be augmented with any site-
specific information. In the next section, I describe how I operationalized each variable
used in this study.
Data Collection
The unit of analysis for this dissertation is the Temporary Interorganizational
Network (TIN), whose structure and performance characteristics are contained within
bridge construction proposals. All proposals submitted to the Oregon Department of
Transportation (ODOT) for constructing a bridge contain the same types of data.
Proposals are submitted by lead firms and include detailed information on subcontracting
firms. Lead firms must be pre-qualified on an annual basis according to Oregon state
provision OAR 734-010 sections 240 - 280. Subcontracting firms do not have to be
pre-qualified by ODOT. The primary criterion for pre-qualification is a lead firm's
ability to insure their work through bonds from surety companies. Surety companies will
bond a particular lead firm to a maximum figure (in millions of dollars), and then ODOT
will limit the projects upon which a lead firm can bid based on what the surety company
is willing to insure.
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Bonding capacities are adjusted on an annual basis. If a lead finn has poor safety record
for a given year, their bonding capacity may be reduced. Alternatively, if a lead finn has
a good safety record and completes projects according to plan and on budget, their
bonding capacity may rise in the next year. This means that each year, a lead firm may
increase or decrease the size of a project they can bid on based on past perfonnance.
Once prequalified, a lead firm/general contractor engages in a competitive
bidding process to win the right to construct a project. In general, highway construction
involves submitting a competitive bid to the owner (ODOT in this setting) for a project
whose specifications are detennined by the owner, with the assistance of architects and
engineers (Robert G. Eccles, 1981). These specifications (design, perfonnance
requirements, and even construction methods) "largely detennine the types oflabor skills
needed and the amount and timing of their application" (Robert G. Eccles, 1981, p. 451).
The combination of competitive bidding, owner-detennined specifications, on-site
production, and custom building techniques introduces a high amount of uncertainty for
contractors and owners. To reduce this uncertainty as much as possible, general
contractors must review and submit multiple supporting documents with each bid. For
the owners, these comprehensive documents ensure prospective bidders understand the
complexity and uncertainty involved within this particular project and account for this in
their cost structures. For general contractors, these documents provide a means to assess
risk. While not all components of a particular project can be identified and assigned
stochastic weights reflecting their probability of occurrence (Knight, 1921), these
specifications provide a means to assess the risk of some components, which mitigates
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some ofthe uncertainty that is inherent to the larger process. Table 7 summarizes these
documents and indicates where these publicly available documents are located.
The main goal of the data collection was to find or construct objective measures
from these publicly available documents. Quantitative variables were extracted from
archival documents maintained by the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT).
Due to federal funding of bridge projects in Oregon, ODOT keeps a vast array of
information on project characteristics, firm performance, and the network of
subcontractors identified for each project. The variables were coded to align with theory.
They represent continuous measures that capture variation across TINs according to
exchange conditions, subcontractor network characteristics, performance ratios, and
control variables. Information for control variables, such as lead firm size and age, were
obtained from ODOT's General Prequalification Form, Dun and Bradstreet's
ReferenceUSA database, and state business directories, published by American Directory
Publishing and American Business Directories (1990- 2007). Table 6 summarizes the
constructs, variable types, and data sources used to construct each variable.
Data Sources and Operationalization of Variables
Due to the voluminous records kept by the Oregon Department of Transportation,
constructing variables to test my hypotheses was straightforward. Generally, I was able
to construct a continuous measure for each variable directly from the bid tabulations.
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Table 6: Data Sources Within Typical Bid Proposal Documents
Construct Name Type ofVariable Data Source
Aggregate Tie Strength Dependent Variable Subcontractor disclosure
Continuous form - required by ODOT
Ratio Variable
Performance Dependent Variable ODOT Bid Tabulations -
Continuous Publicly available documents
Ratio Variable that offer cost information on
a per project basis. Cost
information includes the
aggregate cost for a lead
firm's network, plus costs for
each sub-task needed to
complete the proiect
Project Complexity Independent Variable ODOT Bid Tabulations -
Continuous One specific component of
Ratio Variable the Bid Tabulations is the
Bid Schedule. The Bid
Schedule provides a count
and description of all the
work that needs to be
completed on a particular
iob.
Project Duration Independent Variable Bid Tabulations
Continuous
Project Uncertainty Independent Variable Project specifications for
Continuous environmental regulations
Ratio Variable (e.g. fish windows) with
specific penalties
Lead Firm-Size Control Variable ReferenceUSA, State
Business Directory as
published by the American
Directory Publishing and
American Business
Directories
Lead Firm Age Control Variable ReferenceUSA, State
Business Directory as
published by the American
Directory Publishing and
American Business
Directories
Project Frequency Control Variable Total sum of projects on
annual basis, as noted in
ODOT Bid Tabulations
Environmental Munificence Control Variable ODOT Bid Tabulations
Bid tabulations record detailed estimates of costs expected for completing a bridge
project for every submitted proposal. For each of the 584 proposals that were retained
from the 3-stage screening process, a complete bid tabulation was available.
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The bid tabulation is composed ofcost infonnation for each proposal, as well as a
schedule ofwork items that must be completed to satisfy the conditions of the RFP. This
work schedule, called the "bid schedule" by ODOT, stipulates each component of the
project that must be completed, including all bridge components, roadside improvements,
landscaping, grading and excavation work, lighting and electrical work, painting, paving,
and every other component needed to ensure the bridge is structurally sound and
aesthetically pleasing. A complex project consisting of multiple bridges in a heavily
populated area may require over 400 individual work items, while a similar project in the
wilderness may have only 70 work items. To ease accounting for ODOT, all work items
are assigned the same code, no matter the project type or location throughout Oregon.
For example, digging the hole where a bridge foundation will ultimately be built is
tenned "Structure Excavation" and coded the same whether the structure is at a busy
intersection in Portland, Oregon or across a remote ravine in the Cascade Mountains of
Central Oregon. Thus, comparing the type of work and number of work items is
consistent across projects. Table 7 describes each variable, its data source, and how the
variables were operationalized. Next, I will describe these operationalization procedures
in detail.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in my analyses measure the structure and the
perfonnance of temporary interorganizational networks (TINs). TIN structure is
operationalized as the Aggregate Tie Strength for a lead finn's network of subcontractors.
Table 7: Data Sources, Variable Descriptions and Operationalization
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Construct Name Type of
Variable
Data Source Operationalization
Ratio of costs of lead
firm's network to lowest
cost network on a per
project basis (Truncated at
1.0 for lowest cost
architecture, more
expensive architectures
will score> 1.0)
Performance
Aggregate Tie
Strength
Continuous
Ratio Variable
Continuous
Ratio Variable
ODOT Bid Tabulations -
Publicly available
documents that offer cost
information on a per
project basis. Cost
information includes the
aggregate cost for a lead
firm's network, plus costs
for each sub-task needed
to complete the project
Subcontractor disclosure
form - required by ODOT
/ n
L
subcontractor; =1
TC
TR
Winning_Time1
Winning_Time2
Project
Complexity
Project Duration
Categorical
Categorical
Continuous
Ratio Variable
Continuous
ODOT Bid Tabulations
ODOT Bid Tabulations
ODOT Bid Tabulations
- One specific
component of the Bid
Tabulations is the Bid
Schedule. The Bid
Schedule provides a
count and description
of all the work that
needs to be completed
on a particular job.
Bid Tabulations
" ,-
As seen in Equation 4.0
All observations that
had both a low proposal
cost (Performance =
1.0) and occurred
before 2005. All non-
winning observations
prior to January 1, 2005
were coded as zero.
All observations that
had both a low proposal
cost (Performance =
1.0) and occurred after
January 1, 2005. All
non-winning
observations after
January 1,2005 were
coded as zero.
Bid Schedule
Complexity Normalized
by project size. For a
given job, the Bid
Schedule will vary
according to project
characteristics. A
simple count of the
number of work items
in a Bid Schedule,
normalized by the
project size, provides a
measure of complexity
US dollars - Project
size is a conunon proxy
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J
for duration with these
~ Project dataMeasured via number ofProject specifications for pages in Section 00290 ofContinuous environmental regulations Special Provisions. These
Uncertainty Ratio Variable (e.g. fish windows) with pages delineate penalties
specific penalties for spills or other
violations impacting
natural environment
State Business Directory
as published by American Size measured by annual
Lead Finn-Size Controls Directory Publishing and number of employees at
American Business the Lead Firm HQ
Directories
State Business Directory
as published by American
Lead Finn Age Control Directory Publishing and Years
Americiln Business
Directories
Total sum ofprojects
Project Frequency Control on annual basis, as Count on annual basis
noted in ODOT Bid
Tabulations
Count variable of
Environmental median proposal costs
Munificence Control ODOT Bid Tabulations submitted for bid eachyear,
Millions of dollars
Performance is operationalized by comparing a lead finn's proposed cost to the lowest-
cost bid that was actually awarded the project.
Aggregate Tie Strength is constructed as a ratio variable and measures a TIN's
relational embeddedness on a project-to-project basis. This ratio variable captures recent
ties to subcontractors proposed for inclusion in an impending project, and adjusts this
value by dividing it by the total number of subcontractors proposed for that project. This
calculation is show in equation 4.0. The numerator contains the variable Ties Repeated
(TR), which considers the identities of the subcontractors proposed for the current project,
reviews recent projects for that lead finn, and sums all of the repeated ties during the
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most recent projects. The denominator contains the variable Ties Current (TC), which
counts the total number of ties for the current project.
nI TR
Aggregate Tie Strength = subcontractorj ~1
TC (4.0)
Only the five most recent ties between a lead firm and a subcontractor were
included in counting values of TR. Gulati (1995) found that only the four most recent
interactions positively affected current alliance performance. I ran sensitivity analyses to
determine the effects of repeated partnerships on the most recent partnership, the second
most recent partnership and up to the five most recent partnerships. Sensitivity analyses
did not show any statistical difference between the 3-5 most recent partnerships, thus I
chose to include all five and use as much information as possible.
Values of Aggregate Tie Strength were truncated at zero, which reflects either a
lead firm with no partners on the current project or a lead firm with no repeated partners
in the current project. For projects where a lead firm chose no partners, equation 4.0
becomes undefined. In these instances, I overwrote the equation and entered zero to
reflect no tie strength when a lead firm chooses to complete the work alone, despite the
presence of ample subcontractors. The values for Aggregate Tie Strength ranged from 0
- 4.00 with a standard deviation of 0..55.
Performance is operationalized as a ratio of the lead firm's proposed cost for
completing a project and the lowest cost of any proposal submitted for that project. Thus,
the minimum value of this variable is 1.0, which indicates a lead firm submitted the
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lowest cost and won the bid. For all other proposals submitted for that particular project,
their cost ratio was some number greater than 1.0. Values ofPerformance ranged from
1.0 to 2.49, with a standard deviation of 0.17.
Population-level learning (Hypotheses 3a-b) is evidenced by the increasing use of
successful routines or the removal of deleterious routines across a population of TIJ"-rs.
TIN structures act as a proxy for routines, and TIN structures that resulted in winning
bids represent successful routines. Likewise, TIN structures that resulted in failing bids
represent failing routines. In order to capture variation in routines over time, I had to
construct a composite variable.
First, I divided the sample into two temporal periods. This was to ensure I had
enough observations within each period to allow statistical analyses. The first period was
from 2000 - 2004 (302 proposals) and the second period was from 2005 - 2007 (282
proposals). Next, I coded "winners" in each temporal period. Recall, in this competitive
bidding case, only one proposal "wins" each bid and winning is determined by having the
lowest total cost (Performance Ratio Variable = 1.0). Thus, two composite variables
were constructed:
1) Winners_Time] = Performance Ratio ==1.0 & Project Year <=2004
2) Winners_Time2 = Performance Ratio == 1.0 & Project Year >=2005
These dependent variables were coded 1 for winners in each period; all other results for
that period were coded as zero.
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Independent Variables
Project Complexity is a variable that measures the number of specialized inputs
needed to complete a project (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997) and is a key determinant
of organizational form in the construction industry (Robert G. Eccles, 1981). Project
Complexity is determined by the production requirements and the variety of individual
skills and specialized functions needed to construct a bridge or building: "The number of
uses, the amount and types of equipment used and installed, and the materials used ... all
effect the number of specialties required" (Robert G. Eccles, 1981, p. 453). Previous
studies have used census data to model complexity (Stinchcombe, 1959), however this is
misleading because census data are too general and do not report indicators of complexity
specific to each type of construction (building, highway, and specialty trade). To more
accurately reflect complexity in highway bridges, Eccles (1981) suggests the number of
functions required to complete a given structure should operationalize complexity.
To model these processes, Project Complexity was calculated by counting the
number of work items listed in a project's bid schedule and dividing by the median
project cost of all proposed costs submitted for that project. As mentioned previously,
the number of items in a bid schedule can vary widely, depending on the work items that
make up a particular project. For example, in 2006 two projects had a median project
cost between $24-25 million. Project number one, with a median proposed cost of$25.1
million, had 211 work items in its bid schedule. Project number 2, with a median
proposed cost $24 million, had only 157 work items. Additionally, a project whose
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median proposed cost in 2006 was $36.5 million contained only 66 work items. These
differences provide a clean and valid way to operationalize complexity.
Project Duration is operationalized by a proxy - total project cost. Large projects
are associated with longer time durations (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008) and construction
project duration is often measured by total project receipts in dollars (Robert G. Eccles,
1981). The reasons for using project cost as a proxy for duration are two-fold: (1) it is
reasonable to assume that long duration projects require more labor and materials and are
more costly. Also, (2) specific to the construction industry, coordination demands and
project duration "are a resultant not a determinant of dollar volume"(Robert G. Eccles,
1981, p. 455).
Project Uncertainty is operationalized as the number of pages contained within
Section 00290 of the Project Special Provisions. As mentioned previously, because
section 00290 calls a prospective bidder's attention to potential behaviors by wildlife and
potential issues with environmental hazards in existing structures, but does not give fine-
grained estimates of their size or scope, section 00290 is a salient source of uncertainty
for prospective bidders. Across the sample of projects, section 00290 ranges from one
paragraph (1/4 page) to 25 pages. The mean number of pages is 6.85 with a standard
deviation of 4.37 pages.
Control variables were operationalized as follows. Lead Firm Size was
operationalized as the number of employees at the lead firm's headquarters. As shown in
Eccles (1981), heavy highway construction firms are highly variable in their total number
of employees due to the seasonal nature of the work and the technology differences
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between heavy highway construction firms. Some firms specialize in earth-moving
technology, which assigns one person to perform a large volume of work, such as a large
bulldozer. Other firms specialize in paving or structures, where a team of carpenters and
laborers must support the technologies (paving equipment, cranes) to complete even
small volumes of work. The most valid measure of firm size, as it relates to strategic
decision-making and the amount of subcontracting per project, is the total number of
employees at the headquarters (Robert G. Eccles, 1981). Seldin and Bloom (1961)
echoed this reasoning and gave evidence that in construction, planning, scheduling and
control are performed by administrators at the home office, versus on site. Lead Firm
Age is a count of the number of years since the lead firm was founded. Project
Frequency is a count variable that counted the total number ofprojects in Oregon for a
given year. Project Frequency is particularly important as a control variable in the
construction industry. Eccles (1981) found that when controlling for "market
variability," which he measured as the number of construction opportunities for a given
year, previous findings by Stinchcombe (1959) about the structure and performance of
the subcontracting organizational form were reversed. Environmental Munificence is a
count of the total dollar volume ofprojects in Oregon for a given year. Eccles (1981)
also suggests controlling for munificence allows scholars to more clearly describe the
organizational role of subcontracting in construction projects.
One control variable that is not included is a variable for new entrants. As noted
in Eccles (1981), entrance into the construction industry is relatively easy when
compared to other industries such as manufacturing. However, the effect of new entrants
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on existing firms in the construction industry is limited, particularly in heavy highway
construction where the capital requirements for entry are much greater than other forms
of construction (Robert G. Eccles, 1981). Still, despite the findings ofEccles (1981), I
conducted a careful review of the sample to determine if any new entrants entered the
population. To get a sense of the population oflead firms in Oregon prior to my
sampling window of 2000 - 2007, I reviewed those lead firms prequalified to bid on
bridge projects since 1995. Among the sample of firms, there were only two new
entrants and one exit in the years 2000 - 2007. Both of the new entrants were spinouts
from existing lead firms and the exit was through acquisition by another lead firm in the
sample. These firms accounted for less than 2% of the 584 proposals that made the final
sample. Including a dummy variable for new entrants did not affect the results, and
therefore was removed from the analysis. In the next section, I provide a framework for
the statistical analyses I used to test the hypotheses from Chapter III.
Framework for Statistical Analyses
The nature of the dependent variables within this study drove the selection of
analytic method. I have three dependent variables in this study, and each of them is
classified as either a qualitative "dichotomous" dependent variable or as a "limited
dependent variable," which makes ordinary least squares (OLS) regression insufficient
(Greene, 2003; Kennedy, 2003). In general, dichotomous and limited dependent
variables are examined using Maximum Likelihood Estimation because OLS estimates of
these dependent variables are biased (Greene, 2003; Kennedy, 2003). Maximum
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Likelihood Estimates are based on the idea that the sample at hand is more likely to have
come from "the real world," which can often have attributes that violate the assumptions
underlying OLS (Kennedy, 2003).
Rather than assuming a distribution ex ante of regression as in OLS, Maximum
Likelihood Estimation creates estimates based on the greatest probability of having
obtained the sample in question, which introduces several desirable properties when
investigating limited and dichotomous dependent variables. Maximum Likelihood
Estimators have several desirable asymptotic properties: they are asymptotically
unbiased, they are asymptotically efficient, they are distributed asymptotically normally,
and their asymptotic variance can be calculated with the standard formula (Kennedy,
2003).
Two types of dependent variables call for Maximum Likelihood Estimation,
qualitative (dichotomous) dependent variables and limited dependent variables.
Qualitative dependent variables are often dichotomous values, such as values of 0 or 1,
and are used to model how a series of independent variables affect the likelihood of
discrete event occurring (Kennedy, 2003). As an example, Kennedy (2003) uses factors
that affect a person's decision to buy a car. Buying a car is coded as a 1, and not buying
a car is coded as 0, which assumes that the predicted value of this dichotomous dependent
variable can be interpreted as the probability that the individual will buy a car, given the
values of the explanatory variables for that individual. For Hypotheses 3a-b, where
"winning" a bid is coded as a 1 and all other values of the dependent variable are coded
as zero, the Logit regression model is preferred (Kennedy, 2003).
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When dependent variables are continuous but limited to a range of values, the
dichotomous approaches described above do not fit. Additionally, OLS is not the best
regression technique. While OLS does assume continuous dependent variables, the
assumption is that these variables range from negative infinity to positive infinity, or at
least through a large range of values (Kennedy, 2003). In these cases oflimited but
continuous dependent variables, a hybrid between OLS and maximum likelihood offers
the optimal solution. Next, I describe the characteristics of continuous limited dependent
variables, followed by the hybrid estimation technique that allows regression, the Tobit
model.
When dependent variables are continuous, but limited in their range of values,
censored and truncated regression techniques are preferred (Kennedy, 2003). In the
censored sample case, some values of the dependent variable, corresponding to known
values of the independent variables, are not observable (Kennedy, 2003). For example,
in a study ofthe determinants of wages, "you may have data on the explanatory variables
for people who were not working, as well as for those who were working, but for the
former there is no observed wage" (Kennedy, 2003: 282). In the truncated sample case,
values of the independent variables are known only when the dependent variable is
observed (Kennedy, 2003). James Tobin (1958) was the first to analyze these types of
data in the regression context, and advocates regression in these cases employing the
Tobit regression model (Kennedy, 2003).
The Tobit model is a hybrid model that incorporates components from OLS to
handle continuous dependent variables and components from Maximum Likelihood
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Estimation to handle the limited range of a dependent variable (Greene, 2003). The
distinctive feature of Tobin's model is that all observations on the dependent variable that
lie in a certain range are translated into a single variable (Kennedy, 2003). The logic
behind the Tobit estimation procedure requires that values of the dependent variable must
be able to take on values close to the limit or truncation point. Kennedy uses the demand
for hockey game tickets as an example: "For demand for hockey game tickets ...
demand can be close to the arena capacity, so this is a legitimate use of Tobit model"
(Kennedy, 2003: 283).
To summarize, the best use of the Tobit model involves limited and continuous
dependent variables, a fixed range ofvalues for the dependent variable that may be
truncated on either an upper or lower limit, and an empirical setting where observations
can take on values close to the limit. Both of my dependent variables satisfy these
conditions, which suggests Tobit regression is the preferred model for this study.
An additional feature of the Tobit model is that it incorporates sample selection
correction into the estimation technique (Kennedy, 2003). Sample selection bias is
introduced when observations are drawn from a special subpopulation and
generalizations to a wider population are made. This causes the sample to be non-
random, which means any conclusions drawn about the wider population drawn from
these samples can be biased, unless this bias is taken into account during estimation
(Kennedy, 2003). "In the Tobit model, the sample selection equation is the same as the
equation being estimated, with a fixed, known limit detennining what observations get
into the sample" (Kennedy, 2003: 284). However, scholars need to be careful employing
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the Tobit model and its sample selection correction only in cases where both the
observations on the dependent variable and those found in the real world are actually
truncated - such as in the hockey arena example. An arena is a physical structure whose
capacity is fixed, and whose sell-out crowds provide situations where the demand for
tickets is capped at this limit. In other cases, where the fixed range of values is not as
clear, two-stage selection corrections, such as those by Heckman (1974) are more
appropriate.
The dependent variables in this study, Performance and Aggregate Tie Strength,
each is truncated at a lower limit, and each has a limited range of values - suggesting
Tobit regression is the preferred modeling technique. Furthermore, for each bridge
proposal in the sample, observations take on values at the limit, which is another strong
indicator that Tobit regression is the appropriate choice in this case (Kennedy, 2003). In
the next chapter, I provide results from these Tobit regressions, interpret these results,
and provide conclusions.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL TESTING AND FINDINGS
This chapter is an empirical exploration of the structure and performance of
network organizational forms, using descriptive summaries of the data and regression
analyses. As described in the previous chapter, Maximum Likelihood Estimation is
preferred in this empirical setting, due to the limited and dichotomous nature of the
dependent variables. The first section reports descriptive statistics and inter-correlations,
and goes on to investigate how project characteristics affect the governance structure of
temporary interorganizational networks (TINs). The second section describes the
empirical models and results that test how project characteristics and network structure
affect the performance of TINs. The third section discusses the results and offers
estimates of effect size, which facilitate interpreting the practical significance of the
results from hypothesis testing (Ellis, 2009). The fourth section examines population
level learning in the context of TINs. Chapter V concludes with a review of the
empirical findings, a summary table, and a discussion of limitations to this study.
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Investigating the Structure and Performance of TINs
Table 8 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used to
study the structure and performance of TINs. None of the correlations are statistically
significant at the 5% level and none of the correlations are extraordinarily high. Kennedy
(2003) suggests correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.8 or 0.9 indicate high
correlation. The highest correlation between variables exists between Project Duration
and Project Complexity (-0.66) and between Project Duration and Project Uncertainty (-
0.68). Higher values of correlation may introduce problems with collinearity, but the
Tobit procedure does not yield collinearity test statistics. To ensure collinearity was not a
problem, I ran OLS regression to estimate network governance structure (Model 5) and
performance (Model 7) with the full range of variables in Table 8. Following regression I
calculated the variable inflation factor (VIP), which is a salient indicator of collinearity if
its value is greater that 10.0 (Meyers, 2006). The largest VIP value in Model 5 was 1.68
and the largest value in Model 7 was 1.70. Thus, I conclude that collinearity did not
degrade the results from the Tobit regression procedures.
Analysis of Governance Structure
Recall that for each proposal included in the sample, I analyze how exchange
conditions relate to governance structure. The three exchange conditions are project
complexity, project duration and project uncertainty. Table 9 presents the results from
the Tobit regression that tests the effects of exchange conditions on the governance
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structure of TINs!. Modell includes only the control variables and provides baseline
estimates. Models 2, 3, and 4 begin introducing the key independent variables, with
ModelS being the full or unrestricted model for Hypothesis 1.
To test the goodness-of-fit of the models, I used a chi-squared likelihood ratio
(LR) test developed by Neyman and Pearson (Greene, 2003). The LR test is commonly
used to assess two competing models, and provides evidence of the support of one model
(usually a full or complete model) over another model that is restricted by having a
reduced number of parameters (Greene, 2003). The Neyman-Pearson LR test statistic is:
LL(fJRJ represents the log-likelihood at convergence of the restricted model and LL(fJu)
represents the log-likelihood at convergence of the unrestricted or full model. The LR
test statistic is X- distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the
number of parameters between the restricted and unrestricted models. The results from
LR testing indicate Model 5, the full model, is the best fit for these data (p < .05).
1 Environmental Munificence, captured on an annual basis, also serves as a control for contemporaneous
correlation. Contemporaneous correlation exists when the error terms of observations in each time period
are correlated (Certo and Semadeni, 2006). As an additional robusmess check, I replaced munificence with
year dummies and found no adverse effects from contemporaneous correlation.
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Performance 1.15 0.17 1.00 2.49 1.00
(2) ATS 0.37 0.55 0.00 4.00 -0.02 1.00
(3) Project Duration" 14.62 1.42 11.39 18.13 -0.22 -0.40 1.00
(4) Prqject Complexity 0.53 0.61 0.02 8.49 0.06 -0.04 -0.45 1.00
(5) Prqject Uncertainty 6.85 4.37 0.25 25.00 -0.12 0.08 0.46 -0.23 1.00
(6) Lead Firm Sizeb 64.76 107.92 1.00 750.00 0.02 -0.09 0.19 -0.06 0.04 1.00
(7) Lead Firm Agee 35.15 22.80 0.00 130.00 -0.11 -0.02 0.30 -0.10 0.08 0.36 1.00
(8) Env. Munificence" 19.21 0.29 18.62 19.74 -0.10 0.09 0.09 -0.13 0.09 0.08 0.04 1.00
(9) Prqject Frequenc/ 42.84 7.46 28.00 52.00 0.05 0.00 -0.17 0.10 -0.37 0.04 0.05 0.30 1.00
a Log, Millions of US Dollars
b Number of HQ Employees
c Years
d Projects Per Year
>-'
+:>
00
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Table 9: Tobit Regression of Exchange Conditions on Governance Structure
D V - Aggregate Tie Strength
**
***
Model 3 Model 4
-14.86 *** -13.1 ***
(4.88) (4.94)
-0.001 ** -0.001 **
(.000) (.000)
0.001 0.001
(.002) (.002)
0.778 *** .678 ***
(.258) (.260)
-0.008 * -0.003
(.006) (.006)
Constant
Lead Firm Size"
Lead Firm Ageb
Log Munificencec
Project Frequency
Project Complexity
Hia
Project Durationd
RIb
Project Uncertainty
Hic
Modell
-14.914 ***
(4.86)
-0.001 **
(.000)
0.001
(.002)
0.790 ***
(.255)
-0.009 *
(.006)
Model 2
-13.38 **
(4.94)
-0.001
(.000)
0.001
(.002)
0.711
(.258)
-0.007
(.006)
-0.144 *
(.089)
0.Q11
(.037)
0.022 **
(.011 )
Model 5
-11.29 *
(4.99)
-0.001 **
(.000)
0.001
(.002)
0.636 ***
(.261)
-0.003
(.006)
-0.186 *
(.118)
-0.06 *
(.047)
0.025 **
(.012)
584
-608.34
8.02**
584
-610.35
4.00**
584
-612.30
0.10
584
-610.71
3.28*
584
-612.35
Observations
Log Likelihood
i LR Test Statistic
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a Number of Employees
b Years
c Millions USD, annually
d Log Duration
Hypothesis la predicted that as project complexity increases, TINs will be
designed with a more diverse set of network partners. The logic offered was that greater
project complexity will be associated with greater and more diverse project components,
which will require a lead firm to contract with more specialty subcontractors. A greater
number of diverse specialists were expected to reduce the relational embeddedness within
TINs, as reflected by a lower value of the dependent variable, Aggregate Tie Strength.
The negative and significant coefficients obtained for project complexity in Models 2 and
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5 indicate that as project complexity increases, Aggregate Tie Strength decreases. This
supports Hypothesis la.
Hypothesis 1b predicted that as project duration increases, TINs will be designed
to include a set of more familiar network partners, which increases relational
embeddedness. Increasing relational embeddedness can occur by increasing the number
of repeated partnerships within a TIN and by using fewer partners to do a larger share of
the work. Either of these behaviors - more repeated partnerships or fewer partners each
performing a greater portion of the work - increases relational embeddedness,
corresponding to a larger value of the dependent variable, Aggregate Ties Strength. The
negative and significant coefficient obtained for project duration in Model 5 indicates that
longer projects are associated with lower values ofAggregate Tie Strength, which
contradicts the hypothesized relationship. Therefore, HIb is not supported.
Hypothesis lc predicted that as project uncertainty increases, TINs will be
designed with a tighter set of network partners, which increases relational embeddedness.
As described above, increasing relational embeddedness may result from a greater use of
repeated partnerships or from collaborating with a select few firms with each firm
completing a larger portion ofthe work. The coefficient on the Project Uncertainty
variable is positive and significant in Models 4 and 5. This means that project
uncertainty is associated with increased relational embeddedness among TIN partners,
which supports Hypothesis 1c.
To summarize, the results in Model 5 (the full model) are consistent with the
interpretation that exchange conditions significantly affect the structure of TINs. The
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negative and significant coefficients for Project Complexity and Project Duration
indicate that TINs under these exchange conditions have lower values of relational
embeddedness. The positive and significant coefficient for Project Uncertainty in Model
5 indicates that TINs exhibit higher relational embeddedness under the exchange
condition ofproject uncertainty. Turning to the control variables, I see that large firms
tend to experiment with a more diverse array of subcontractors and that environmental
munificence, which measures the total volume of work for a given year, is related to
higher values ofAggregate Tie Strength. Next, I present the results from Models 6 - 11,
which test how exchange conditions and relational embeddedness interact to affect
network organizational performance.
Analysis of Performance
Table 10 presents the results from the Tobit analyses that relate the structure of
TINs to their performance. To facilitate exposition and interpretation of the results, the
raw data for the dependent variable, Performance needed to be "reversed." Because
Performance is a ratio of a particular TIN's cost against the lowest overall cost for a TIJ\J
on that project, values of 1.0 signal the best performance, and values greater than 1.0
signal poorer performance. Thus, performance increases by having the actual values get
smaller, while values of the independent variables increase by getting larger. To address
this problem, I regressed the independent variables against -1.0 times the values of
Performance, which effectively reversed their signs and eases interpretation of the
results.
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Models 6 and 7 present the results for the main effects and Models 8 - 11 add in
the interaction terms. Likelihood ratio tests for goodness of fit show that as interaction
terms are added, the predictive power of the models increases. However, the LR test
statistic for Model 11 is not significant at the 10% level (p = 0.1119), which raises
concerns that one or more of the models is misspecified. Several authors suggest that
misspecifications are common in Tobit regressions due to the limited nature of the
dependent variable (Kennedy, 2003; Vuong, 1989). In cases where LR tests provide
inconclusive results for goodness of fit, Sribney (1997) suggests LR statistics and p-
values for the individual models (similar to the R2 in OLS) are an additional option. Each
of the LR test statistics for models 6 - 11 is significant at the 1% level, and all of the p-
values are less than 0.001. While these statistics are not as powerful as the traditional
Neyman-Pearson LR test, the do reduce concerns ofmisspecification in Models 6 - 11.
As in the previous regression analyses, Environmental Munificence effectively controls
for contemporaneous correlation (Certo & Semadeni, 2006). Thus, I am confident that
contemporaneous correlation does not degrade the results from the Tobit regression.
Due to the specification issues described above, I ran Models 6 - 11 using a Logit
regression to see whether this type of analysis improved the results. Logit regression
requires the dependent variable to be set up as a 0-1 dummy variable (Kennedy, 2003),
where observations producing the desired outcome are coded as 1 and all other outcomes
are coded as zero. Since these data are drawn from federally funded highway bridge
projects, only the lowest cost proposal is awarded a contract, and all ofthe other
proposals (of greater cost) are rejected. Perhaps winning TIN proposals are substantively
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different than proposals that do not win, while the costs reflected in the losing TIN
proposals are not a systematic measure of their relative performance. Were this so, it
follows that an alternative analysis to the Tobit model is to code ''winning'' proposals
(Performance values =1) with a dummy variable of 1 and all other proposals with zero.
However, the results from the Logit regression did not explain more variance than those
reported in Table 10. In fact, the results from the Logit analysis explained less variance.
This is likely due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable in the Logit analysis,
which uses less information to generate the parameter estimates than the continuous
dependent variable in the Tobit regression (Kennedy, 2003). Since the results from the
Logit regression have shed no additional light on the findings shown in Table 10, these
results can be interpreted as offering only partial support for Hypotheses 2a-d.
Overall, Hypotheses 2a-d predict that Aggregate Tie Strength will have a direct
effect on the performance of TINs as a governance structure, and that this direct effect
will be moderated by exchange conditions. In general terms, this is expressed as equation
5.0:
Performance = a (ATS)+ fJ(ATS *Exchange Condition) +y(Controls) +& (5.0)
Alpha (ex) represents the parameter estimates for ATS, beta ((3) reports the parameter
estimates for the interaction variables, gamma ()I) reports the parameter estimates for the
control variables, and epsilon (E) is the error term. Models 7 through 11 test these
relationships, with Model 7 testing the direct effect ofATS on Performance, and with
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each successive model introducing an interaction term. As described above, the
predictive power of each model increases with the introduction of each successive
interaction term.
Hypothesis 2a predicts that the direct effect of increasing relational embeddedness
decreases performance, due to deleterious effects from network inertia. Relational
embeddedness is captured by Aggregate Tie Strength and TINs exhibiting network inertia
will have higher values ofAggregate Tie Strength. Model 7 indicated that the direct
effect of ATS on performance is positive an not significant. However, when considered
with the interaction terms (Models 8 and 9) the coefficient becomes negative, which
suggests the direct effect of ATS may only be negative in the presence of the interaction
terms. This is further confirmed in the full model, Model 11. The negative and
significant coefficient for Aggregate Tie Strength in Model 11 (p = .0418) indicates that
network inertia, when simultaneously considered with the interaction terms, is associated
with lower levels of performance. Thus, Hypothesis 2a is partially supported.
Hypothesis 2b predicts there will be an interaction between Project Complexity
and ATS, and that higher values ofProject Complexity will lessen the direct effect ofATS
on Performance. Model 11 shows a positive and significant coefficient for the
interaction variable, ATS*Complexity (p = .0392), which partially supports Hypothesis
2b. To facilitate interpretation of the positive and significant coefficient for
ATS*Complexity, the following series of equations provides insight as to how the
interaction term can lessen the direct effect ofATS on Performance.
Table 10: Tobit Regression of Exchange Conditions and Governance Structure on Performance
D V - Performance
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Constant -3.375 *** -3.336 *** -3.340 *** -3.332 *** -3.298 *** -3.380 ***
(.802) (.805) (.806) (.805) (.806) (.807)
Lead Finn Sizead -0.018 *** -0.018 *** -0.018 *** -0.018 *** -0.018 *** -0.018 ***
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Lead Finn Agebd 0.020 ** 0.019 ** 0.019 ** 0.019 ** 0.019 ** 0.019 **
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Env. Munificencec 0.093 ** 0.091 ** 0.092 ** 0.091 ** 0.088 ** 0.096 **
(.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042)
Project Frequency 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 *
(.001 ) (.001) (.001 ) (.001 ) (.001) (.001)
Project Complexity 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.010 *
(.011 ) (.011 ) (.011 ) (.011 ) (.011) (.011)
Project Durationd 0.027 *** 0.028 *** 0.030 *** 0.027 *** 0.028 *** 0.023 ***
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.008)
Project Uncertainty 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
ATSH2a 0.008 -0.008 -0.016 0.023 -0.451 **
(.013) (.020) (.150) (.022) (.260)
ATS*Complexity H2b 0.033 0.090 **
(.033) (.051)
ATS*Duration H2c 0.002 0.030 **
(.010) (.017)
ATS*Uncertainty H2d -0.002 -0.003
(.002) (.003)
Observations 584 584 584 584 584 584
Log Likelihood 35.97 36.15 36.66 36.17 36.51 38.34
)( LR Test Statistic 0.36 1.38 0.4 1.08 4.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (One-tailed tests)
a Number of Employees
b Years
c Millions USD, annually
d Log (Variable)
I-'
VI
VI
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Perfonrnnce = a(ATS) + f3( ATS*Exchange Condition) + y(Controls) + E (5.0)
Equation (5.0) represents the general fonnat for the regression analyses. To test
hypothesis 2b, the specific exchange condition of Project Complexity is evaluated,
which is shown in equation 5.1.
Perfonnance= a (ATS) + f3(ATS*Project Complexity)+y(Controls)+E (5.1)
Taking the partial derivative of equation 5.1 with respect to ATS yields equation 5.2:
o
Performance = a + fJ (Project Complexity)
OATS
(5.2)
Equation 5.2 provides the mathematical basis for interpreting the coefficients
provided in Model 11, which is necessary to detennine whether H2b is supported.
Model 11 provides the coefficient for ATS (a = -0.451) and the coefficient for the
interaction tenn, ATS*Project Complexity ({3 = .090). Inserting this infonnation into
equation 5.2 yields:
o
Performance = -,451 + 0.090 (ProjectComplexity)
OATS
(5.3)
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Setting equation 5.3 equal to zero and solving for Project Complexity, shows that for
any project with a Project Complexity score greater than 5.011, the moderating effect
ofProject Complexity on ATS is able to overcome the negative direct effect ofATS on
Performance. Since values ofProject Complexity range up to 8.49 (as seen in Table
8), there are observations within the sample that exhibit this value, which confirms
both the partial statistical support for Hypothesis 2b and its practical significance.
Hypothesis 2c predicts there will be an interaction between Project Duration
and ATS, and that higher values ofProject Duration will lessen the direct effect of
ATS on Performance. The coefficient for ATS*Duration in Model 11 is positive and
statistically significant (p = .0383), thus H2c is partially supported. By performing
the same calculations shown above (Equations 5.0 - 5.3), we can confirm the
statistical support for Hypothesis 2c. The coefficients from Model 11, inserted into
equation 5.3, indicate that values for Project Duration greater than 15.03 will
overcome the negative direct effect ofATS on Performance. Checking Table 8,
values for Project Duration range up to 18.13, which not only confirms the statistical
support Hypothesis 2c, but also the plausibility of the findings given the data range.
Hypothesis 2d predicts there will be an interaction between Project
Uncertainty and ATS, and that higher values ofProject Uncertainty will lessen the
direct effect ofATS on Performance. The coefficient for the interaction variable
ATS*Uncertainty in Model 11 is not statistically significant at the 10% level (p =
0.1271). Thus, H2d is not supported.
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Discussion of Results for the Structure and Performance of TINs
In this dissertation, I have proposed and tested a theory that integrates ideas
from transaction cost economics and sociology to explain the structure and
performance oftemporary interorganizational networks (TINs). I also argued that
TINs represent a unique variant of network organizational forms. Because TINs are
composed of much more transient relationships than traditional network
organizations, they require integrative theoretical frameworks to test their structure
and performance. I argued that TIN structures are designed according to exchange
conditions. I argued that the design of TINs directly affects their performance as a
governance structure. I also argued that the direct affect of a TIN's governance
structure on performance is moderated by exchange conditions. Next, I summarize
the findings and discuss the implications of the study for theory.
Studying TINs seems a logical extension of existing theories of organizational
governance. The notion that governance structures are designed according to
exchange conditions is not new and has been empirically supported across a wide
range of industries. However, these theories were largely formulated to study
organizations that last for a long time. Even when applied to less permanent
organizations, such as strategic alliances or equity joint ventures, theories of
organizational governance consistently held when studying these less permanent
governance structures. However, dramatic changes in the last twenty years have
shortened the temporal duration of many governance structures. Whereas strategic
alliances and joint ventures may shorten the time window from several decades to
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several years, these emerging governance structures may last only a few days (music
video production), weeks (film and housing construction), or months (highway
construction). New terminology arose to describe these more ephemeral governance
structures, such as virtual organizations (Davidow & Malone, 1992), temporary
project originations (Bechky, 2006; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008), quasifirms (R.G.
Eccles, 1981), and modular organizations (Hoetker, 2006; Schilling & Steensma,
2001). The question remains, do the older theories still apply despite a dramatic
reduction in the lifespan of more temporary organizational forms. This study
represents an initial attempt at solving this puzzle and the results for Hypothesis 1a-c
provide evidence that a new system of rules for governance design may be needed.
The results for both hypotheses 1a and 1b, suggest TINs behave like modular
systems. The literature on modular systems suggests that subcontractor firms are
highly interchangeable, and that lead firms can effectively reduce costs by having a
loosely-coupled network of specialists that can be plugged in and out of a network
with little impact on its performance (Hoetker, 2006; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996;
Schilling & Steensma, 2001). For Project Complexity, TCE and capabilities
arguments also support the increased use of subcontractors as project complexity
increases (S. W. Anderson, Glenn, & Sedatole, 2000; Argyres, 1996; Balakrishnan &
Wernerfelt, 1986; R.G. Eccles, 1981; Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Perry,
1982; Rubin, 1973; Williamson, 1975, 1985b). What is interesting is that the benefits
that follow from TCE and Capabilities logics do not hold for TIN designs on projects
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oflonger duration. In fact, the findings for how Project Duration affects Aggregate
Tie Strength are directly opposite to the hypothesized relationship.
One explanation of this surprising result could be the empirical setting.
Because these data come from an industry where competitive bidding is the rule,
firms may elect to use market forces to drive down the prices via competition
between subcontractors (M. E. Porter, 1985; David J. Teece, 1984), in spite ofthe
acknowledged benefits from choosing repetitive partnerships as duration increases
(R.G. Eccles, 1981). Eccles (1981) suggests that competitive bidding situations may
cause a "reverse effect" in subcontractor selection in the construction industry, due to
the high availability of specialty subcontractors and the tendency for these
subcontractors to perform similar functions for multiple lead firms (page 399). Still,
while Eccles (1981, pp. 399-400) did find increased use of subcontractors for
contractors in the residential and industrial building space (38% and 54%
subcontracted out, respectively), he did not find as large a percentage for highway
and bridge contractors (18% and 22%, respectively). Thus, despite highway and
bridge contractors competing in a competitive bidding scenario, Eccles (1981) found
these trades exhibited higher amounts of repeated partnerships and using fewer
subcontractors overall. Thus, the empirical setting and its competitive bidding
requirement only partially explains the negative relationship between Project
Duration and ATS. Despite competitive bidding being a logically persuasive
explanation for the negative and significant coefficient on Project Duration, it
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appears modularity is a better foundation to explain the unexpected result that ATS
decreases as Project Duration increases.
Project Uncertainty, however, does follow logics from TCE and Capabilities,
suggesting that when uncertainty is high, TINs are designed with more highly
embedded networks and more repeated partnerships. Project uncertainty arises from
exogenous sources and is a characteristic of a TIN's task environment. TCE and
Capabilities literatures suggest that as task uncertainty increases, more hierarchical
governance forms will dominate (Robert G. Eccles, 1981; R.G. Eccles, 1981; Santoro
& McGill, 2005; Walker & Weber, 1984). This finding also supports the conceptual
claims of Jones and Lichtenstein (2008) and the empirical findings of Eccles (1981),
suggesting Project Uncertainty is indeed a salient driver of organizational form in
TINs. Eccles (1981) found an increasing reliance on trust in uncertain situations in
the home building industry, where general contractors preferred to use the same set of
subcontractors whose work they knew they could rely upon. Next, I interpret the
results from hypotheses 2a-d that investigate how the structure of TINs affects their
performance.
Despite only partial support for Hypothesis 2a, the result for H2a may be the
most intriguing finding of this study. As described earlier in this dissertation, the
primary motivation for this study was to construct a more balanced measure of the
performance of networks to allow investigation of negative performance outcomes
associated with network organizational forms. A primary criticism ofthe network
literature is that scholars continue to tout the flexibility and economic benefits to
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network organizational fonns, without obtaining empirical evidence of network
constraint, poor perfonnance, or failure (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; Podolny &
Page, 1998). The negative and significant coefficient for H2a suggests that network
inertia may be a salient source of failure for the network organizational fonn and
represents one of the first empirical tests of failure among network organizations.
Additionally, the size of the coefficient on H2a relative to those for the other
hypotheses suggests that network inertia might have an adverse effect upon
organizational perfonnance (see Table 12 for an estimate of effect size) are
particularly large. Despite this finding for the negative main effect ofATS on
Performance, results from the interaction variables suggest these adverse effects can
be overcome when TINs adjust their structure in a contingent fashion. Perhaps
aligning exchange conditions and TIN structures does improve perfonnance.
Because H2a receives statistically significant support only in Model 11,
concerns about multicollinearity surface. Multicollinearity arises when the variances
of some correlated independent variables are quite large (Kennedy, 2003). When
these variances are large, it is difficult to detennine which independent variable
should be "given credit" for explaining the variation on the dependent variable.
When multicollinearity is present, it is likely that two highly correlated variables may
jointly explain the variation on the dependent variable, causing the parameter
estimates to be imprecise and reducing the power of hypothesis testing (Kennedy,
2003). However, since the largest inter-correlation value is only 0.46 (Between
Project Duration and Project Uncertainty) and the results from the variable inflation
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factor (VIF) analysis were so low, issues with multicollinearity are likely not the only
reason Model 11 obtains statistical significance for H2a. However, the dramatic
changes in parameter estimates in Model 11 cannot be ignored, which means the most
I can say about these Hypothesis 2a is that it is partially supported. Further,
interpretations of the interaction terms must also be tempered as their statistical
significance could be partially explained by effects from multicollinearity.
Hypotheses H2b-d investigated how the negative direct effect ofATS on
performance may lessen due to the interaction between exchange conditions andATS.
The results provide mixed support for the hypothesized relationships. H2b is
partially supported and suggests that in the presence of sufficient project complexity,
the negative direct effect ofATS on performance may be overcome. This finding
enhances the earlier findings from Hypothesis 1a-b, which suggests that TINs behave
as modular systems. By evaluating the effects ofmore modular organizational forms
on performance, this finding confirms Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti' s (1997)
conceptual argument that more flexible governance structures increase performance
as complexity increases.
Hypothesis 2c is partially supported and suggests that in the presence of
sufficiently high Project Duration, the negative direct effect ofATS on Performance
may be overcome. This finding supports arguments from TCE and Capabilities
scholars that suggest repeated interactions reduce the costs of organizing due to
efficiencies gained from trust (RG. Eccles, 1981; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone,
1998), from developing superior interorganizational routines with a select group of
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partners (Nelson & Winter, 1982), and from developing dedicated resources (Kale,
Dyer, & Singh, 2002). Further, these findings align with prior investigations of more
traditional networks, such as supplier networks and traditional alliances, which
suggest a select group of partners that interact over time derive benefits from
information sharing (Dyer, 2000; Hayes, Wheelwright, & Clark, 1988) and greater
cooperation (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Heide & John, 1990).
The results obtained for Hypothesis 2c become even more interesting when
considered in parallel with the fmdings for Hypothesis lb. Recall that HIb is a test of
behaviors among TINs, but H2c is a test of how these behaviors affect performance.
Findings for H1b support that TINs behave more like modular systems that are
composed of a greater number ofpartners, repeat fewer partnerships, and exhibit
decreasing relational embeddedness when Project Duration is higher. However,
despite the frequent occurrence of this behavior among the sample of TINs within this
study, H2c suggests that the opposite behavior can lead to better performance.
Among the 584 observations that comprise the final sample frame, 384 projects
exhibited sufficient project duration (score >= 15.01 in Model 10) to benefit from
higher values of relational embeddedness. Thus, modularization largely explains how
TINs organize in response to project duration, but transaction efficiency arguments
and arguments for the coordination benefits gained through relational embeddedness
suggest this is the wrong behavior for TINs seeking to reduce the costs of organizing.
Hypothesis 2d is not supported. The coefficient on the interaction ofATS and
Project Uncertainty is negative and is not significant at the 10% level. Given the
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small size of the coefficient and lack of statistical significance, it is difficult to make
any meaningful conjectures.
Calculating Effect Sizes
Increasingly, scholars are using effect sizes to estimate the "actual" impact of
strategy research on the performance of "real" firms. Ellis (2009) presents their
argument in his book: The Essential Guide to Effect Sizes: An Introduction to
Statistical Power, Meta-Analysis and the Interpretation ofResearch Results. Ellis
(2009) essentially argues that statistical models may be high in rigor and high in their
ability to explain nuances of theory, but scholars often fail to translate statistical
findings into valuable insights that influence businesses in the real world. Moreover,
researchers have reported statistically significant findings that support theorizing
about the impact of a particular strategy on performance, even when the actual effect
of following this strategy does little to benefit firms (i.e. increase profits). Only by
assessing effect size and statistical significance in tandem can we ensure our
interpretations translate into valuable insights in the real world (Ellis, 2009).
Table 11 offers estimates of effect sizes for Hypotheses H1a-c and these
effects represent the percent change in ATS associated with each exchange condition.
Calculating percent change as an effect size is more complex than other calculations
of effect size, because one needs to isolate the change in the expected value of the
dependent variable, rather than simply considering the magnitude of the expected
value of the dependent variable that is associated with a particular regression
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coefficient (McDonald & Moffit, 1980). Isolating the change in expected value
requires decomposing the Tobit regression coefficient (Boschung, Sharpe, & Abde1-
Ghany, 1998; McDonald & Moffit, 1980). Following McDonald and Moffit (1980), I
offer a series of equations that decompose Tobit coefficients and allow the calculation
of percent change. Equation (5.4) offers the general Tobit model for regression
where the dependent variable has a lower limit of zero.
~ = a + XiBi + Pi if a + XBi +Pi > 0
r; =0 if a + XBi +Pi S 0
=1, ...n
(5.4)
In Equation (5.4), Yi is the dependent variable, alpha (O!) is a constant term, Xi is a
vector of independent variables, Bi is a vector of unknown coefficients, J4 is a
normally distributed error term, and n is the number of observations. The expected
value of the dependent variable, EYz·, is presented by the following formula:
(5.5)
where F(z) is the cumulative normal distribution function associated with the
proportion of cases above the threshold value (zero in this examp1e),j(z) is the unit
normal density, z is the z score for an area under the normal curve, sigma (a) is the
standard deviation of the error term, and Bi is the Tobit coefficient for the specific
independent variable Xi,
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The first order partial derivative of Equation (5.5) aE~ signifies the effect of
aXi
an independent variable on the expected value of the dependent variable for all
observations and can be presented as follows:
(5.6)
Where EY/ is the expected value of the dependent variable for observations above
the threshold, aE~' is the change in the expected value of the dependent variable,
aXi
aF(z)
and is the change in the cumulative probability of being above the threshold
aXi
value associated with an independent variable. For calculating percent change as an
~Y.. fi
effect, __I IS the tenn ofmterest (McDonald & Mof It, 1980). The fonnula for
aXi
deriving this value is presented in equation 5.7:
aE( =B.[I- zj(z) _ j(Z)2]
aXi ' F(z) F(z)2 (5.7)
Finally, the value derived from Equation (5.7) is then divided by the mean value for
ATS (0.4047) to obtain the percent change. Table 11 presents these results.
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Table 11: Effect Sizes
Hypotheses 1a-I c
Project Complexity
-0.1856 -0.1473 0.4047 -36.4%Hla
Project Duration
-0.06489 -0.0480 0.4047 -11.9%Hlb
Project Uncertainty 0.25 0.2247 0.4047 55.3%Hlc
To summarize the information in Table 11, it appears that exchange
conditions produce significant effects on ATS. The variable Project Complexity
produces a 36.4% reduction in values of ATS. The variable Project Duration
produces an 11.9% reduction in values of ATS. Finally, Project Uncertainty
increases relational embeddedness (ATS) by 55.3 %. These percent changes in the
governance structure of TINs are dramatic and support the regression analyses with
actual effects.
Table 12 offers several estimates of the effect sizes for Hypotheses H2a-d.
For these calculations, I calculate effect sizes based on the expected value of the
dependent variable associated with the regression coefficient of an independent
variable (i.e. not the percent change as in Table 11). Since my dependent variable,
Performance, is a ratio of the lowest cost for a TIN on a particular project, calculating
the effects on profits of following a strategy is difficult. Further, nearly all of the lead
firms in this sample are privately held, and compete in an industry where low cost is
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the only path to contract award. Thus, finns are very reluctant to disclose any
infonnation about profit margins for fear of a competitor gaining an advantage.
However, in 2007, the Construction Financial Managers Association (CFMA)
solicited anonymous accounting records from heavy and highway construction finns
and published a report that shows average profit margins per dollar of bid costs for
heavy and highway construction finns. While certainly not a comprehensive review
of all highway construction finns (n = 15), this report does allow calculating effect
sizes.
Since this empirical setting only awards contracts to the lowest bidding TIN, I
began by selecting the winning projects for the years 2006 and 2007 - the only years
where profit infonnation was available (CFMA, 2007). Next, I calculated a median
winning bid cost for each year, and then multiplied this number by the coefficients in
Model 10 (full model) for each strategy (H2a-d). Profit margins as a percentage of
bid cost, gained from the CFMA 2007 annual report, were then multiplied by that
number. The resulting estimate of effect size is reported in US Dollars and represents
a potential increase (or decrease) in profits for those finns that follow the strategies
my hypotheses test. These initial calculations represent the direct effects of each
strategy on profit (Table 12).
The interaction effects are presented in Table 13. Since I hypothesized that
the interaction effects may overcome the negative direct effect of ATS on
perfonnance, Table 13 presents effect sizes for projects where this occurs. In 2006
and 2007, the only observations I had that were above the threshold value for the
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interaction effects were for the Project Duration variable (threshold = 15.01). The
median winning bid cost for projects above the Project Duration threshold was
$13,500,000 for 2006 and $13,800,000 for 2007. Table 13 shows estimates ofthese
interaction effects.
Despite my options for calculating effect sizes being constrained, the
estimates in Table 12 and Table 13 do provide an indication of how the statistical
findings may transfer to the real world. Since the magnitude of the coefficient on
H2a, for example, is so much larger (-0.451 versus 0.090) it appears that the effect of
network inertia is much more potent than that of any ofthe other variables examined
in the study. For example, in 2007, my calculations indicate that, for a firm whose
maximum annual revenue did not exceed $10 million (CFMA, 2007), a rigid and
inflexible network conforming to the assumptions ofH2a could result in losing over
$667,000 dollars. In contrast, the coefficients for H2b and H2c were positive and
significantly related to performance, but their positive effect was more than ten times
smaller than the negative effect from ATS alone (H2a).
Table 13 provides more encouraging results. Table 13 presents calculations
from projects of sufficient duration as to potentially allow TINs to overcome the
negative effects of ATS. In 2006, where the median winning bid cost for projects
above the threshold was $13,500,000, TINs exhibiting the strategy for H2c were able
to overcome the main effect of ATS on performance and be profitable. In 2007,
however, TINs were unable to completely overcome the negative direct effect of
ATS, though this effect was dramatically reduced.
Table 12: Effect Sizes
Direct Effects
Potential Effects ofHypothesized Strategies on Profit
(Profit Percentages Calculated From Highway Construction Firms with Average Annual Revenues of$10 Million or less)
Potential Increase
Median Winning Bid Cost % Profit for (Decrease) in Profit fromCoefficient Winning Bids1 Following DirectStrategy (T-stat) (US Dollars) Strategy
(US Dollars)
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007Direct Effect
Aggregate Tie Strength -.451 15.6 21.6 ($194,200.14) ($667,1$2,760,250 $6,848,662 69.24)H2a (1.73)**
$133,13Project Complexity*ATS 0.090 $2,760,250 $6,848,662 15.6 21.6 $38,753.91 7.98H2b (1.76)**
$44,379Project Duration*ATS 0.030 $2,760,250 $6,848,662 15.6 21.6 $12,917.97
.33H2c (1.77)**
($4,437Project Uncertainty*ATS -0.003 $2,760,250 $6,848,662 15.6 21.6 ($1,291.76
.93)H2d (1.14) ,
1 Average % Profit Per Dollar ofProposed Cost for Heavy Highway Construction. As reported in Construction Financial
Managers Association Annual Report(2007)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (One-tailed test)
>-'
-....l
>-'
07
($667169.24)
2006
$210799.86
Potential Increase (Decrease) in
Profit from Following
Interaction Strategy (USD)
Profit = Direct Effect +
Interaction Effect I
($194,200.14)
21.6
21.6
2007
As reported in Construction Financial
15.6
15.6
2007
$6,848,662
No Projects
No Projects
$13,800,000
$2,760,250
No Projects
No Projects
$13,500,000
Median Winning Cost of
Projects Greater than Threshold
Value: Above Threshold,
Interaction May Overcome
Direct Effect
-.451
(1.73)**
Project Complexity*ATS 0.090
H2b (1.76)**
Project Duration*ATS 0.030
H2c (1.77)**
Project Uncertainty*ATS -0.003
H2d (1.14)
1 Average % Profit Per Dollar ofProposed Cost for Heavy Highway Construction.
Managers Association Annual Report(2007)
Table 13: Effect Sizes
Interaction Effects
Potential Effects ofHypothesized Strategies on Profit
Percentages Calculated From Highway Construction Finns with Average Annual Revenues of $10 Million or less)
I ..• Coefficient
(T-stat)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (One-tailed test)
,.....
---.l
N
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Thus, firms interpreting my results should be more concerned about the negative effects
ofATS on performance. However, if the actual duration of a project is sufficiently large
as to allow the influence from that project's duration to overcome the large and negative
direct effect of ATS, my results support that this strategy dramatically improves
performance.
Population Level Learning in the Context of TINs
Another interesting but distinct performance outcome for network organizations is
learning. As reviewed in Chapter III, the benefits of learning from network organizing
have received ample attention from scholars. Network ties are conduits for rapid
knowledge transfer between partners (Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Hamel & Prahalad,
1991; Kogut). Networks allow collaborating firms to internalize one another's skills
(Hamel, 1991b). Finally, the dynamic capabilities literature suggests that learning is path
dependent and "often a process of trial, feedback, and observation" (David J. Teece,
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997, p. 523). This study investigated learning within the context of
TINs, and I focus on path dependent learning and feedback mechanisms.
Path dependent learning, due to its incorporation of feedback mechanisms, aligns
with behavioral learning theories. Behavioralleaming theories depict learning as a
mechanistic and involuntary process where firms are assumed to repeat behaviors that
lead to pleasant outcomes and discontinue behaviors that lead to unpleasant outcomes
(Starbuck & Hedberg, 2001). One advantage of behavioral theories is they can explain
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how learning can improve over time, even when information about individual manager
perceptions is unavailable (Starbuck & Hedberg, 2001). In Chapter III, I adopted a
behavioral perspective to learning and developed hypotheses that measure the adoption of
a network design based on past success or failure of this design across a population of
network organizations, holding project characteristics constant across time.
Population level learning is defined as "a systematic change in the nature and mix
of routines in a population of organizations arising from shared experience" (Miner &
Haunschild, 1995). Thus, population level learning is largely a study of imitation - with
the increasing adoption of successful routines drawing the most attention among scholars
(Miner, Kim, Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1996). Like their counterparts in the network
literature, scholars of population level learning have largely ignored failure. When
failure is examined, population ecology scholars (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) and a few
studies of bankruptcy and disasters (Perrow, 1984; Sutton & Callahan, 1987) have treated
failure as an outcome, and their analyses usually are limited to causal models of failure ~
what predicts failure and how to avoid it (Miner, Kim, Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1996).
However, by treating failure as an independent variable, scholars can ask a completely
different series of questions. For example, what effect does failure by one or more
organizations have on the larr-er groups for which they are a member (Miner, Kim,
Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1996)? Further, how does success or failure affect the rate of
learning within and between collaborating organizations? Specific to the context of
TINs, how does success/failure of TIN structureslbehaviors at the organization level
affect a transformation of behaviors at the population level.
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Empirical Testing and Findings for Population Level Learning
To study how success or failure among TIN routines at the organization level
affect behaviors at the population level, I began by segmenting the population of TINs
according to their structure and across time. I divided the sample into two temporal
periods, from 2000 - 2004 and from 2005 - 2007. The two periods were chosen to split
the sample in half, thus ensuring an adequate number of observations in each period to
allow statistical analyses. The first period contained 302 observations and the second
period contained 282 observations.
Within each period, I used the statistical software STATA to group all TINs
according to ATS. Using STATA's "group" command, I segmented the population of
TINs into three groups of equal size. Next, I regressed two of the groups (dropping one
group to avoid issues with multicollinearity) against "winning" (and losing) to see
whether a particular TIN structure was significantly related to winning (or losing) a bid
during the first period. Using a Logit model, I found that TINs exhibiting lower values of
ATS were significantly more likely to "lose" and that finns in the mid-range of ATS
were significantly more likely to "win." These behaviors (reflected in TIN structures)
represent organization-level routines during the period between 2000 - 2004.
In order to test population level learning, I had to examine the second period,
from 2005 - 2007, to see whether winning routines were increasingly adopted and
whether losing routines were removed (Miner & Haunschild, 1995). Using t-tests to see
whether the occurrence of winning (and losing) routines significantly increased (or
decreased) during the second period, my findings suggest that the extent of learning
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reflected in the incidence of routines encoded in TIN structures depended on whether the
routines had resulted in successes or in failures. Table 14 shows the results from this
study of population level learning.
Table 14: Learning from Success and Failure at the Population Level
Reporting Percent Change in Occurrence ofSuccessful/Unsuccessful Routines
Percentage of PopulationSample Exhibiting Level Test Commentthe best/worst Learning
routines
2000 - 2005 - % Change T-test
2004 2007 in Routine Statistic
Best Routines H3aNot(Lowest Cost = 33.64% 33.07% (.57%) 0.17 SupportedSuccess)
Worst Routines H3b(Highest Cost = 40.55% 31.25% (9.3%) 2.296 SupportedFailure)
I I
As shown in Table 14, the lead finns appear to have learned more from failure
than from success. The percent change in the occurrence of successful routines was
small and statistically insignificant (H3a not supported), while the percent change in the
occurrence of deleterious routines was large and statistically significant (H3b supported).
Discussion of Results for Population Level Learning
The context of temporary organizing provides new insight to previous studies
about learning from success and failure at the population level of analysis. Previous
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studies suggest drastic failure is the main mechanism for learning at the population level:
"Organizations disappear ifthey act inappropriately or ineffectively, so the surviving
organizations act appropriately and effectively" (Starbuck & Hedberg, 2001, p. 450).
However, population levelleaming is defined as an increase or decrease in the use of
routines, which may fail multiple times for a variety of reasons without causing
organizational failure. Miner et al. (1996) attempted to uncover the more subtle effects of
failure, but also used the failure of an entire organization (or a few of them) as an
indicator of change at the population level. This study measures the failure of routines
directly, indeed, no lead firm failed during the years 2000 - 2007. Thus, my findings
offer more fine-grained evidence bearing upon how the removal of deleterious routines
affect behaviors across a population of TINs.
Another interesting finding has to do with the Red Queen effect, or in this case,
the lack thereof. In a population of competing organizations, learning often creates a Red
Queen effect (Barnett & Hansen, 1996, p. 139):
An organization facing competition is likely to engage in a search for ways to
improve performance. When successful, this search results in learning that is
likely to increase the organization's competitive strength, which in tum triggers
learning by its rivals - consequently making them stronger competitors and so
again triggering learning in the first organization.
Barnett and Hanson (1996) inferred that some learning behaviors in batiks are consistent
with the Red Queen effect. Ingram and Baum (1997) found similar leaming among hotel
chains, which grew less likely to fail by observing more other hotel chains and more
failures by other hotels. In this population of TINs, at least for the most successful
routines from 2000 - 2004, firms did not exhibit learning from observing the past
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successes of their competitors (H3a not supported). This suggests the context of
temporary organizations may enact different mechanisms for learning than more
traditional organizational forms.
Summary of Empirical Findings and Limitations
This chapter has reported and interpreted the outcomes of hypothesis tests and
other empirical findings as summarized in Table 15. In the first series of analyses,
hypotheses aiming to unpack how project characteristics affect TIN structure were tested.
A second series of analyses tested hypotheses about the performance of TINs, and a third
offered estimates of effect sizes for the strategies modeled in the hypotheses. A fourth set
of analyses examined population level learning within TINs. The results suggest that
TIN structures are designed as modular systems, but that this structural design does not
necessarily lead to better performance. Additionally, strong support was found for
negative performance associated with particular network structures, with structures
exhibiting network inertia negatively related to performance and also producing the
largest potential effect size from the relationships tested. The analyses ofpopulation
level learning suggest that designers of TINs are more likely to learn from failure than
from success, which echoes previous findings at the individual and organizational levels
of analysis (Starbuck & Hedberg, 2001).
In the next section, I discuss several limitations to this research design that may
affect this study's contribution to theory and also the ability to generalize these findings
to other populations.
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Table 15: Summary of Statistical Findings
Legend
Hypothesis Supported +
Hypothesis Not Supported 0
Significant Contrary Relationship Found -
I. Investigating Network Organizational Structure
Hla Higher levels ofproject complexity will be associated with lower +levels ofATS among TINs
Hlb Higher levels ofproject duration will be associated with higher -levels ofATS among TINs
Hlc Higher levels ofproject uncertainty will be associated with higher +levels ofATS among TINs
II. Investigating Network Organizational Performance
H2a As ATS increases, temporary interorganizational network +performance decreases
The negative influence ofATS on Performance is moderated by
H2b project complexity such that as Project Complexity rises, the +
impact ofATS on Performance lessens
The negative influence ofATS on Performance is moderated by
H2c Project Duration such that as Project Duration rises, the impact of +
ATS on Performance lessens
The negative influence ofATS on Performance is moderated by
H2d Project Uncertainty such that as Project Uncertainty rises, the 0
impact ofATS on Performance lessens
III. Investigating Population Level Learning
Populations ofnetwork organizations learn from success. When
H3a new projects have similar characteristics to past projects, 0
organizations will exhibit learning by increasing the occurrence of
TINs that previously succeeded
Populations ofnetwork organizations learn from failure. When
H3b new projects have similar characteristics to past projects, network +
organizations will exhibit learning by reducing the occurrence of
TINs that previously failed
Limitations of the Study
In designing the research to investigate the structure and performance ofnetwork
organizational forms, I faced several challenges. While this study represents an
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important step toward our understanding of the full range of performance for network
forms of organization (including poor performance and failure), a series of decisions
about research methods, operationalization ofvariables, and supporting theory was made,
and these decisions introduce limitations to this study. It is important to address possible
limitations arising from these decisions prior to considering any normative and research
implications of my findings.
One limitation arises from the decision to investigate temporary network
organizations instead of more permanent networks. This choice was made for three
reasons. First, TINs are a form of network organization that has received comparatively
little scholarly attention, despite its growing prevalence and economic importance.
Second, temporary network organizations highlight the role of temporal variation into the
design of governance structures (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Jones & Lichtenstein,
2008; Scott E. Masten, Meehan Jr., & Snyder, 1991). Transient networks increase firms'
awareness oftime pressure, a critical antecedent to network governance (Jones, Hesterly,
& Borgatti, 1997). Third, studying temporary networks increases the availability of
reliable data on network tie dissolution - without which one cannot reliably examine poor
performance and failure. While firms tend to announce tie formation with great fanfare
(Podolny & Page, 1998), reliable data on tie dissolution and the performance outcomes
from dissolution are much more difficult to obtain. However, despite the advantages of
studying temporary network organizations, many other types of network organizations do
not exhibit these characteristics. Examples of networks that exhibit a lower degree of
time pressure include R&D alliances, where the outcome of interest is often innovation
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output and patenting (e.g. Ahuja, 2000), rather than reducing the costs of the
organizational fonn itself.
Limitations of the Research Design
The research design also introduces limitations. First, choosing bridge
construction firms in Oregon reduces the generalizeability ofthe findings to other
geographic areas, other industries, and to other cultures. During my career in bridge
construction, I completed RFPs to construct bridges whose physical locations spanned six
western states (Oregon, Washington, California, Idaho, Nevada, and Alaska). Each of
these projects was funded with federal dollars, which meant they required many of the
same types ofinfonnation to be submitted with each bid (total cost, bonding capacities,
etc.). However, Oregon is the only state to require the subcontractor disclosure form
(SDF), which provides information about the network of subcontractors each lead firm
intends to use. Thus, I was constrained to only collecting data within Oregon and only
during those years when the Oregon Department ofTransportation began requiring the
SDF with each bid (2000 - 2007). Still, I am confident that my findings will directly
generalize to bridge construction within the United States, and may also generalize to
other industries where temporary networks are the preferred organizational fonn (film
industry, music video production, etc.) and where minimizing the costs of organizing is
critical.
Second, the screening process used to select the final sample aimed to reduce the
"noise" inherent in the archival data, but doing this may have introduced sample selection
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bias. Sometimes lead firms forget to tum in a subcontractor disclosure form, which
removes that observation from consideration. Since the subcontractor disclosure foqn is
required for contract award, it is unlikely that a "winning" bidder will "forget" to tum in
this required form. Similarly, if a proposal finished dead last, that lead firm's motivation
to tum in all required paperwork is likely to be less than for a bid that is very close to
winning or that of the actual winner. This raises some concerns of a success bias being
present in these data, but my concerns are reduced by the simultaneous equation
modeling present in Tobit regression, which controls for this form of bias (Kennedy,
2003).
In addition to concerns from missing data, the research design relied on proposed
costs for completing a bridge and did not measure actual costs. I tried to obtain actual
project costs from the Oregon Department of Transportation, but many of these
documents were sealed and not publicly available. Since my sampling window was very
recent, many of the projects I included are currently underway and some are in litigation,
which precludes acquiring actual cost data. Despite this limitation, using proposed costs
increased the availability of data on tie dissolution and its associated costs. Consider a
project with ten bidders wherein only one of them wins a contract, while the nine other
proposals "fail," the ties they propose to dissolve immediately. Even if two of these lead
firms do not tum in a list of ties for that project (via the SDF), data are still available to
describe the winning bidder's network as well as seven examples of "failing" networks.
Due to the presence of so much reliable data on failure, the inability to obtain actual costs
seemed a suitable compromise.
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Despite the limitations described above, there are several normative and research
implications that this study provides. In Chapter VI, I review the contributions of this
study and delineate normative implications for managers and research implications for
scholars interested in the performance of temporary interorganizational networks. I
conclude with areas of future research, including studies I plan to conduct using these
data.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This concluding chapter reviews the study, summarizes the study's empirical
findings, and posits some research and managerial implications that extend current
perspectives on network organizational forms. The first section is an overview and
summary of the research issues and the theoretical framework constructed to
investigate the structure and performance of network organizational forms. Major
empirical findings are also summarized in this section. The final sections are devoted
to some research implications that recast current theorizing on governance structure
and performance and managerial implications suggested by the empirical findings. I
also suggest future research that may further extend our understanding of the structure
and performance of network organizational forms.
Overview and Summary
In this study, I have proposed and tested an integrative theory explaining the
structure and performance of temporary interorganizational networks (TINs). Prior to
about 1980, the notion that firms could improve performance by cooperating with
competitors and by designing temporary governance structures would have been
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viewed with extreme skepticism. The prevailing organizational structures had long
time horizons and explicit contracts and governance structures of that period
facilitated resource accumulation and control (Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992). This
began to change with advances in information technology, deregulation, and
privatization that allowed companies access to new forms of capital, technology and
skills that simply were not available previously (Prahalad & Oosterveld, 1999).
These rapid changes led to an increasing occurrence of network organizational forms
and the inability of contemporary theories to fully explain the structure and
performance ofnetwork forms motivated this dissertation.
Prior Theory and Research
In past research, two main theories informed the design and performance of
governance structures - transaction cost economics (TCE) and social embeddedness.
Economic and sociological explanations of governance represent independent
approaches to explain a common phenomenon. Each theory presents a compelling,
yet polarizing argument for the emergence and persistence ofnetwork governance.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) has been the dominant theoretical
perspective to examine the structure and performance of governance forms. TCE "is
grounded upon a legal understanding of organizations as governance mechanisms
distinct from markets" (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005, p. 492). Under TCE, the firm
boundary is determined by asking whether conducting a transaction inside the firm or
externally in the market most reduces the sum of production and governance costs.
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Governance costs include monitoring operations, allocating requirements for
production, initial contractual agreements, and setting up initial procedures for
exchange (Mayer & Salomon, 2006).
However, TeE has come under fire from sociologists, who argue that
transaction efficiency arguments are "under socialized" (M. Granovetter, 1985).
Sociologists argue that all economic transactions are embedded within a wider
network of social relationships and that governance structures arise from these
embedded relationships in addition to economic considerations (M. Granovetter,
1985). This is particularly the case in networked economies, where the shorter
temporal duration of economic exchanges increases the influence of social
relationships (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Walter W. Powell, 1990).
Sociologists define the quality of relationships between firms according to the level of
relational embeddedness between partners. Relational embeddedness refers to the
degree to which exchange parties know of and consider one another's needs and goals
(M. Granovetter, 1992). From a sociological perspective, relational embeddedness
drives organizational form at least as much as economic concerns. Reconciling these
competing theories is necessary to explain the structure and performance of network
governance.
Gaps in Understanding
My analysis of the literature highlighted three critical shortcomings that block
a fuller understanding of network governance. First, theorizing about network-level
187
performance, which requires conceptualization of webs of multiple simultaneous
relationships (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007), is combined with data collection and
analysis of individual and discrete dyadic relationships. Second, because scholars
largely study networks using cross-sectional analyses, their findings imply that ties
are durable and that all observed network ties add value (Gulati, 1995; Kim, Oh, &
Swaminathan, 2006). Attending to benefits realized from successful networks, while
ignoring the costs associated with failing networks limits our understanding of
network performance. Third, reliable performance data for a population of network
organizations are often unavailable.
The first gap in understanding arises from a mismatch between levels of
analysis. Scholars continue to explain network level performance using dyad level
relationships. This is likely due to the availability of reliable data at the dyad level,
but in order to advance a more robust theory of networks, we must move the level of
analysis up to the network level (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Walter W. Powell, White,
Koput, & Jason, 2005; Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). The network level of analysis
involves the aggregation of multiple dyads interacting simultaneously (Provan, Fish,
& Sydow, 2007). This dissertation introduced a new construct, Aggregate Tie
Strength (ATS), that resolved the inconsistency between levels of analysis.
The second gap in understanding arises from theorizing that implies network
relationships are durable and that all observed network ties add value (Gulati, 1995;
Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006). As mentioned by Kim et al. (2006), a selection
bias exists among scholars studying these ties due to their comparing returns to
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organizational performance with the presence of current and new partners. Because
these comparisons treat tie formation and dissolution as discrete events, rather than as
a series of unfolding events that occur over time, changes in network ties always
seem to result in positive outcomes (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006). This is in
sharp contrast to empirical findings about the durability of network ties. Gulati's
(1995) findings show network ties are unstable, short-lived, and that the
transformation of network ties is associated with costs. This dissertation treats
network ties as temporary, and offers new theorizing about both the costs and benefits
that network ties have on performance.
The third gap in understanding stems from a lack of data. Without reliable
data on tie dissolution and network failure, we cannot fully understand the
performance implications of network organizing (Podolny & Page, 1998). While
firms tend to announce tie formation with great fanfare (Podolny & Page, 1998),
reliable data on tie dissolution and the performance outcomes from dissolution are
much more difficult to obtain. This lack of data on poor performance and failure
results in a preoccupation with the benefits of successful networks and little attention
to the costs of unsuccessful networks. This has introduced a survivor bias into
empirical studies that link the presence of network ties to performance (Kim, Oh, &
Swaminathan, 2006; Podolny & Page, 1998).
Closing these gaps in understanding requires a new theoretical model that
addresses each of the issues described above. By treating economic and sociological
theories as interdependent, the theoretical model developed in this study effectively
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addresses temporary governance and provides insight into how organizational
structures can adapt to the networked economy.
Theoretical Model
This study represents an important step in our understanding of the
relationship between network ties and performance. By focusing on TINs, this study
developed a model that integrates core arguments from TeE and social
embeddedness perspectives, conceptualizes and measures ties at the network level of
analysis, and incorporates performance data across the full range ofperformance.
TINs represent a salient example oflead-firm networks. They offer an
unparalleled setting to test the ability of economic and sociological logics to explain
network structure and performance. In economics, networks have been treated as a
variant ofthe make-or-buy decision (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Lorenzoni & Lipparini,
1999). The same logic by which firms choose between the extremes ofmake-or-buy
(Scott E. Masten, Meehan Jr., & Snyder, 1991; Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Walker
& Weber, 1984) is expected to continue once firms elect to form an alliance (Gulati &
Singh, 1998). Additionally, alliance networks exhibit relational embeddedness (Jones
& Lichtenstein, 2008), a critical theoretical perspective in sociology. Since lead-firm
networks are deliberately designed networks, these networks fit with Williamson's
discriminating alignment hypotheses (Williamson, 1991). This suggests that lead
firms select partners to reduce production and transaction costs according to factors
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that align exchange conditions with the cumulative capabilities found among a TIN's
partners.
Research suggests the quality of relationships between partners drives the
economic performance of these organizational forms (Robert G. Eccles, 1981; R.G.
Eccles, 1981; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999). For example, Eccles (1981a, b) found
that partnering with a select, persistent set ofwell-known and trusted subcontractors
improves the efficiency of organizing in the construction industry. Lorenzoni and
Lipparini (1999) found that as the quality ofpartners increases, the costs of
organizing are reduced. Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) link these cost efficiencies to
gains from tight, repeated, and trust-based partnerships that bring both sustainable
competitive advantage and cost economies to organizing. Collectively, these studies
suggest that exchange conditions do not provide a complete explanation ofthe
performance of networks; only when exchange conditions are linked with partner
characteristics can performance be fully explained. This is a very strong statement,
implying that repeated partnerships explain why or how exchange conditions cause
performance. Analytically, this logic requires a test of mediation (Baron & Kenny,
1986). As described earlier, I operationalize repeated partnerships as Aggregate Tie
Strength (ATS) and, following these scholars, propose that ATS mediates the
relationship between exchange conditions and performance.
Scholars have shown that exchange conditions and repeated partnerships can
have synergistic effects on performance (Gulati, 1998; Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008).
Exchange conditions and past partnerships are necessarily intertwined as origins of
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economic efficiency (M. Granovetter, 1985; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Poppo,
Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). Repeated partnerships act as a "social lubricant" to transactions
that enhances task coordination between parties engaging in network partnerships
(Gu1ati, 1998). Additionally, parties that choose to cooperate in repeated partnerships
develop "credible assurances" that partnerships will continue into the future (Dyer &
Singh, 1998). This expectation of continuity is an effective contractual safeguard
because repeated partnerships and long-term contractual relationships contain
customized provisions that safeguard exchanges from opportunistic behaviors (Poppo
& Zenger, 2002).
Poppo et al. (2008) suggested exchange conditions influence the expectation
of continuity among network partners. This proposed interaction of exchange
conditions and repeated partnerships in shaping network performance requires an
analytic test ofmoderation. Figure 13 shows the conceptual model for this study.
Figure 13 depicts the mediating relationships with solid lines and depicts the
moderating relationships using dashed lines. For the mediation analysis, governance
structure (ATS) mediates the relationship between exchange conditions (project
characteristics) and performance. The dashed arrows shown below depict the
interaction between exchange conditions and governance structure. As described
above, exchange conditions are expected to enhance or reduce the direct effect of
governance structure on performance (poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008).
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Figure 13: Conceptual Model
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TIN Design and Behavioral Learning at the Population Level
Behavioral learning theories depict learning as a mechanistic and involuntary
process where firms are assumed to repeat behaviors that lead to pleasant outcomes
and discontinue behaviors that lead to unpleasant outcomes (Starbuck & Hedberg,
2001). One advantage ofbehavioral theories is they can explain how learning can
improve over time, even when information about individual manager perceptions is
unavailable (Starbuck & Hedberg, 2001). I adopted a behavioral perspective to
learning and developed hypotheses that tested how the performance outcomes from
adopting a network design in one temporal period affect the subsequent adoption of
that design.
Population level learning is defined as "a systematic change in the nature and
mix of routines in a population of organizations arising from shared experience"
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(Miner & Haunschild, 1995). Thus, population level1earning examines how
outcomes from past behaviors among a group of organizations (shared experience)
affect the behaviors these same fIrms exhibit in later periods. If previously successful
behaviors are increasingly adopted, the population has learned from shared positive
experience. Likewise, if prior shared experience that resulted in poor outcomes
enacts decreasing adoption of those prior behaviors, the population has learned from
shared negative experience. This study represents one of the fIrst examinations of
population level learning in a temporary network context.
Analysis and Findings
In this dissertation, I have proposed and tested a theory that integrates ideas
from transaction cost economics and sociology to explain the structure and
performance of temporary interorganizational networks (TINs). I also argued that
TINs represent a unique variant of network organizational forms. I argued that TIN
structures are designed according to exchange conditions. I argued that the design of
TINs directly affects their performance as a governance structure. Finally, I argued
that the direct effect of a TIN's governance structure on performance is moderated by
exchange conditions.
The results from hypothesis testing suggest TINs are designed to fIt exchange
conditions. Project Complexity and Project Duration were signifIcantly related to
lower values of relational embeddedness, which suggests these exchange conditions
promote more modular organizational structures. Modular organizational structures
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tend to mirror the organizational structure of the product being produced (Hoetker,
2006). In the case of TINs, the greater the number ofproduction requirements and
specialized tasks, the greater the number of partners and the greater diversity among
partner skills that composed the TIJ'J. Project Uncertainty was significantly related to
higher values of relational embeddedness, which suggests this exchange condition
promotes more repeated partnerships and a greater amount of strong ties within TINs.
The relationship between TIN structures and performance suggests there are
contingent benefits to relational embeddedness for temporary interorganizational
networks. The direct effect of high relational embeddedness on performance was
negative and produced the largest effect size on performance. Despite the negative
main effect of relational embeddedness on governance performance, results from the
interaction variables indicate these adverse effects disappear when TINs adjust their
structure in a contingent fashion; aligning exchange conditions and TIN structures
does improve performance.
The context of temporary organizing provides new insight to previous studies
about learning from success and failure at the population level of analysis. Previous
studies suggest drastic failure is the main mechanism for learning at the population
level: "Organizations disappear if they act inappropriately or ineffectively, so the
surviving organizations act appropriately and effectively" (Starbuck & Hedberg,
2001, p. 450). However, population level learning is defined as an increase or
decrease in the use of routines, which may fail multiple times for a variety of reasons
without causing organizational failure. Miner et al. (1996) attempted to uncover the
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more subtle effects of failure, but also used the failure of an entire organization (or a
few of them) as an indicator of change at the population level. This study measures
the failure of routines directly, indeed, no lead firm failed during the years 2000-
2007. Thus, my findings offer more fine-grained evidence bearing upon how the
removal of deleterious routines affects behaviors across a population of TINs.
Research Implications
The conceptual and empirical findings of this dissertation provide several new
directions for current and future studies of network organizations. In this section, I
first explain how the dissertation extends the existing literature on network
organizational forms. Next, I explain implications for existing theories in economics
and sociology, focusing on implications for the design of governance structures
specifically. The third part of this section emphasizes the extensions of research
methodology for studying performance within network organizations.
Extensions of Existing Theory
This dissertation overcomes many of prior limitations by proposing a new
theoretical framework based on temporary interorganizational networks (TINs). TINs
raise the level of analysis to the network level. TINs also highlight the transient
nature of relationships between network partners, which is conspicuously missing
from previous studies. Finally, TINs persist in industries where network tie formation
and tie dissolution is common and expected by cooperating partners. Within these
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industries, infonnation on tie fonnation and dissolution is more available, as are data
that link network ties with fine-grained perfonnance infonnation (construction costs,
film revenues and awards, Playbills and gate receipts).
Before discussing how this dissertation extends current theory, it is important
to note the boundary conditions of this study's applicability in other industries. The
findings from this study apply to temporary governance structures. Even within
industries that exhibit temporary governance (film production, music, banking
syndicates, etc.) the results from this study must be used with caution. The outcome
variable I was most interested in was reducing the costs of organizing, which may not
be the most important or interesting outcome within other industries (e.g. Ray,
Barney, & Muhanna, 2004). For example, researchers studying temporary organizing
in the film industry generally use box office sales or industry awards received as
outcome measures (Faulkner & Anderson, 1987; Jones & DeFillippi, 1996) and not
the actual costs of fonning and dissolving the temporary networks that produced the
films. However, since the costs of organizing do affect the overall profitability of the
TINs producing films, this study could provide infonnation to film studios about how
to lower the costs of organizing and, potentially extract more profits from box office
sales. At the very least, this study may provide a starting point for studying other
industries that exhibit temporary governance.
Another boundary condition of this study is that I chose a very stable industry.
The bridge construction industry in the US has changed very little over the years and
the engineering standards to which bridges are built have been around since at least
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1927, with the introduction of the Steel Construction Manual (AISC, 1927).
Choosing a stable industry allowed me to distinguish the costs of organizing networks
from many other potential sources of cost, but one must be cautious about translating
the findings from this study to more dynamic industries that use temporary
governance. In these more dynamic industries, perhaps some of the constraints
present in bridge construction are relaxed, and the questions asked in this study could
be adapted to temporary governance in more dynamic settings.
By thinking differently about strategy research and incorporating knowledge
from multiple fields, scholars of network governance can recognize new sources of
value from old contexts. For example, while my study leaned heavily on Uzzi's
(1996) ethnography of the New York City garment industry for theoretical
inspiration, it was Uzzi and Spiro's (2005) study of Broadway musicals that inspired
my research design. Their realization that Broadway Playbills serve as artifacts that
track the movement of social actors within a closed network was highly innovative.
Further, cross-referencing these movements with gate receipts and other artifacts
from this industry produced important insight about networks from an empirical
setting that is quite different from the more common settings used to study
governance (equity joint ventures, strategic alliances, supplier networks, etc.). While
Uzzi and Spiro (2005) did not address governance costs directly in their study of
small world networks, their research design transferred directly to my study of TINs.
Although questions about network constraint, poor performance, and failure
rose to prominence in the late 1990s (Podolny & Page, 1998), many questions
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remained unanswered ten years later (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006). This
dissertation has addressed some of these questions and I hope this study inspires other
scholars to follow Uzzi and Spiro (2005) and ask old questions in new and exciting
ways.
Future research on network governance may examine structure and
performance in more permanent settings, such as R&D alliances, banking syndicates,
and traditional outsourcing. As in the case of this dissertation, findings from coarse-
grained analyses should be supplemented by case studies and ethnographies in these
more permanent contexts, to uncover the impacts of network governance in settings
that are more permanent.
Implications for Transaction Cost Economics
Research suggests that organizations are becoming more temporary and are
requiring more flexibility to adapt to rapid changes in the environment (Achrol &
Kotler, 1999; Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992). This trend calls for transforming
internal governance (Praha1ad & Oosterveld, 1999) and results in more temporary
governance structures. Temporary governance structures pose challenges to the
traditional make-or-buy decision because of their shorter temporal duration. Like
more traditional alliance networks, TINs are deliberately designed networks, whose
design follows Williamson's discriminating alignment hypothesis (Williamson,
1991). TINs aim to create competitive advantage through cooperative advantage
(Ring, 1996), through idiosyncratic combinations of complementary resources
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(Kogut, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1992), and through relational advantages (Dyer &
Singh,1998). However, the window of time cooperating parties have to extract value
from these relationships is much shorter in TINs than in traditional alliances and
alliance networks. This suggests strategies for efficient organization may shift toward
modularization when time horizons are dramatically shorter.
As firms reduce the temporal length of sourcing arrangements and become
modular in their structures, the complexity inherent in modular organizations will
increase the knowledge burdens on the focal firm. For example, when the number of
firms collaborating to produce a product increases, firms need to have deeper
knowledge about their partner firms' skills and processes to overcome imbalances in
knowledge that may slow production (Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 2001).
Additionally, increased modularity raises the number of labor specialties, which
increases coordination costs between firms (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001). Modularity
and shorter durations change the dynamics in the traditional "make-or-buy" decision,
causing firms to both make and buy the same function and adopt contingencies that
were previously viewed as extraneous and unnecessary (parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani
& Mitchell, 2007).
Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) suggest focal firms that behave as "systems
integrators" will increase performance when designing modular sourcing
arrangements. Systems integrators rely on accumulated knowledge about product
components as well as knowledge about component linkages that drive the overall
organizational system. Because systems integrators have an abundance ofknowledge
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that spans organizational boundaries, they can isolate capabilities (like knowledge
capabilities) that require fewer resources, produce these in-house, and outsource the
more expensive components (like manufacturing) to suppliers. By splitting risks and
revenues among a wider population of suppliers, systems integrators reduce their own
stake in production, while simultaneously increasing the potential revenues from
operations (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001).
Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) developed their theory of systems integrators by
studying aircraft engines and chemical plants, industries with much longer time
horizons than are typical within TIJ\Js. However, in terms of the organizational
design processes, their setting shares many similarities with the research setting of
this dissertation. Lead firms designing TINs must have boundary spanning
knowledge to design their network structure according the project characteristics.
Lead firms must have precise knowledge about their own capabilities as well as those
for each specialty contractor. However, TINs generally have much shorter lives than
sourcing networks formed for aircraft engine manufacturers and chemical plants.
This suggests TINs are a logical next step in understanding for scholars interested in
more temporary sourcing arrangements.
Another promising setting for investigating TINs are networks formed in the
public sector. Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 230) contrast public sector and private
sector governance, suggesting that in public management, "governance refers not to
the activities of boards, but mainly, to the funding and oversight roles of government
agencies." Hill and Lynn (2005) suggest the use of network governance is increasing
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in the public sector, particularly in the public oversight of private companies
contracted to provide public services. Since the employment contracts for public
officials are temporally limited, but the projects undertaken may actually bridge
between multiple political terms and multiple government regimes, researching TINs
in the public sector could provide an interesting extension of this study's analysis and
findings. For example, it would be interesting to consider how the costs of organizing
differ when the projects stay the same, but the lead organization and political regimes
change. Answering questions ofthis sort could add important nuance to the findings
from bridge construction TINs, and they may generalize to a wider population of
temporary networks.
Implications for Sociology
This study focused on relational embeddedness as its primary sociological
indicator of network structure. Because TIN design is framed as an endogenous and
strategic decision by lead firms, the quality of relationships between a lead firm and
its potential partners, defined as relational embeddedness by Granovetter (1992), is a
key driver of network organizational structure. Further, as confirmed in this study,
relational embeddedness has a direct effect on network organizational performance.
Still, the other half of embeddedness - structural embeddedness - deserves
further attention within the context of TINs. Structural embeddedness is a measure of
the mutual contacts between parties within a network. Operationally, structural
embeddedness refers to the amount of indirect communication between third parties
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and how this communication affects the overall network structure. A greater amount
of communication between third parties enhances structural embeddedness because
organizational actors "will not only have direct relations, but also are linked
indirectly to third parties, who are likely to have future interactions and talk about
their interactions with one another" (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008, p. 239). Measuring
structural embeddedness directly calls for social network theory and its measures of
how network position may affect the performance of actors in those positions.
Measuring the degree of structural embeddedness within TINs requires
shifting the focus away from lead firms and toward subcontractors. While this study
focused on relational embeddedness, the quality of relationships between a lead firm
and its subcontractors, shifting the focus to subcontractors and how they move among
and between lead firms would directly measure structural embeddedness. TINs
represent a much more ephemeral network structure, which may require different
strategies than more permanent network structures. For example, within TINs is it
more advantageous for a subcontractor to occupy structural holes as has been shown
in more permanent networks (Burt, 1992)? Alternatively, since TINs form and
dissolve ties more frequently than permanent networks, perhaps the benefits from
brokering positions within structural holes are diminished. Since the economy is
moving more toward temporary governance, it seems scholars should reexamine the
performance benefits to network position within the context of TINs moving forward.
TINs also offer a setting to examine the interaction of relational and structural
embeddedness. Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt (2000) examined the interaction of
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relational and structural embeddedness in the steel and semiconductor manufacturing
industries. They argued that the roles that relational and structural embeddedness
play in firm performance could only be understood in reference to each other.
Rowleyet al. (2000) found that benefits from relational embeddedness were
contingent upon the industry as well as upon the level of structural embeddedness for
the lead firm. However, like most studies of network ties and performance, these
authors count any previous tie as bringing value to a firm and ignore how the value of
previous relationships may decay over time. It seems asking questions about the
interaction of relational and structural embeddedness within the context of TINs
would offer findings that are more robust because TINs allow scholars to track both
positive and negative effects of network ties on performance.
Implications for Research Methodology
Current research methodologies that aim to examine network organizational
failure suffer because they look for data in settings that only model success.
Traditional sources of network data come from industrial settings like traditional
alliances (Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Singh, 1998) and patenting (Ahuja, 2000), where
reliable data on failure is either not recorded or not published (Podolny & Page,
1998). While I certainly had to make some concession in this study (e.g. measuring
proposed costs instead of actual costs), researching TINs within the bridge
construction industry provided a valid way to model and test failure for network
organizational forms. Another benefit of the bridge construction empirical setting is
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its low cost requirement for project award. Because I was interested in studying the
governance costs of network forms, choosing an industry where each firm aims to
achieve low cost with every TIN design controlled for many unobserved effects. As
scholars move forward and test other industrial settings, it seems advantageous to
look for data in new places, to see if the same findings from bridge construction can
inform other empirical settings.
This study also looked at networks from an unusual methodological
perspective, that of the lead firm. In general, social network scholars show greater
interest in the structural characteristics of the larger network, and less interest in how
specific chunks of a network are strategically transformed over time. Social network
theory and its analytical methods have come under fire as atheoretical (Salancik,
1995) and cast as merely a collection of tools which can inform other, more
traditional theories of strategy. However, by thinking differently about networks, this
dissertation offers a direct link to more traditional theories of organization (M.
Granovetter, 1985; Williamson, 1975), but does so in a context that is more aligned
with a networked economy.
Future studies that take older theories and adapt them to network theories may
be better at explaining strategy in the new economy (Evans & Wurster, 2000;
Tapscott, 1997). I hope this initial attempt to move old conversations into new places
generates interest in TINs and network governance moving forward.
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Managerial Implications
Managerial implications from the empirical findings of this study lie in
choosing network partners, structuring network organizations, and transforming
network organizations over time. These implications inform the decisions made by
lead firms when they design network organizations according to exchange conditions.
These implications also inform lead firms in terms ofhow repeated partnerships and
relational embeddedness affect performance in a contingent fashion. In some cases,
repeated partnerships and relational embeddedness improve performance, while in
others these characteristics ofnetwork structure can decrease performance. Next, I
address the managerial implications for lead firms.
Implications for Lead Firms
The empirical findings of this dissertation suggest that exchange conditions
and relational embeddedness interact to affect the costs of organizing in temporary
networks. Managers should consider exchange conditions to inform their initial
make-or-buy decision, which determines the portion of the work they should conduct
themselves and the portion they should outsource to subcontractors. By carefully
reviewing the exchange conditions for a particular project, considering their current
capabilities, and determining which portion of the project they can complete for
themselves, lead firms can design an initial TIN prior to evaluating the specific
characteristics of available partners. However, once an estimate of the in-house work
206
is determined, choosing the right partners will enhance or reduce the efficiency of the
ultimate network design.
Managers designing networks high in complexity should consider more
modular organizational forms. Complex projects increased the likelihood of
downstream adaptations; and forms that are more flexible can adapt better and at
lower cost than less flexible forms. This is particularly true in industrial settings
where a stable supply of specialty subcontractors exists. In these industrial settings,
like construction and film production, networks with loosely coupled and
interchangeable partners perform better because they adapt more easily and at lower
cost.
For managers designing TINs around projects of greater duration and with
greater uncertainty, the strategies tested in this dissertation are less clear in their path
to good performance. The empirical findings support that higher relational
embeddedness improves performance for longer projects, but the effect size for this
strategy is small. Further, for uncertain projects, I cannot make any strong claims
other than some adaptation in network partners is needed to reduce the direct and
negative effects of rigid networks on performance.
Finally, another contribution of this study for managers arises from the
skeptical perspective this dissertation takes on the effectiveness of network
organizations. The previously mentioned bias emphasizing the positive benefits from
informal contracting and the increased flexibility found in networks has transferred
from the pages of scholarly journals into the minds of managers (e.g. Johnson,
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Christensen, & Kagermann, 2008). Contrary to the rosy perspective on networks that
dominates the literature (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; Podolny & Page, 1998),
my perspective is that of a "cranky professor" that says we must temper our
excitement moving forward and seek a middle ground between hierarchy, arms-
length contracts, and purely socially governed transactions. Moving forward,
managers must also be skeptics and perhaps this dissertation provides support for how
a mix of contractual and relational governance can improve performance.
Managers in other industrial settings can derive value from this study. Due to
advances in information technology, deregulation, and privatization, managers in
more traditional industrial settings are being asked to design radically different
business models (Evans & Wurster, 2000) that access new forms of capital,
technology and skills that simply were not available previously (Prahalad &
Oosterveld, 1999). Current evidence suggests firms are ill-equipped to make these
changes, requiring federal bailouts, bankruptcies, and other stays of execution just to
survive long enough to begin thinking about how to reorganize the hierarchical
behemoths that so dominated the 20th century. Faced with this daunting challenge,
perhaps these managers can look at the performance outcomes if TINs as a place to
start.
As shown in this dissertation, managers designing TINs form, dissolve, and
reform their business model with each proj ect; and over many years and hundreds of
projects, these managers develop "organizing capabilities" by necessity. With the
emergence of a networked economy, perhaps organizing capabilities will become
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increasingly important to organizational performance and survival. Lessons learned
from the expert organizers within TINs can translate to other settings and, potentially,
serve as a basis to reorganize existing firms in a strategic and contingent fashion.
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